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SOME ASPECTS OF CHINA'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

ONE who ventures to deal with the somewhat esoteric topic of Chinese politics may hardly avoid both the Scylla of naïveté and the Charybdis of patronage. How much credit to place in the products of national and provincial constituent assemblies and in the agencies and instruments of their creation is indeed a difficult question. One cannot watch the National Assembly in session without the sense that it is pantomime. Yet he feels that in the presence of such emphatic seriousness risibles are more criminal than gallery applause in the House of Commons. Nor may he forget that the fisticuffs, noise and hurling of ink-bottles, which have marred the deliberations of the legislature at Peking, all have their parallels in parliaments nearer home. And it would seem that the Chinese temperament, combining deliberation with the practical, will yet find use for its toys.

On the tenth of October the long-awaited "permanent" constitution was promulgated and may be presumed to be legally in effect.[1] The larger part of this document was worked out in the Temple of Heaven during the summer of 1913 and was revised in 1917, the only new chapters being those that deal with the division of powers and with local government.[2] In the meantime, except for the period of Yuan Shih-Kâi's "Constitu-

[1] Published in *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. VII, no. 4, Oct., 1923, pp. 257-279.

[2] For 1913 draft see *China Year Book, 1914*, pp. 490-499; for that of 1917 see Weale, Putnam, *The Fight for the Republic in China*, p. 448 *et seq.*

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tional Compact" which was subsequently declared to have been inoperative, the "Provisional Constitution" of 1912, supplemented for the election of the president and vice-president by a few provisions of the 1913 draft which were promulgated just prior to the election of Yuan Shih-Kái and are retained in the final instrument, has furnished the format of central government.[1] Provincial and local administration had not been brought within the bounds of a national constitution prior to the present time.

The first decade of China's experience under republican forms was one of civil war and the second is beginning under the same auspices. Not even Yuan Shih-Kái, with all his strength and blood-letting, was competent to hold the mutually repellent factions together, while since his death the presidency has been held by weak men.[2] Like a bottle thrown against a wall the empire has been shivered by the republican revolution into many fragments. Mingling with less worthy motives, is the essential cause which brought about the revolution and is still operative, that is, the desire for constitutional government. The interpretation of the term as it is to be discovered in the activities of members of parliament scarcely measures up to its full connotation but it must be admitted that the desire to transfer control to representative assemblies exists and is responsible for the consistent progress in the elaboration of the national constitution which the brief periods of respite from internal strife have made possible. It is a paradox that while Dr. Sun Yat-sen's personal prospects seem continuously to be growing darker his principles have marched on to embodiment in the constitution. To what extent these principles can become effective under the double embarrassment of parliamentary corruption and military interference is the essential problem facing Chinese liberals.

The contrast between the conditioning factors of political re-

[1] The Provisional Constitution was published in the *China Year Book, 1912,* p. 489 *et seq.;* the Constitutional Compact in *China Year Book, 1916,* p. 440 *et seq.*

[2] The writer was reliably informed in Peking that during Yuan Shih-Kai's presidency 15,000 people were put to death.

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organization in China and in Japan is marked. In China the emperor, a far more vital agency of administration though less sacrosanct than the Japanese emperor, was dethroned; in Japan he was exalted to his rightful position in the state. For two thousand years the feudal authority of the landlord, still effective in the Japan of the Restoration, had been, save for exceptional periods, non-existent in China. No counterpart of the splendid if musty and frayed Chinese civil service, so ungratefully discarded by the reformers, could be abolished in Japan, to the destruction of ancient but accustomed machinery of administration, for it did not exist there. Obviously, Japan's Restoration did not constitute a revolution, while in China the republican régime was *de novo*. No longer limited by an all-powerful monarch, China's provincial governors have reverted to feudalism while the *samurai* of Japan under the wise direction of a theocrat have been transformed into a well-disciplined bureaucracy. The history of the struggle for representative institutions in China has been, consequently, complicated by disorder not attending the corresponding efforts in Japan. The struggles themselves have, however, been strikingly similar in the two countries. In them both peoples have been held back by inherent limitations, the Japanese by a tendency to feudal obedience to party leaders which stultifies their native patriotism, the Chinese by a lack of individualism and of a national point of view which they have been saddled with through a thousand generations of the clan system. In both countries, therefore, it has been possible for the actual forces of government to corrupt or to intimidate the supposed representatives of the people.

The clash of interests and of forces between the real executive power at Peking and the National Assembly has centered in the contrary views entertained regarding the parliamentary system. Every national constitution drafted by representative bodies in China, from the "Nineteen Articles" of 1911 to the lately-promulgated organic act, has provided or attempted to provide for cabinet responsibility to the Assembly. Against the determination of the "Old Parliament" in 1913 to choose its own drafting committee and so control its work, Yuan Shih-

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Kái protested in vain and finally was forced to dissolve the leading party, the *Kuomintang*, and expel its members in order to prevent the adoption of a constitutional draft too well calculated to extinguish the new flame of his monarchical ambition. The articles then devised are to-day in force, supplemented and strengthened, having been promulgated at the request of Marshal Tsáo Kún on the day of his inauguration as president of the republic. Why this quondam lieutenant of Yuan Shih-Kái should have desired to take oath to support a constitution which strips him of power is another Oriental paradox.

In comparison with the pertinent sections of the constitution of 1923 those of the Provisional Constitution affecting the cabinet system were quite incomplete. They authorized interpellation, impeachment, and approval by the Assembly of ministers appointed by the president. The president might remove ministers and was required to do so if a minister were impeached. He was not equipped to prorogue or to dissolve the National Assembly. In reality these provisions gave the president greater power than the Assembly over the cabinet, though Chinese writers refer to the system as parliamentary, under a misapprehension of the nature of the impeachment power. The impeachment provision was vague, failure "to perform his official duties" as well as an illegal action was sufficient ground for the impeachment of a minister and the former charge could easily be trumped up.[1] Ordinarily Chinese officials resign at the slightest hint of criticism in influential quarters so that the National Assembly might well have viewed the impeachment power as adequate unless a minister or cabinet should feel that the president's support outweighed that of the Assembly. The fact remains that the Assembly has had no authority to bring about the fall of a ministry on purely political grounds. Hence the frequent resort to impeachment in an effort to stretch that power to provide a substitute for the missing power to censure or to express a lack of confidence.

On the other hand the president could not dissolve the Assembly legally. The situation was that regularly observable in

[1] Article XIX, sec. 12.

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a presidential system, aggravated by the tendency of the legislative branch to encroach upon executive powers. Unless in cases either of appointments or impeachments president or assembly would give way, the result was a deadlock. The consistent aspect of republican government has been in consequence deadlock, culminating in 1914 and again in 1917 in the illegal prorogation of the Assembly. To charge the fractious members with obstructionism and to condemn them as men who place personal political advantage above the national welfare is not to cover the whole issue. Yuan Shih-Kái was an object of dread and hatred in whom no confidence could be placed. There was no hope in the minds of members that a restrained parliamentary policy would be met with moderation in the exercise of the executive power. Yuan was thought of as an animal with the "head of a tiger and the tail of a snake", to borrow the metaphor recently applied to him by one of the advisers of General Wu Pei-fu. There was no common ground of compromise nor did the Provisional Constitution assist toward finding one. Since Yuan's death the presidency has been controlled by his political heirs up to the Chihli-Fengtien war of 1922 and is still a militarist sinecure. The early precedents have been maintained during the brief periods when the Assembly has been in session. The courts have been in the earliest stages of reorganization and have not been considered in the settlement of issues as to the respective powers of executive and legislature. It may be said that under the republic the Chinese government has been government by deadlock.

The present constitution proposes to avoid the perpetuation of such an anomaly by establishing a clear-cut cabinet system, rendered more smooth-running through definite provisions against interference by the Senate with the responsibility of the cabinet to the House of Representatives. The president may appoint the premier but the lower house must approve. Presidential mandates are invalid without ministerial endorsement. The executive power to dissolve the House is limited by the right of the Senate to consent. On the side of the Assembly there are additional powers. Either house may offer suggestions to the government and interpellate ministers. The

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lower house alone may express want of confidence, which must be followed by dismissal of the ministers or dissolution of the house.[1] In China it is not likely to be less difficult than in France to secure senatorial approval of dissolution. The ministry is not likely to be closely in touch with the Assembly since ministers are debarred from sitting in either house.[2] The opportunity for deadlocks between a president determined to dissolve the House and an Assembly determined to get rid of a cabinet has not been eliminated.

Whether or not the National Assembly has taken the right alternative in its desire to work out of the balance of forces resulting from the Provincial Constitution may not be prejudged. It is upon the rock of parliamentary insistence upon control that China's republican "junk" has twice been badly split and one is entitled to doubt whether the repairs will outlive another typhoon. Tsáo Kún or any man who is likely to succeed him may understand the terms of the constitution but it is beyond the most visionary idealist to expect them to follow it. So long as a parliamentary majority will accept the interpretation of the president, as it did in accepting five thousand dollars per vote for electing Tsáo Kún, the constitution "between friends" will be preserved. But money will not flow so plentifully now that the election is over, and past events cast ominous shadows.

If the Chinese political parties had advanced to the stage reached in Japan one might anticipate the development of working arrangements of a more or less opportunistic nature by which the executive might maintain a factitious harmony with the Assembly. But Chinese politicians, like the French, prefer to act in small and fluid political groups rather than in large and permanent parties. Even with assured control over

[1] Chapter VI, articles 62, 65, 67; chapter VII, article 89; chapter VIII, articles 94, 95,

[2] Article 45; in the debates a variety of arguments pro and con were made on this subject. The large section of members who favored the original provision allowing cabinet ministers to sit in the Assembly were outvoted by those who feared that members would consume too much energy in seeking cabinet posts, that ministerial members would exercise too great influence over the others, that the duties of both positions would be too heavy for one person to discharge, or that ministerial life might corrupt members of the Assembly.

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the executive the tendency would be toward frequent changes of ministry. Under the irritation of executive interference this tendency will not be lessened.

The Constituent Assembly has permitted its long-standing fear of presidential usurpation to blind it to the circumstances that call for larger executive powers. The most significant of these has been suggested, that the real authority in the country is executive and will not submit to control. Back of that is banditry and civil war, very little of which has now any relation to the movement for constitutionalism. Probably no Chinese government even with Sun Yat-sen himself as president, could function with the powers distributed as they are in the new constitution. Furthermore, there is very little understanding of the proper workings of any sort of representative assembly even among the class of educated men from whom representatives must be drawn. Most of the time of both houses has been consumed in political bickering. Not yet has the Senate, since it convened in August of last year, been able to choose a chairman. China is a country of politicians—from the humblest coolie to the president its people live by politics —but it is politics of a petty and negative sort. As for the humble peasantry one does not question its acceptance of any sort of government but feels that it is entitled to till the fields in peace and security.

Upon the question of parliamentary government the National Assembly has always been practically unanimous. Concerning the equally important issue of federalism there has been a considerable difference of opinion within as well as outside the Assembly, which debated to a stalemate in 1917 and was unable to incorporate a chapter on the subject in the revised draft of that year. In the years following, interest in federalism has greatly increased and has culminated in the adoption of the principle in the permanent constitution.

Since 1921 three provinces have drafted constitutions and several others have begun their consideration.[1] This action

[1] Chekiang, Hunan and Kwangtung provinces have drafted constitutions. That of Hunan has been promulgated. Some consideration has been given in the assemblies of Kweichow, Szechuan, Shensi, Hupeh and Chihli. In Kiangsu a group of gentry outside the provincial assembly has recently drafted a constitution.

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has been taken without authorization from Peking. Chekiang Province was the first to complete its draft. A resolution passed by its assembly shortly before it began to sit as a provincial constituent body makes it evident that the assembly was disinclined to accept the control of a central government dominated by militarists not to its liking, and that it entertained the conception of federalism as an avenue to provincial autonomy. Sentences of the resolution run:

> There are troubles ahead—fighting among the different factions; disrespect of the central government by the militarists; without: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, endangering the Far East; within: the troubles in Shensi and Hupeh brewing fast. All around us we see famine sufferers, starving refugees. The power of the central government is waning and that of the militarists is increasing every day. We the people of Chekiang are, in the midst of this trying situation, doing our best to work out a way to salvation. . . . The idea of centralization is obsolete and in its place division of authority must be introduced. Since the foundation of the federal government has not been laid, to satisfy the hopes of the people a provincial constitution must be drawn up. It is not only to satisfy the hopes of the people but also to follow the tide of the world-wide democratic movement . . . we hope to lessen our responsibility by compromising between the new and the old.[1]

The terms of the provincial constitutions so far drafted embody the assumption of a large sphere of power by the provinces and the guarantee of the province against outside interference.[2] They have not become effective because of objections of the military governors who, in every province of China, hold the actual authority.

The attitude of the military leaders toward the issue depends upon whether they are inside Peking and want to stay there or are outside the capital and more interested in provincial or regional matters. The Chihli military faction, of which Tsáo

[1] Hsien, Chen Y., *History of the Drafting of the Constitution of Chekiang* (2nd ed., Hangchow, Dec. 15, 1921), p. 6.

[2] The Chekiang Constitution is published in the *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. VI, no. 2, 1922, pp. 114-142; the Hunan constitution appeared in the same journal, vol. VII, no. 2, April, 1923, pp. 78-102.

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Kún, the new president is the head and Wu Pei-fu the military genius, has opposed federalism as a counter-movement to its policy of compulsory unification. Chang Tso-lin, the governor of Manchuria, Governor Yen in Shansi, and, if one may judge by their disregard of Peking's mandates, the great majority of the governors not affiliated with the dominant clique, find provincial autonomy, not to say provincial independence, more profitable than dependence upon Peking.

The combined force of opinion of the assemblies, probably uncontrolled in this case, and the governors has no doubt made it possible for the large assembly majority in its favor to secure the approval of the prevailing military group for the chapter on division of powers. It is not unlikely that Tsáo and Wu are somewhat confused as to the real content of certain terms and clauses which appear to maintain the unitary character of the government while actually conceding to the provinces power to draft their own constitutions and to exercise large authority within the provincial sphere. The powers within this sphere, according to Mr. Tâng Yi, chairman of the drafting committee, "are limited to those only that are adapted to the cultural and economic development of the particular locality."[1] Powers are enumerated in three groups, the first national, the second concurrent and the third provincial. The division follows the logical principle stated with respect to non-enumerated powers: "Any matters . . . the nature of which is national shall be dealt with by the national government. Matters by nature provincial shall be dealt with by the provincial government. Cases of disputed jurisdiction shall be adjudicated by the supreme court of justice." Civil, criminal and commercial law, the courts and the military forces are to be national.[2]

The supremacy of national law is safeguarded by articles 28 and 125 which declare that "Provincial laws which conflict with national laws are invalid" and that "these (provincial self-government laws) may not conflict with this constitution or with any national law." Although stated so broadly, article

[1] Report of the Committee of the Whole to the House of Reps., Jan. 10, 1917.

[2] Chapter v.

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28, if read in connection with article 26, quoted above, and with article 27 which authorizes the national government to "regulate the kinds and methods of collection of provincial taxes," is probably to be considered as qualified by the right of the provinces to legislate without interference within their own sphere. The power of the Supreme Court to review legislation is stated ambiguously. By article 28 it is apparently authorized to decide conflicts between the national and provincial governments as to the scope of their respective powers, yet article 139 provides that "should there be any question regarding the meaning of the constitution, it shall be decided by the constitutional convention," i. e. by the National Assembly sitting as such. The Supreme Court of China is the only national governing agency recognized throughout the length and breadth of the land, yet its function of classification of powers is not likely to prove an enviable one.[1]

The application of the federal principle to China may appear simply the adoption of a new name for an old garment. The viceroys of the Manchus and their predecessors were autonomous satraps so long as the due proportion of revenue reached the capital and no censor or faction brought criticism upon them. But it is equally true that no viceroy might safely cross the will of the emperor though it should involve his own suicide. It is significant that the Japanese do not anticipate success for federal government in China and that the Chinese regard it rather as a makeshift than as a desirable reform. It is demanded by existing conditions but its success will depend upon the progress of liberal institutions, which have, so far, shown more vitality in certain provinces than in Peking. Fortunately, China has a second line of defense against militarist factionalism in the remarkable unity of her widespread civilization.

Reference has already been made to the clan system, the central feature of Chinese civilization. Since the family rather than the individual has been and remains today the primary unit of Chinese political organization, it would seem advisable to

[1] Appeals reach the court today from every province in China except Kwangtung.

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embody any general principles derivable from that fact in the constitution of the republic. This is the more desirable since the village—an expanded family or a group of families—is regulated by the heads, who form a governing "council of elders" of a very informal type—a patriarchal aristocracy naturally very close to the people and well-informed as to their desires and necessities. The elders of the various villages composing a *hsien* or district constitute a highly influential gentry whose opinions the district magistrate, though an appointee of the central government, uniformly respects. Within the village and the district is done most of the governing. In times of special stress, when the central government has been unable to fill the magistracies, the gentry has set up its own committees to collect taxes and perform the hundred and one other functions that fall within the magistrate's jurisdiction.[1] Through individual and guild action many matters, such as the reconcilement of injured parties and the faithful execution of contracts, are arranged without recourse to the regular public agencies.

The framers of China's constitutions have not, fortunately, disturbed the well-tried local machinery. It may be doubted, however, whether they have given sufficient consideration to the most useful means of linking it up with provincial and national institutions. The present "permanent" constitution provides for the election of both provincial and national assemblies by direct vote of the qualified electors. In view of the present lack of experience among the Chinese, as individuals, with the choice of representatives, and having regard to the unsatisfactory experience with the effort to apply direct electoral methods, it would seem that if a system might be devised, by which the local community opinion could be transferred to the provincial and national capitals for application to problems of wider scope, there would be more reality, greater interest, larger knowledge and a more disinterested attitude in the treatment of those problems than is possible at present. It is not suggested that aristocracy is at all times and in all places preferable to democ-

[1] For an excellent illustration, in the work of the Hunan gentry during the Taiping Rebellion, see H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, p. 158.

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racy, but it may be held that during this difficult transition period it may be profitable to China to keep as closely as possible to successful elements of her ancient system. Not improbably the election of provincial and national representatives in district conventions of the gentry could be arranged for more expeditiously and less expensively than the present type of elections. It is also reasonable to imagine that the convention would be much more difficult to intimidate than the individual voter and that any budding susceptibilities toward liberalism would have a greater opportunity for expression.

It cannot escape anyone who comes into frequent contact with the Chinese people, whether it be in Chihli or Kuangtung, Szechuan or Fengtien, that there is a high degree of local loyalty, and that China as a whole means much to them. There is general dissatisfaction with the militarism and political mongering they have been compelled to endure. There is a distinct tendency for localities to seek some road out of their own difficulties, in despair of influencing the forces that predominate in national life. This tendency should not be interpreted as indifference to the preservation of the empire but as an intermediate measure of reform. If the national parliament could be made more truly representative of the localities one might hope for closer cooperation between them and a change of emphasis from questions of location of power to those affecting the welfare of the people.

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TREATY NO. 2 OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

(RELATING TO SUBMARINES AND NOXIOUS GASES)

ON December 11, 1922, there assembled at the Hague a commission to consider amendments of the laws of war made desirable by the introduction or development, since the Hague Conference of 1907, of new agencies of warfare. It finished its labors on February 19, 1923. This commission was the creation of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament by its Resolution No. 1. The duty of convoking the commission and of fixing the date and place of assembly was left to the United States. The resolution was signed by the representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and provided for representation on the commission by delegates from these five Powers only. Later on, the United States, with the concurrence of the other signatory Powers, extended to the Netherlands an invitation to be represented, which invitation was accepted.

With great military Powers like Russia and Poland unrepresented, not to speak of Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, the Balkan countries, Turkey and China, it is plain that the commission was international in a narrow sense only, but was not international in any such broad sense as were the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Even assuming full powers to the delegates to enter into a convention, and subsequent ratification by the six governments represented, it is also plain that international law would not result, however important the step in that direction. As a matter of fact, the commission was one of very limited powers.

The commission's duty prescribed by the resolution was:

. . . to consider the following questions:

(a) Do existing rules of International Law adequately cover new methods of attack or defense resulting from the introduction or de-

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velopment, since the Hague Conference of 1907, of new agencies of warfare?

(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought to be adopted in consequence thereof as a part of the law of nations?

[and to] report its conclusions to each of the Powers represented in its membership.

The resolution goes on to say:

Those Powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of the report and the course to be followed to secure the consideration of its recommendations by the other civilized Powers.

The resolution does not limit the purview of the commission in so far as concerns the elements on which, or in which, warfare is to be waged, whether on land or sea, or in the air. In other ways, however, the powers of the commission are seen to be strictly limited, being similar to those of a committee of a legislative body—to consider and recommend. "Acceptance of the report" and adoption of the recommendations of the report are two different matters, although perhaps the latter may be included by inference in the former as between the Powers represented on the commission. It is, however, worthy of note that Resolution No. 1 uses the word "consideration" and not the word "adoption" in referring to the action to be secured on the recommendations by the other civilized Powers. Apparently the aim of the resolution is to secure desirable amendment and addition to the laws of war by the tedious process of diplomatic correspondence rather than by discussion around the conference table by plenipotentiary delegates of all Powers interested.

Limited as was the commission in its powers by the terms of Resolution No. 1, it labored under still other limitations. At the time of the meeting of the commission the press announced, apparently by authority, that its deliberations were to be confined to matters pertaining to radio and aviation. If this announcement was not in error, one most important subject—the use of mines—was removed from the purview of the commission. The rules for the use of mines were left in

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an unsatisfactory state by the Hague Conference of 1907; and it will be recalled that this very matter of the use of mines began the series of charges and countercharges, reprisals and counter-reprisals, that culminated in unlimited submarine warfare.

But the most extraordinary limitation on the powers of the commission is to be found in Resolution No. 2 of the Washington Conference. This was adopted by the same signatory Powers that adopted Resolution No. 1, and at the same session. It reads:

> Resolved, That it is not the intention of the Powers agreeing to the appointment of a Commission to consider and report upon the rules of International Law respecting new agencies of warfare that the Commission shall review or report upon the rules or declarations relating to submarines or the use of noxious gases and chemicals already adopted by the Powers in this conference.

Resolution No. 2 can only mean that the delegates of the signatory Powers were so entirely satisfied with the work of the Conference regarding submarine and gas warfare as to regard it as the last word in form and substance; otherwise they would not have removed the right to review or report upon the rules and declarations of that treaty from the commission they themselves had just created to study the broad question, of which submarine and gas warfare are such integral and outstanding parts.

Such satisfaction is not universally shared. The need for revision of the laws of war is manifest; and it is regrettable that a commission of distinguished jurists should have been called together for that purpose with such a limitation upon their action as that imposed by Resolution No. 2. As for Treaty No. 2, an attempt is made in what follows to show that it needs revision, especially in respect of its provisions regarding submarine warfare—a revision that the Hague commission would have been so competent to make.

The present criticism of the treaty is not born of any lack of sympathy with its purpose on the part of the writer. On the contrary, he has exerted such influence as he had toward the

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adoption of a more radical solution of the submarine problem than the treaty attempts. He would prefer to see the submarine abolished. That view has not prevailed, however; and worse still, the Washington Conference failed to put any limitation upon the numbers of submarines, relative or absolute. It consequently failed, potentially at least, to stop competition in submarine building. Under existing circumstances, and having in mind the submarine practices of the Germans during the war—practices that were such a blot upon the German national reputation—it was all-important that any agreement on the subject reached by the Washington Conference should be correct in substance and form; and this is especially true if that agreement was to be the final word on the subject. It was the last word in so far as the Hague commission is concerned; but it can not be doubted that a future conference on the laws of maritime warfare, composed of delegates from all maritime Powers so that the voice of the conference will carry real international authority, will refuse to be shackled by such a limitation as that prescribed by Resolution No. 2 of the Washington Conference.

Coming now to a discussion of Treaty No. 2, only such parts will be quoted as are necessary to an understanding of the comment that follows. Article I reads in part:

> The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law.
>
> (1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.
>
> A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.
>
> A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.

This is not, and does not pretend to be, a full statement of the maritime rules governing visit, search and capture in time of war. It is a paraphrase of certain of those rules, which may be found stated elsewhere in more precise form. In passing,

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it may be remarked that the body of rules was developed to protect property rights, quite as much as, if not more than, to protect "the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war".

Article I (2) and Article II need no comment.

Article III reads:

> The Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

This article is highly objectionable. A minor but very real objection lies in the words "attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships" in the opening clause. Comparatively few have any knowledge of the laws of maritime warfare upon commerce, and in spite of Article I the uninstructed reader is apt to receive the impression from the collocation of words quoted that *destruction* of prizes is an ordinary incident of such warfare. Before the late war this was not so. Indeed, *attacks* upon merchant vessels have been rare in the past up to the violation by the Germans of the code of honorable warfare. Here and elsewhere the treaty bears the earmarks of being a protest against German methods in the past rather than a constructive measure, coolly and deliberately considered, to be incorporated in international law in order to meet general conditions in the future between combatants governed by decent and humane rules of conduct.

While international law has not absolutely prohibited destruction of prizes in the past, the best world opinion frowned upon it. Many of the most enlightened publicists condemn it entirely in the case of captured merchant ships of neutral registry, and consider it justifiable in any case only under circumstances of compelling military necessity. Yet the phrase

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quoted carries no such idea to the man in the street who reads it. Rather, with the knowledge of what Germany did in the war freshly in mind, this phrase, in connection with the language of the next article, will give him the false impression that destruction of prizes is concomitant with maritime warfare against commerce.

This is a very real objection, but there are others of a more serious nature in the part of Article III following the words already quoted. The first of these to be noted is that the five Signatory Powers declare to the world how they will regard the nationals of *any* Power [signatory or otherwise] who shall violate "*any* of those rules [of Article I (1)] whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental [not simply military] superior" (writer's italics). This is in fact, although the right was not explicitly claimed, a rule of warfare dictated by five nations, and even as such its wording needs revision. In this day of rapid communication the character of a merchant vessel and of her cargo may be accurately known to a belligerent government the moment she leaves port, and it is not inconceivable that the belligerent would order its cruisers by radio to seize a named vessel under such circumstances. Ordering the named vessel to submit to visit and search, followed by actual visit and search, is not a necessary preliminary for a cruiser captain in such a case; he has a definite order to do a definite thing. Yet should he do that definite thing without going through all the motions prescribed by the first rule of Article I (1), he would be liable to the pains and penalties of piracy before the courts of any Power in the world within whose jurisdiction he might be found. That any such result was in the minds of the plenipotentiaries of the Washington Conference is too absurd to be believed for a moment; that it is a possible consequence of a literal reading of the treaty shows the need of revision.

The next objection to Article III lies in the words already quoted: "whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior". This is an iniquitous provision. Except by implication the entire article casts no stigma upon —threatens with no penalty—any government that orders its

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naval officers to conduct maritime warfare against commerce contrary to the rules of Article I. Its threat is against "any person in the service of any Power"—against the agent and not the principal. This is far from a lofty ethical stand, not to characterize it in more vigorous language.

There is no parallel between this case and that of an agent offending against municipal law, which recognizes the co-responsibility of agent and principal. Under municipal law agent and principal alike are subject to the law, which is above both; there are courts having jurisdiction before which a fair trial may be had; and there is an executive power to enforce the courts' judgments against either agent or principal. Neither principal nor agent is the *source of the law*. Only in rare instances is the agent sworn to a performance of duty toward his principal, and such an oath would not hold in court as regards an act contrary to the law itself.

The case of the naval officer is very different. He is the sworn supporter of his government. If he disobeys his government he is guilty of an offense that may even be regarded as treason. His government is the source of the law that governs his conduct. He is in no sense the free agent toward his government that one private individual is toward another, or toward a group of others.

It may safely be assumed that no naval officer will engage in unlimited warfare against commerce, contrary to the generally accepted laws of war, unless ordered to do so by his government. The writer knows of no case where even a German did that. Any decent government would itself punish its own officer if he did venture such warfare on his own initiative. It is not credible that Article III contemplates simply sporadic acts of individuals. A condition of things is plainly contemplated where unlimited maritime warfare against commerce is a governmental policy and is being conducted under governmental orders. The government is the principal, the naval officer is the agent, for it is the naval officer that is meant by the word "person". There is no super-nation, no super-court before which both can be haled, no super-executive to carry out a super-court's decree. The arch-culprit is the government

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itself—the ultimate source of law and of rules of conduct for the officer. Yet Article III aims only at the officer! Can this be regarded as a high ethical accomplishment for a great international conference of leading civilized nations?

But this is not the worst. The tribunals before which an offending "person" may be brought to trial are indicated and the penalties for the offense are prescribed. As for the tribunals, it would be bad enough if the five contracting Powers assumed for their own courts the right of trial, but they go far beyond that point. Gratuitously they extend that right to the whole world; or, to quote the exact words of the article, to "any Power within the jurisdiction of which he [the violator of 'any of those rules'] may be found". The pains and penalties prescribed are those attaching to piracy. The article does not actually designate as pirates those at whom it is aimed, but the liability to trial and punishment is "as for an act of piracy", a distinction without practical difference. Could anything be more astonishing? The words "any Power", whatever mental reservations were in the minds of the signatories, must surely include every Power which has been admitted to the councils of the Hague Conferences or the League of Nations, however great or small, however advanced toward western ideals or the contrary. In the very Conference out of which this treaty was born there participated a nation whose judicial system is such that every one of the five signatories enjoys extraterritorial rights in her boundaries; and the word "capitulations" has been enough before the public recently to bring to mind another nation, a participant in the Hague Conferences and expected to become a member of the League of Nations, whose judicial system does not enjoy the confidence of western nations. Yet the judicial rights and powers conferred by Article III extend to both of these nations, as they do to the most insignificant or the most backward of the admitted family of civilized peoples.

Stress has been laid upon the fact that Article III is aimed at naval officers, and practically only at naval officers, in spite of its somewhat general phraseology. A few words are worth while to make this entirely plain. In the first place, the free

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lance is eliminated from consideration. Maritime warfare against commerce is not permitted except to authorized agents of a belligerent government. If a free lance should undertake such warfare no Article III is necessary for his trial and punishment "as for an act of piracy". He is a pirate.

Next comes the consideration of the agents authorized by a belligerent government to prosecute maritime warfare against commerce. By the first of the four rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 privateering is abolished, and this rule has become world practice. Spain, Mexico and the United States did not adhere to the Declaration. The refusal of the United States was based on the omission from the Declaration of Paris of a rule for the immunity of private property at sea. Despite these exceptions to the general adherence, privateering is in act abolished, and it is improbable that any nation will attempt to revive the practice. Privateers may therefore be regarded as practically eliminated from the "persons" contemplated by Article III.

Only naval officers remain. It has already been stated, and is here repeated, that no naval officer on his own initiative may be expected to indulge in unlimited maritime warfare against commerce; from this it follows that such warfare, if undertaken, will be by governmental order.

Logically, therefore, Article III is written in contemplation of unlimited maritime warfare against commerce, prosecuted by the naval officers of a belligerent government under the orders of that government. Its sanctions ignore the criminal government and visit punishment upon the naval officer who obeys his government's orders in pursuance of his sworn duty.

Article III is unsound and should not stand.

Article IV reads:

> The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914–1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a

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part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

Article IV is open to criticism on two counts. The first is the use of the words "as commerce destroyers", for which the words "in maritime warfare against commerce" are more exact. "Commerce destruction" is a loose term used in English to describe what the French designate much more accurately as *guerre de course*—cruiser warfare—and what is still better rendered in English by the exact expression given above. Similarly "commerce destroyer" is a loose term descriptive of the vessels authorized by a belligerent government to wage maritime warfare against commerce. The warfare is against *commerce*, not primarily or necessarily against the means of transportation of commerce; although, of course, the destruction of commerce carriers is a potent method of warring against commerce itself. The military aim is to deprive the enemy of the support derived from his overseas commerce. This has been done throughout the history of maritime warfare, and long before the submarine was invented the rules, some of which are stated in Article I, had crystallized into a generally accepted code of maritime warfare. As already stated, the destruction of the carrier has been frowned upon except under unusual circumstances of compelling military necessity; it is not at all a requisite of the object in view which is better attained by the capture and condemnation of the offending vessel. For purely economic reasons this latter method is preferable, because, first, it enriches the captor at the expense of his enemy, and second, it does not diminish the total of the world's means of transportation on the sea.

To the layman unfamiliar with the laws of maritime warfare, for whose benefit this explanation otherwise unnecessary is given, the illegal and inhuman warfare against commere waged by the Germans has created the erroneous idea that destruction of the carrier, the ship, is a usual and even a necessary part of maritime warfare against commerce. This has never been so; and the world will look with less and less patience on

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the destruction of ships, as the growing interdependence of nations makes the necessity for shipping greater. Quite aside from any humanitarian aspect is this objection to the unlimited maritime warfare practised by Germany, with its wholesale destruction of shipping, which penalized not only the enemy belligerent but the whole world, by the destruction of shipping instead of the transfer of its ownership and control contemplated by the recognized laws of war.

The wording of Article IV, supported by other internal evidence in the treaty, makes it clear that the term "commerce destroyers" refers to belligerent vessels that destroy the *carriers* of commerce on the sea—ships—and not to those destroying commerce itself by recognized legal methods. Surface vessels employing the methods used by the Germans in their unlimited submarine warfare would be equally as guilty of violating "the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations" as submarines. And yet, as has been pointed out, surface vessels designed to prey upon commerce in war have been designated as "commerce destroyers" with no thought of their being used illegally. There seems to be no possible question that Article IV is intended to prohibit the use of submarines altogether in maritime warfare against commerce; it would be a work of supererogation to declare that if used in such warfare they must be used legally. The article should say exactly what it means.

Of course governmental action on the interpretation of treaties or the violation of the laws of war is taken by responsible and instructed agents; but the popular support of such action must come from the mass of the people in a democracy. For this reason the criticism of inexact and misleading terms used in important international compacts is not out of place.

The second criticism of Article IV is more far-reaching. The article opens with the flat statement that "The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914–1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants". This is an over-

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statement. There can be no question that submarines labor under great inherent disadvantages as instrumentalities in waging legitimate maritime warfare against commerce, and especially submarines of the limited size in use during the late war; but even so the statement is exaggerated, and it entirely ignores the possibility of the development of the submarine. Vessels of this class are now under construction having a displacement of about 3000 tons, armed with guns up to 6 inches in caliber, carrying boats, and able to carry extra personnel for prize crews or even themselves take on board extra personnel from captured vessels. There is no reason why they cannot be made of larger size still, and be armored as well as armed, nor why such submarines could not carry on maritime warfare against commerce in entire accordance with the recognized laws of war.

The obsession due to Germany's utter disregard of the laws of war shows in the statement quoted. *The reason why Germany used submarines as she did was because she had been driven off the surface of the sea.* Had she been able to maintain anything like a disputed control on the surface there is no reason to believe that she would have embarked upon unlimited submarine warfare, which was in fact approved with the greatest reluctance by a large element of the responsible governmental authorities. The submarine undoubtedly lends itself to illegal warfare because of its ability to conceal itself from observation by submergence. But it must not be forgotten that surface vessels are able to wage illegal warfare against merchant vessels in the very same manner as submarines, even though they lack the ability to submerge for concealment. The real argument against submarines does not lie in the *impossibility* of their legal use in maritime warfare against commerce; it does lie in the great temptation to use them illegally if the course of a war makes it impossible to use surface vessels.

The practice of arming merchant vessels is intimately connected with this question. During the late war it began with the British; but the origin of the practice with them was not founded upon defense against submarines. It was done to give

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merchant vessels a defense against converted cruisers—merchant vessels converted into war vessels by giving them an armament —as parliamentary discussions will demonstrate. Later, when unlimited submarine warfare broke out, a measure adopted to meet entirely different conditions was found to be useful as against submarine attack. A full discussion of this connection would take too much space, and the subject is dismissed with this brief mention.

After the part of Article IV last quoted above, it goes on to say: "and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto". To this engagement itself there is no objection in principle, aside from the use of the term "commerce destroyers"; but the statement of the mutual engagement is weakened by the overstatement preceding it.

In Article V of the treaty the Signatory Powers agree to be bound as between themselves by the prohibition of "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices", and invite the adherence of all other civilized nations. This prohibition undoubtedly meets the approval of practically all civilians; the sentiment for prohibition is not so unanimous among military men, not a few of whom believe that gas warfare is proper and advisable provided it be restricted to gases that do not inflict unnecessary suffering. Representative men of the Army and Navy of the United States, however, favor the absolute prohibition of gas warfare. General Pershing, Chief of Staff of the Army, was chairman of a subcommittee (on land armament) of the Advisory Committee appointed by President Harding to serve during the Washington Conference. General Pershing's subcommittee reported as follows:

> Chemical warfare should be abolished among nations, as abhorrent to civilization. It is a cruel, unfair, and improper use of science. It is fraught with the gravest danger to noncombatants and demoralizes the better instincts of humanity.

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The whole Advisory Committee unanimously adopted this report. The General Board of the Navy also reported upon this subject. Its report concludes:

> 6. . . . Gas warfare threatens to become so efficient as to endanger the very existence of civilization.
>
> 7. The General Board believes it to be sound policy to prohibit gas warfare in every form and against every objective, and so recommends.

With these authoritative expressions of representative military opinion the writer is in entire accord. The prohibition of chemical warfare unquestionably meets the overwhelming approval of the people of the five Powers that signed the treaty; and no criticism is offered to their assent in Article V to its prohibition, and their contract to abide by that prohibition as between themselves.

Some particulars of the discussion in committee are, however, worthy of comment. The mistaken impression appeared to prevail that the article was declaratory of existing international law. Mr. Root, in introducing the resolution from which Article V grew, read a part of Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, as follows:

> The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage, and use of the said products or devices.

He then went on to say that he understood that declaration of prohibition "to be a statement of the previous rules which had been adopted during the course of the Hague conferences."[1] The language of Article 171 will be examined later; just now the reference to the Hague conferences is in issue. On the day following the introduction of the resolution Mr. Balfour (now Lord Balfour) is reported as saying "that as he understood the matter, the proposal before the meeting was the reaffirmation of the admitted principles of international law."

[1] *Senate Document 126*, 67th Congress, Second Session, p. 388.

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After referring to treaties made subsequent to the armistice, all of which contained a provision similar to that of Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, and to a declaration made by the Allied and Associated Powers laying down "the same doctrine" in March, 1918, before the armistice, he went on to say, "Behind all those formal acts there had been the findings of the two Hague conferences."[1]

The Hague Declaration referring to asphyxiating gases was made in 1899, at the First Conference. Its essential provision reads: "The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." The spirit of this is plain enough; but the language is restrictive and would not cover the case of gas generators such as were used in the trenches. Certainly there is a great difference between the Hague Declaration and Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Hague Declaration had no time limitation, and it was ratified or adhered to by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, and by all the Allies and Associates *except the United States, which did not sign and never has ratified this Declaration*, as Mr. Balfour delicately intimated.

In so far as an appeal to the action of the Hague Conferences is concerned, the prohibition of gas warfare in Article V of the Washington treaty was not declaratory of existing international law: unless, indeed, the United States is prepared to admit the dangerous precedent that a rule to which she declines to accede is international law none the less, despite her attitude. Mr. Balfour shrewdly assumed the admission, saying of the "findings of the two [one] Hague conferences" that they "were accepted by all the other powers [other than the United States] engaged in those conferences, undoubtedly with the sympathy although not with the explicit ratification of America." A reference to the records of the Hague Conference of 1899 will show a conspicuous absence of the "sympathy" that Mr. Balfour gives us credit for; no less distinguished a delegate than Admiral Mahan voted in committee against the Declara-

[1] *Senate Document 126*, p. 392.

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tion, the entire delegation followed him, and voted against it in plenary conference, and the Senate did not advise ratification.

The words of Mr. Root quoted above fall far short of an admission that the Hague Declaration concerning the use in war of asphyxiating gases was international law. Mr. Root based his argument for the resolution that he presented on "an expression on this subject which presented the most extraordinary consensus of opinion that one could well find upon any international subject." He then referred to the language of the Treaty of Versailles (Article 171) which was repeated in the treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly, the Trianon and Sèvres, and homologated by the United States in its separate treaty with Germany, Austria and Hungary. Nowhere did he claim that a rule against the use in war of asphyxiating gases was international law by reason of these treaty provisions. The very object of his resolution was to make international law, as will be seen from the text of Article V of the Washington treaty, which differs only slightly in form and not at all in substance from the original resolution. Article V reads:

> The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
>
> The Signatory Powers to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

Mr. Root and Mr. Balfour were not playing on the same string.

It has seemed worth while to dwell somewhat upon this matter for it is more than doubtful that Americans, with the exception of a comparatively small number, have had the least idea of the attitude of their own government upon the question of gas warfare in the past, and until the Washington Conference. That our government was willing to revise its attitude was made clear by the fact that its own delegate introduced the

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resolution leading to the prohibition in the treaty; but it was in no position to admit that its revised attitude was a reaffirmation of existing international law.

Articles VI and VII, the last of the treaty under consideration, need no comment.

The objects sought to be attained by Treaty No. 2 of the Washington Conference have the sympathetic support of the vast majority of the people of the United States, to speak of no others. These objects should be attained, and it is no attack upon them to indicate faults believed to exist in the methods adopted for their attainment. There was a distinct impression abroad in Washington during the Conference that this particular treaty was being railroaded through—an impression that a perusal of the minutes does not dissipate. An impatience was manifested with the idea of its examination by experts that is difficult to understand, as it is difficult to understand the need of great haste (the Committee adopted the entire subject matter of the treaty by January 7, 1922, and the Conference did not adjourn for a month thereafter). Quite in line with this general attitude was the adoption of Resolution No. 2, reference to which has been made. Whatever the reasons for such special treatment of this one treaty, it should now be possible to review the treaty in a calm spirit, and at least consider the faults in substance and form that the writer, in common with others, believes to exist in it at present.

HARRY S. KNAPP[1]

[1] This article was written by the late Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp shortly before his death, and is now published by the courtesy of his sisters.

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ON METHODS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS II*

III

FORTUNATELY we have for studying the process of government three or four separate groups of sources, no one of which, it is true, is very adequate in itself, but all of which, when used to supplement and check up one another, furnish us with as complete a picture as can be hoped for in the present state of the social sciences.

The source which comes first to mind, and is the most accessible, is the daily press. Newspapers are of very unequal value in this regard, but such a paper as *The New York Times*, especially in its short news items on the inside pages, is a mine of information. On going over the results of assiduous clipping for a few weeks, or better still, months, one is amazed at the quantity of actual information on the political action of interest groups presented—the great number and variety of organizations, of objects, and types of activity, the strange alliances and conflicts, the close relationship with the governmental machine, the surprising amount of data as to actual motives in politics.[51] Yet by itself this source is incomplete, even fragmentary; very rarely can the full history of a legislative measure be pieced together, never the full story of governmental action; only seldom do we find specific instances of the success or failure of an organization's efforts. Rather do we get an impression of ceaseless and enormously varied play upon

* Part I of this article appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY for December, 1923, vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, pp. 636-651.

[51] As a test, from the front page of the real estate section of a single Sunday issue, November 13, 1921, the writer once clipped ten items relating to political action by real estate interests alone—little news remained in that section of the paper.

An interesting example of conflicting motives in politics is thus recorded—"An attempt to put the American Federation of Labor on record for unrestricted immigration was overwhelmingly defeated today in the annual convention. . . . Jewish delegates led the fight to reverse the position of labor on the immigration question."—*New York Times*, June 21, 1922.

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the government, of forces at work in politics which our older methods of study never revealed to us, but which, one soon becomes convinced, must be evaluated if political science is to accomplish anything. The newspapers are a source of outside rather than inside testimony; they supply considerable direct, probably impartial evidence, but their contribution is general, sketchy, impressionistic, a suggestion of new worlds for the investigator to conquer. They are destructive of traditional methods and points of view rather than adequate purveyors of a new system. They are valuable mainly for preliminary work and to check up on results obtained elsewhere.

Allied to this material are those publications, such as the *Congressional Record*, in which the sayings of actual members of the government are recorded.[52] Much evidence as to the inspiration of such men's actions can be gleaned from this field. Reports of hearings are indispensable material.

The best source of all is the official publications of the interest groups themselves. Probably all the organizations which in the long run really count in politics issue annual reports, in which the presidential address, the key-note speech of the annual meeting, is usually printed *verbatim*, along with important reports of committees. The more powerful associations, moreover, issue official periodicals, which are worthy of analysis from cover to cover. These furnish direct, inside evidence, essential to all modes of studying group activity. Not merely is an account given of the part played by the organization in contemporary politics, its action upon the government and its efforts to enlist or combat other interests, but also its social philosophy is strikingly set forth in unvarnished style, and light is thrown upon the government and politics of the organization itself, the internal organization and procedure, the outstanding persons who largely determine its action, and the means taken to create opinion among the rank and file of the membership as well as the public at large. After compiling all the data obtained from this material, we can then check it up with the con-

[52] Political memoirs, biographies and such like literature, though in general disappointingly meagre for our purposes, must not be neglected.

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tent and method of presentation of our daily news, the pronouncements of public men, and the actual conduct of the government.

Nevertheless this source, also, is not as complete as one would desire. Results are reported to a considerable extent and in the fashion demonstrated by the following extracts:

It is gratifying to state that the Government has in every instance attended to the requests of the Board, and many needful reforms have been accomplished.[53]

It is noteworthy that the procedure at the Conference [Brussels, December, 1901, on abolition of sugar bounties] appears to be based on a resolution which emanated from the London Chamber of Commerce and was carried at the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire in June, 1900 . . . it may also be observed that two of the official delegates to the conference are members of the Council of the London Chamber.[54]

At the instance of the Canadian Press Association, the government caused an official investigation to be made into the allegation that a combination existed among the paper manufacturers of Canada . . . the Government has issued an order reducing the duty on such paper in sheets or rolls from 25% to 15%.[55]

Your transportation Committee appeared before the Railway Commission for the purpose of securing reduction of the winter rate to Portland on cheese from Montreal. Valuable lessons were learned of how to proceed in future cases, although the committee failed in its object.[56]

Your Council, in representing our total membership, it must be conceded, represents very large individual and corporate interests, and meeting week by week, should give attention to the various questions arising in connection with civic government, and in so doing they should not be misunderstood, or their right to petition or advise even so sacred a body as a City Council should not be questioned, and yet I fear that that is the position in Montreal. . . . I confess that often such representations as I refer to from Associations such as ours have

[53] Halifax (Canada) Board of Trade, *Annual Report* (1897), p. 10.

[54] *London Chamber of Commerce Journal*, vol. 21, p. 12.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[56] Montreal Board of Trade, *Annual Report* (1907), p. 99.

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not been couched in language calculated to soothe the savage breast. . . . This year we have been trying to be fair and gentle and even loving in our petitions, but persistent. We have gone as near to writing love letters to our friends in the City Hall as business men careful of their reputations could well do. We have prayed them in our Secretary's sweetest and most courtly language, yet I regret to say that, judging from results, we have not as yet been very successful. . . . It is more soul-satisfying to be kicked out of a place, petitions and all, than to be ignored.[57]

It is a pleasure for your Committee to report that it has not been necessary for the Association to oppose at Ottawa any demands of organized labor.[58]

The (Lord's Day) Act as originally introduced was so objectionable that it had to be practically redrafted, and in the new act the manufacturers' interests are protected.[59]

Undoubtedly the most serious defect is in the information as to means employed in specific cases,[60] though even here frequent clues are furnished and other sources may be drawn upon to fill up gaps; the evidence, however, is probably accurate as far as it goes. Direct testimony which is corroborated by strong circumstantial evidence would seem acceptable.

Data collected from these groups of sources may be supplemented to a considerable extent by verbal testimony secured through personal interview and investigation. As contrasted with the historian, the student of contemporary politics lacks that perspective which distance affords, he is also constantly liable to have misstatements due to insufficient data contradicted by living and better-informed participants in the actual events, but he at least has the advantage of a resort to verbal testimony

[57] *Ibid.* (1909), President's address.

[58] *Industrial Canada,* vol. 7, p. 213, Report of Parliamentary Committee to Annual Meeting C. M. A. (1907).

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 214.

[60] The minutes of executive committee meetings of a certain powerful organization were circulated to members as a supplement to the official organ (with perforations for separate filing) and were prefaced by the following caution: "Note—This report is sent you *in confidence* and should under no circumstances be thrown away without first being destroyed."

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for filling gaps in his documentary evidence. Verbal testimony, it is true, is received under the grave limitations imposed by deliberate lying, the personal equation, deceptive fitness to give information on the points sought, the law of libel, honorable restrictions regarding matters told in confidence, an exaggerated view of the part played by the informant and his organization, or conversely, that modesty which would stop short of self-incrimination.

When we come to discuss methods of utilizing this material, of actually observing these organizations at work and weighing their accomplishment, we attack an almost untouched field. Hence our discussion must be by way of suggestion rather than the actual recording of results achieved. We may consider three main lines of approach, all of which must be used to supplement one another if any adequate portrayal is to result. The first we may call the geographical. It is a correlation of votes on men or measures with the predominant interests within the voting area.[61] The various election districts must be surveyed, and the voting elements, racial, religious or occupational, and the social stratification analyzed, also the most influential organizations within or operating on the area distinguished. With this data we must correlate the votes from these districts —votes on candidates at general elections, in the light of the platforms to which they pledge adherence, votes on measures submitted to popular referendum, and votes by representatives from the districts in various assemblies. By this procedure some surprising circumstantial evidence can be obtained, yet it is subject to too many drawbacks to be employed exclusively. In regard to votes by representatives from districts, we face a dilemma—rather academic it is true. By assuming strong locality allegiance, we may demonstrate the force of the local interests we have discovered; conversely, by assuming the force of such interests, we may prove the man a "delegate", not a "representative." One or other assumption must be made unless supplementary evidence secured by other methods is

[61] This was the method employed by Bentley—see his *Process of Government*, appendix.

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adduced. Furthermore, this method encounters the operation of too many unknown and uncontrolled factors for our conclusions to be very reliable. What about mixed districts, where the predominant interest is not obvious? Again, the motives may be entangled—the specific issues confused or falsified, traditional party allegiance, personalities, various prejudices and occult influences operative. Some or all of these are apt to be decisive factors in vote casting. They cannot be properly estimated, particularly by an investigator unfamiliar with local circumstances, and if ignored, will lead to *post hoc ergo propter hoc* reasoning. This method, then, is probably limited in its application to votes on clear-cut issues from unusually homogeneous areas.

Our second mode of approach we may term the study of the lobby in its broadest sense—an effort to write the complete history of specific acts of government. As acts of legislation represent the most definite and obvious crystallizations of decisions upon questions of public policy which arise,[62] our most illuminating investigations will be mainly within this field, nevertheless they must cover every phase of administrative action as well. We should go back, whenever possible, to the very inception of the measure, noting with whom the plan originated, by whom and under what circumstances it was concretely presented, the interplay of interests preceding the introduction of a definite measure, by whom it was drafted, how it was put before the legislature. Incidentally, we must evaluate the personal equations of the individual legislators, especially those of the committee involved, their personal philosophies and affiliations —we should study them as the lobbyist himself does. At each stage in the career of the measure, particularly at the committee hearings and at the time of final action by the executive, we must note the types and sources of pressure—the delegations, demonstrations, interviews, telegrams and letters. We must enumerate the groups represented, study and compare their

[62] Where the Common Law has been left untouched by statute, the legislature may be said by their abstention to have tacitly accepted the Common Law rules as their own statement of public policy upon matters involved.

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arguments, the methods used and, as far as we can, weigh their relative influence with the government.

Although it is a useful habit to speak of the government as a machine, yet we must not forget that it is a machine composed of human beings with personal predilections. Being a part of the legally coercive authority affords a strategic position for the imposition of one's own personal views and reactions—conduct quite compatible with the "representative" as opposed to the "delegate" theory. Although such measures may be put through by log-rolling, fortunately their fate usually depends upon the measure of popular support accorded. In connection with the abortive ordinance to prohibit women from smoking in public, introduced by Alderman McGuiness (New York City), note this enlightening statement: "In introducing the ordinance early this year, Alderman McGuiness said that he, his wife and his sisters had been shocked to see women smoking in restaurants."[63] Again, "Governor Miller forced the passage of the picture-censorship bill, it is said, because he took his daughter to see a movie one night that offended him."[64]

Once their desires have been written down in the law of the land, of course, the proponents of a measure are strategically much better placed than they were previously; the whole body of arguments aiming to maintain the stability of the state is at their disposal; they can denounce as "nullifiers" and "Bolsheviki" any who would repeal or weaken the force of the enactment. Nevertheless in matters involving administrative discretion, including judicial interpretation, we have an identical process of conflicting interests, so that our mode of investigation must be extended to these also.

Although our access to all the facts is perhaps here more restricted than in any other line of investigation, although the

[63] *New York Times*, March 28, 1922.

[64] *Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1921. Somewhat similar is the following—*ibid.*, February 25, 1923—"The meeting was entirely due to the fact that a circulating library had recommended 'Women in Love' to the daughter of Justice Ford. He sent out letters to fifty individuals and societies asking them to be present, and more than half of them responded."

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best of amateur detectives could not hope to furnish us with a complete account of all the events leading up to final action by the government, yet the major factors are bound to reveal themselves. Much direct evidence will be added to the circumsiantial evidence collected by the geographical method; we are presented with a picture of conflicting interests, probably of compromises, possibly of decisive victory for one group or coalition of groups; through it all the government appears more or less in the rôle of a neutralizing agency;[65] in the language of physics, its eventual action is the resultant of all group pressures upon it.

A study of the lobby incidental to specific acts of government does not, however, afford us a view of the process of government over an extended period. We must therefore approach the problem from a third angle, shifting our point of view from the activities of all groups concerned with one particular issue, to a consideration of the part played by one major organization in the resolution of all matters affecting it. Here our starting point and chief source is the official publications of the organizations themselves—already frequently consulted for their stand upon issues and for reported achievements, now analyzed for their policies and activities, their contributions to the life of the community throughout the term of their existence.

By a synthesis of the results obtained by these three methods of investigation, then, may we hope to obtain clues as to the moving forces in politics. The geographical approach throws light upon regionalism, the influence of areas where a certain type of life is dominant. Through investigation of the lobby we see the crystallization of public questions into definite legal statement, we realize the complexity of political action, the diversity of interests involved; by personal investigation of contemporary problems we acquire a wealth of information regarding practical politics. By tracing the contributions of our great continuing organizations, we weigh the forces which in the long

[65] This is probably most easily seen in the case of a parliamentary system, where all groups, at least on major issues, must eventually deal with a specific body of political leaders.

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run have moulded the nation's history, we understand more clearly the vicissitudes in the life of political parties.

IV

The student in politics, however, should not limit his investigations to the governmental organization of the state and the pressures exerted upon it alone; he should also inquire into the mechanisms of control within the interest groups themselves. Shifting our point of view from the state to the organizations, and applying again our criterion as to the scope of "politics", we find here many of the phenomena observable in the wider study. If one were studying, for example, the government and politics of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, he would find an interesting governmental structure to describe, a distinct "political" issue, that of Church union, with a consequent division into two parties under recognized leaders, an organized propaganda on both sides, and a long-drawn-out campaign very familiar to one who has been following similar matters in the national field. Similar examples in connection with almost any organization no doubt could be multiplied. Without forcing analogies, we may even frequently compare the relations of interest groups and those of national states.

The value of thus extending the scope of our study lies first in the fact that in so doing one encounters forms of government more numerous and varied than those we ordinarily consider, hence enriching the data that can be brought to bear upon structural questions. The increasing importance of problems in federalism alone makes such an expansion of the field necessary. Party phenomena, too, will frequently be observable in less complex and misleading forms than in the case of national politics.[66]

Furthermore, since these organizations exert pressure upon the government of the state, since they profess to speak for large sections of the population, it behooves us to discover how such action is determined upon, what is the extent of the dis-

[66] Because such parties have not become "institutionalized", and the relation of issues to alignments is consequently more obvious.

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cretion allowed the executive committee, what is done on their own responsibility, what is subject to a general meeting or referendum of the membership, what influence is exerted by the few leaders over the policy of the rank and file.[67] The concentration of social control through interrelation of interest groups by means of "interlocking directorates" should be carefully looked into, an interesting aspect of this being the coincidence of leadership in our large economic organizations and in those with an avowedly different purpose—churches, Y. M. C. A., educational institutions, citizens' reform associations, political clubs, and so on.

In studying the publications of, let us say, a manufacturers' association, we find not only a comprehensive body of economic thought, and a definite theory of nationalism, but an interesting view of the social organization as well. "Where there is no industry the people perish." The social structure appears as a pyramid, with the manufacturers as the apex, or, let us say, as a planet, with the other interests as moons revolving about it, and the great principle of protection acting as the law of grav-

[67] *New York Times,* December 20, 1920—"A proposed program of Federal Tax revision, suggesting radical changes in present methods, was put to a referendum vote today by the United States Chamber of Commerce. The proposals were prepared by the Chamber's Committee on Taxation, which has made nearly a year's study of the subject. In sending out the proposals the Chamber's Board of Directors made it clear that the Board itself neither approved nor dissented from the report. The sole purpose of the referendum, it was explained, was to obtain the opinion of the country's business organizations."

Industrial Canada, Exec. Com. Proc. (January, 1908)—The Tariff Committee of the C. M. A. asks for power to express attitude of C. M. A. on Franco-Canadian Commercial treaty; Mr. Whyte strongly objects; "he believed it to be too important a matter to be referred to any one committee to decide"; the proper procedure was that of a year ago in regard to tariff revision, i. e. "to call all the sections together and let them deal as they saw fit with the items in which they were directly interested." In opposition to this it was urged the treaty might pass the House before such action was possible.

Ibid., June, 1909, Report of Reception and Membership Committee—"At the suggestion of Pres. Hobson, your Committee would recommend that as a safeguard against utterances which may not be absolutely in line with Association policy, the address which the President delivers at the annual meeting should in all cases be gone over by the Advisory Committee." The Executive Committee adopted the recommendation.

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itation which keeps all running smoothly. Labor would have no means of livelihood without the manufacturer, the farmer would have no market without the factory town, the acme of civilization is urbanization. Conversely, the agrarian press represents agriculture as the source of all life, and labor views all human goods as the result of toil. Each interest tends to dwell upon its own importance to the community, and stresses the weight it should have in the councils of the nation.

One is impressed as much by the obviously sincere conviction of the exponents of these diverse viewpoints as by their almost total inability to put themselves into the other man's shoes, for the fundamental assumptions used as premises differ almost *in toto*. The work a man does in the world mainly determines the people with whom he will spend his time both in and out of business hours, and what is even more important, it also determines those he will not meet, and whose mentality he will not, therefore, understand. These diverse environments produce diverse and conflicting attitudes of mind upon fundamental issues; hence the perpetual conflict of ideals. For example, consider the following quotation from an agrarian publication: "An editor who started about twenty years ago with only fifty-five cents is now worth $100,000. His accumulation of wealth is owing to his frugality, good habits, strict attention to business, and the fact that an uncle died and left him $99,999." [68] Is it unreasonable to look upon this "filler" as more than a mere effort at wit; is it not rather an expression of dissent from a whole body of traditional economic thought on the part of men whose lifetime experience has led them to doubt the infallibility of mere "industry, integrity and intelligence" [69] in the face of market and other conditions over which they have no control? The analysis and comparison of these various philosophies is therefore essential to an understanding of political conflicts as they work themselves out.[70]

[68] *Grain Grower's Guide* (1914), p. 22.

[69] Motto of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association.

[70] These theories should then be correlated with those enunciated from press, pulpit, and platform; then, perhaps, the whole compared with the "pure" political philosophy of the formal treatises.

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Nationalism is a third subsidiary study in which the methods we have been discussing will doubtless render great assistance. Although space permits only the barest mention of this subject, the following mode of approach is suggested. Recent writers agree that nationalism is a state of mind, an aspect of public opinion, not a matter of race, legal status, and so on. If so, it is a question of education and can be largely deliberate. The problem then becomes one of identifying interests nation-wide in scope, as opposed to others merely sectional, and studying their activities.[71] It would be better to center our attention on the more recent manifestations of national feeling—in the South during the Civil War period, in the British Dominions, in the Near East—rather than to attempt as yet such a study in the case of long-standing nationalities whose origins are correspondingly obscure.

As far as the problem of public opinion in general is concerned, the study of the process of government which we have been discussing everywhere includes it, in fact the two terms are in many respects synonymous.

V

Certain obvious and weighty criticisms of our whole method must be at least mentioned if not adequately met—doubts as to our ability to unearth even the essential facts in our investigation, the necessity of relying mainly upon circumstantial evidence, and the impossibility of accurately weighing and measuring the forces we are attempting to study. The answer to these collectively is that they apply to the social sciences in general. It is freely admitted that in the documentary evidence available (and to which, for practical reasons, the student will have ordinarily to limit himself) there are formidable gaps. Were we required to furnish a detailed record of all means employed, or a specific evaluation of all factors involved, these gaps would no doubt prove fatal. Obviously, however, such limitations are not peculiar to the field of investigation we have

[71] See C. A. Beard, *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,* for early nation-wide forces in the United States.

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been discussing. They are not even more of a handicap here than, say, in the general field of political history—unless, indeed, the recorder of past politics is to be excused from that consideration of vital factors which is demanded of students of contemporary phenomena. Clearly it is more difficult to identify forces operating upon the government than to describe the visible workings of that machine, *but if we cannot resist a conviction the latter study is inadequate, we must delve further in the hope of discovering more.* Frequently we must deduce fire merely from the presence of much smoke. Frequently we must deduce activity mainly from the striking coincidence of demands and observable results, yet competent detectives seem to lay much stress upon circumstantial evidence. As far as weighing and measuring is concerned, the diverse application by historians of the term "epoch-making" shows how subjective this must be; nevertheless we can probably determine that in such and such cases certain forces have been mainly operative, or others notably quiescent. In short, it is merely submitted that such investigations as we have suggested will sufficiently add to our comprehension of political problems to repay the effort they demand.

Certainly we can secure much more factual matter than we now possess bearing upon problems of representative government. What does the representative represent? How does he, in voting, say, on a tariff measure, resolve the interesting dilemma imposed by the presence of both importers and manufacturers within his district? Our emphasis upon the dynamic elements in politics will throw light upon problems of leadership and oligarchy. If the few govern by consent of the many, who are those few and how is consent obtained? Who formulate the choices upon which the mass of the electorate votes? We shall meet with certain outstanding individuals who not only dominate specific organizations, but through their varied memberships and activities exert widespread influence upon many aspects of our life. If we list through a term of years those acts of government admittedly of major importance, classifying them according to object promoted or regulated, and according to interests affected, then correlate with the data we have ob-

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tained by the studies just outlined, we may judge who have been, in the main, governing the country. If this data be also correlated with party alignments and activities, we shall probably be greatly helped in analyzing groupings and realignments, but particularly regarding the loss of distinction between long-established parties.

Organizations are in the habit of eschewing "politics" and "political questions" from their discussions. This really means that to keep themselves free for the prosecution of their main objects, they avoid committing themselves to any party, or beclouding the main issue by injecting any extraneous "party politics" as a factor into the debate. When they declare neutrality on a "political question" (in our sense of the term) we know it is to them unimportant; always we can find a pronouncement where their interests are affected. The following two extracts perhaps illustrate this point and some causes of the obliteration of party distinctions:

Others have gone so far as to say that it [the C. M. A.] is a political factor, having as its sole aim the securing of a tariff which will benefit the manufacturers at the expense of all other classes. . . . Let it be understood that the C. M. A. is not a political organization. Its members include men of every stripe, who, in the work of the Association, know no political party, and are subject to no political leader. It may be said to the credit of our country and in answer to those who have misunderstood the Association, that there are business men in Canada who stand above the fluctuating plans of party politics, and who have ceased to view with active interest the petty "squabbles" which are carried on in the political press. In the past the tariff question has been considered as a party question. Why should it be so? Party politics has surely sufficient accompanying evils without throwing open to its temptations and leaving at its mercy a *national* question, upon the solution of which depends the whole future of our Dominion.[72]

It is a source of great satisfaction to all business men that we seem to have reached the point where the tariff has finally been taken out of politics. That is to say, that the means by which commercial prosperity may be best secured and held is now considered too big a ques-

[72] *Industrial Canada,* vol. 3, p. 42, editorial.

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tion to be played with for party advantage. And inasmuch as the tariff was one of the great questions before the country upon which parties were able to divide with considerable fervor, and whereas no such question is now before the country, it seems very desirable that public attention shall be concentrated upon the best methods for enhancing the development of Canada. In this respect it seems to me that it would be a fine thing if there should spring up a greater feeling of independence of rigid party lines.[73]

Only by putting politics upon such a factual basis can we place ourselves in a position to discuss contemporary theories of representative government, public opinion, or types of structure, both those currently accepted, and those of the newer dissentients, such as the Guild Socialists. For example, how much occupational representation do we actually have today?[74] Is it true that our geographical basis represents citizens as consumers only, not as producers? Do a man's interests divide themselves so definitely into these two categories, or is this making the proposition much too simple for practical constitution-framers? From the legalistic approach, the method was deductive, the data limited and easily accessible, the conclusions definite, clear and authoritative. The disconcerting efforts of the descriptive writers, however, destroyed our premises, and ever since we have been in search of new ones. With the understanding of ourselves contributed by psychology, with the ever-broadening basis of factual knowledge supplied by the more purely descriptive studies in government, and with the further information we can ourselves amass by the methods suggested above, we may be increasingly able to understand the main-

[73] Toronto Board of Trade, *Annual Report* (1901), p. 22 — President's address (five years after an erstwhile "tariff-for-revenue" party had come into power). See also the manifesto of thirteen prominent Toronto Liberals (names not unknown to C. M. A.) on leaving the party during the anti-reciprocity campaign of 1911.

[74] See J. D. Barnett: "Representation of Interests in Administration", *National Municipal Review*, July, 1923, pp. 347-9. The present writer has in mind, however, less those cases of occupational representation directly recognized by law, than those achieved indirectly, i. e., by filling an elective or appointive office with men known to sympathize with particular occupational interests.

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springs of political action or to predict the probable operation of schemes of government before they are actually tried out, thus lessening the wastes of empiricism. Is it unreasonable to hope that we may lay foundations on which to build an inductive science of politics impossible to our forbears?

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THE POLITICAL APPLICATION OF ROMANTICISM

HAD William James, the most amiable and tolerant of philosophers as of men, lived to see his doctrines hailed by the apologists of social violence and war to the knife between the classes, he might have been more than mildly surprised. Yet just such an acclaim has been rendered him by M. Georges Sorel,[1] who had previously made his philosophic homage to the *philosophie nouvelle* of M. Bergson. M. Sorel has long been known as the chief of those anti-intellectualistic *intellectuels* who have called themselves "*La Nouvelle École*" of Socialism, and who have preached the gospel of revolutionary syndicalism through the numbers of the *Mouvement Socialiste*, and the equally sympathetic organs of Italian Socialism. Mr. Cole, in the pre-war *World of Labour*,[2] was of

[1] M. Sorel's doctrines have really had a vogue which makes them of sufficient importance as theories to deserve consideration. He has had the insight to push to their logical conclusions the anti-intellectualistic philosophies of "activism", and the unrestrained fashion of expressing himself that is fitting to an apostle of violence. Add to this a very wide range of historical information, and a certain detachment which leads him to counsel others to actions where he is patently sceptical as to the value of any activity, and you have the qualities which give him the literary flavor, at least, of that line of intellectualistic and pessimistic anti-intellectualists among the French thinkers whose writings always have a curiously Mephistophelian flavor. It is perhaps as much for his literary as for his philosophic oddity, brilliant but unbalanced, that M. Sorel has enjoyed so wide a popularity.

As a propagandist his works have been of real importance in the development of modern socialistic theory on the continent, as may be evidenced by the number of editions through which *Réflexions sur la violence* has passed, as well as the fact that it has been translated, along with two or three of his other writings on Marxian doctrine, into Italian (*Saggi di critica del marxisme,* and *Insegnamenti sociali della economia contemporanea,* the translation and prefaces by V. Racca). The practical application which has been made by the proletariat of his *Matériaux d'une théorie du prolétariate,* even more than the general recognition accorded to M. Sorel by political writers as the spokesman of the theorists of Syndicalism and Marxian Revolution, makes him peculiarly fit for an examination of political anti-intellectualism, under the acceptance of the pragmatic test of application we have set down as a method.

[2] *Op. cit.,* pp. 166-168.

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the opinion that the real impact of the "Social Myth" of the violent General Strike as a means of social regeneration had been greater in Italy than in France, and the post-war developments of the two labor movements have gone far toward bearing him out, as we shall see. The impact of the doctrine has been met at length by something more than inertia. As Mr. Ramsay MacDonald recently said, "The answer to Syndicalism is Facismo." [1]

But how is it that M. Sorel should find in the essentially kindly and ethically naïve doctrines of William James anything to serve as a prop to his own *Réflexions sur la violence?* True enough he had barely heard of pragmatism when first he set about reflecting upon the nobility of proletarian violence. At that time he found that the philosophy of action and of intuition which M. Bergson had begun to make prevail mightily could be interpreted in a Nietzscheian sense to fit the regenerative revolution of the workers for which he was trying to enlist the active support of the *syndicats* of the French C. G. T.[2]

[1] *Socialist Review,* June, 1923.

[2] Before his accession to the pragmatism of William James, M. Sorel, in common with the entire group of theorists calling themselves "*La Nouvelle École*" and writing in the *Mouvement Socialiste,* claimed to be philosophical disciples of Bergsonian anti-intellectualism. M. Sorel time and again professes the same faith, e. g. *Réflexions sur la violence,* pp. 9, 40 *et seq.,* 219 *et seq.,* and the chapter devoted to a critique of *L'Évolution créatrice* in *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme.* However he derives many of his philosophic premises from Hartmann (*Réflexions sur la violence;* pp. 13, 22, 289, 112 *et seq.*), among others that capitalism of the Marxian Myth plays a rôle analogous to that which Hartmann has assigned to the unconscious in the world of nature. But as Bergson has carefully refrained from interpreting his doctrines as to their ethical implications, it is to Nietzsche that he goes for ethics. The American captains of industry, completely dominated by the idea of success (p. 115), are really the best modern example of the "Master Morality" of which Nietzsche had written. M. de Rousiers had described the Yankees as all willing to "take a chance", each one "to try his luck". "To be and to remain an American, it is necessary", he had laid down, "to consider life as a struggle, and not a pleasure, to seek in it the effort for victory, energetic and efficient activity, rather than agreement or leisure embellished by the culture of the arts, and the refinements proper to other societies" (quoted *loc. cit.*). This delights M. Sorel as a sign of national vigor and the same heroic qualities possessed by the free-booting Greeks, but not less because he feels assured of the proper Marxian evolution where industrial conflict is so frankly conducted, and so bitter.

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But only so recently as 1921 he found that James, with his gospel rendered according to the sophisticated theological interpretation of "a European brain," had supplied him with the really useful philosophy for which he had been searching. That, at least, seems to be the significance of *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme*, taken in connection with his earlier works. For although M. Sorel had become an apostle of violence before he professed the pragmatic faith, he had manifested it clearly enough in its generally anti-intellectualistic aspects, and had shown himself an unconscious disciple of the "Will to Believe" by his doctrine of Social Myths,[1] and in particular the Myth of the General Strike. This is the kernel of M. Sorel's contribution to Syndicalist theory, and it has had such surprising applications in fact that one may be justified in examining its relations to pragmatism at some length. In the first place let us note briefly the nature of the General Strike, reserving a more detailed consideration of its implications for later. In Syndicalist theory generally, the General Strike has been conceived as the means by which society will pass from capitalism to socialism; it is the catastrophic revolution of the Marxian prophecy; and it had been put before the C. G. T. at its Congress

[1] When M. Sorel wrote *Les Illusions du Progrès* (first edition, 1908, two years after the appearance of *Réflexions*, etc.) he had the following to say about pragmatism: "a new philosophy . . . called pragmatism", "the last term to which bourgeois thought had come: this philosophy admirably suits every *parvenu* who wishes to get himself received in a very indulgent world, thanks to his supple truckling, his bragging, and to the cynicism of his success". In a note (which could not have been written before the second edition, as the work of Schinz to which it refers was not published until 1909) he adds: "In the United States pragmatism must have been given a more decent appearance than it has taken on in Italy; one of the books of the Italian pragmatists has been called *The Liars' Manual*, but it seems they have taken from the new philosophy, *with good right*, the Machiavelian consequences that it carried [*sic*]. A professor of an American University has recently written, as a matter of fact, that pragmatism is an exaggerated individualism authorizing every extravagant caprice. . . . He compares its destiny to that of the Epicureanism which in the hands of Epicurus had originally nothing offensive about it." One wonders whether the doctrines M. Sorel derives from pragmatism are "Machiavellian consequences" drawn *"with good right"* from his newly adopted philosophy, and whether they, too, like the later developments of Epicureanism, might not have something offensive to the genial and tolerant spirit of James.

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in Tours by M. Guerard as long ago as 1896:[1] "The conquest of political power is a chimera . . " he said by way of preface, "Partial strikes fail because the workingmen become demoralized under the intimidation of the employers protected by the government, and succumb. The general strike will last a short while and its repression will be impossible; as to intimidation, it is still less to be feared." The reasons which M. Guerard offered for this last statement are particularly interesting in view of the character the General Strike assumes as a Myth. In the latter case it is left purposely as indeterminate in character as possible, in order that it may partake of the true character of Myths as opposed to intellectualistic Utopias. But M. Guerard, as a practical man, felt it necessary to go into detail as to the probable success of the program he was putting before French labor. He felt that intimidation by the employers and repression by the government would alike be rendered impossible by the fact that the strike would be general, extending over the entire country, whereas the army would be scattered and dispersed. He even went into such minutiæ as the probable difficulties of the army in guarding the railroads. There were 39,000 kilometres of railway lines, and only 300,000 soldiers at most; that made one soldier to every 130 meters—palpably a very difficult task! "The General Strike", he concluded, "will be the revolution, peaceful or not."

M. Sorel's conception of the General Strike is a very different one. For him it simply suffices that the idea of a General Strike as the means to the Marxian revolution exists widely as a belief which gives the proletariat courage and the will to revolt. In common with all the beliefs of a similar nature which have inspired men to sacrifice and even to martyrdom, it is mythical in its character, and not to be tested by critical analysis. The pragmatic essence of his thought follows a reasoning which may perhaps be put in something like the form of

[1] Louis Levine, *Syndicalism in France,* quoted p. 82 *et seq.* This study remains the most complete and accurate exposition of the origins and early history of the Syndicalist movement, as an actual labor movement. The modern literature on actual Syndicalism is of enormous extent. See the bibliographies in Cole's *The World of Labour,* and *infra,* p. 244, note 1.

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James's "faith-ladder" of inferences, by which men actually proceed to a determination.

As a general proposition from which to start, we may say that intellectualism and the "scientific" logic it uses lead us only to the barren reconstruction of reality in the skeletons of concepts, which are slain, so far as the living reality is concerned, in the making. For this proposition we may thank M. Bergson, as well as for the corollary that intuition is the only means of laying hold upon the fugitive essence of truth. Upon this base M. Sorel's propositions are raised, about like this:

(1) The pragmatic test of truth is that which the historian must apply; what "History" (taken in the almost mystic sense given it by Labriola) has rewarded by successful survival may be taken as true.

(2) Belief in myths has strengthened races and nations and sects to acts of sublime heroism and enabled them to conquer.

(3) These myths were true, historically speaking, because of their survival value.

(4) The only consideration justly applicable to the General Strike Myth is: Does it, or can it, grip the proletarian imagination with the force of a great myth?

(5) All other questions, such as, whether the General Strike can succeed in furnishing a positive basis for the new order, and by what provisions, are meaningless ideologies. The future must be left to the *élan vital*. Science only pretends to provide, it really "has no way of foreseeing."[1]

It was in no small degree due to the fact that William James, too, had made war on this "*scientisme*" which pretends to predict the future course of events, that M. Sorel joins forces with him.

People who take seriously what are commonly called the moral and political sciences owe great thanks to William James for the important

[1] The statement that "science has no way of foreseeing" occurs, paradoxically enough, in the work of M. Sorel's own "prophetic period", *L'Avenir socialiste des syndicats*, p. 54. After this work (1904), M. Sorel dismisses the rôle of prophet and adopts that of Myth-maker, refusing to give utopian specifications as to the future course of society, beyond *der Tag*.

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part he took in the struggle waged against the servants of *scientisme* by the philosophers endowed with robust common sense. . . . *Scientisme* corresponds too exactly to the magic-needs of the popular imagination ever to disappear . . . [but] if to-day someone still dares to boast the services which a sociology would be able to render coming generations, a sociology in which the doctors seek to *know* how the general lines of the past are organized with a view to foreseeing the future forms of civil order—which suit [their] present aspirations, why really cultivated people have about the same consideration for such an up-to-date scientist as they have for a compiler of almanacs.[1]

M. Sorel's Romanticism, it will appear, has about it the forced note of the thoroughly disillusioned intellectualist who distrusts reason on rational grounds. Proudhon he acknowledges as his master; and he has something of Proudhon's critical pessimism that escapes itself by transports of enthusiasm for the virtues of the men of the Revolution, and for instinctive revolt in general. Proudhon in *De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Église* had weighed his France in the balance and found her wanting.

France has lost her morals [he lamented]. From critique to critique we have arrived at this sad conclusion: that the just and the unjust, in which we formerly thought ourselves possessed of some

[1] *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme,* pp. 1-2. For his *anti-scientisme, cf.* also pp. 38, 41 *et seq.*, and the chapter "*Observations sur la science grecque*", *op. cit.*, especially, and in *Réflexions,* pp. 53, 203 *et seq.* The method of science is absolutely inapplicable to Myths. One who preaches Myths is "*à l'abri de toute réfutation*" (p. 49). Socialism is necessarily obscure and mystic (Bergsonian, one might say), but "one may say that this obscurity is only scholastic". The intuition can seize the Myth readily enough: "it [the necessary obscurity of Socialism] in no wise prevents it from being easy to represent the proletarian movement in a manner complete, exact, and striking, by the great construction that the proletarian soul has conceived in the course of social conflicts, and that may be called the General Strike. It must always be borne in mind that this perfection in the mode of its representation would vanish in a moment if one attempted to resolve the General Strike into a sum of historical details; *it is necessary to take it entire* [to swallow it whole?] *and undivided, and to think of the passage from capitalism to socialism as a catastrophe whose process escapes description*" (p. 217)—my italics. This is, in good sooth, very much like that ineluctable quality of experience itself, with which Mr. Dewey has made so much play (*Essays in Experimental Logic,* p. 9 *et seq.*).

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discernment, are terms of convention, vague and indeterminable; that all these words — Right, Duty, Morality, Virtue, etc., about which pulpit and school make so much fuss, only serve to cover pure hypotheses, vain utopias, undemonstrable prejudices; that thus the practice of life, directed by I know not what human respect, by conventions, is an arbitrary bond.

Yet Proudhon turned to the "clear conception of Justice of the men of the Revolution" as the basis of that *foi juridique* in which he placed the hopes of social salvation. Similarly M. Sorel, after becoming disgusted with the proletariat for its spineless acceptance of capitalism, (on more than one occasion announcing his intention of leaving off his reflections on violence if others were going to do nothing but reflect, too)—apparently was so heartened by the Russian Revolution and the unstinted use of violence by the Bolshevik dictators that he issued a fourth edition of his *Réflexions* in 1919, with a very interesting "*Plaidoyer pour Lênine*" appended, of which more later.

[1] Proudhon, *op. cit.*, quoted by Sorel, *Réflexions*, p. 332. Justice, in particular, is dissolved into a mere bourgeois and intellectualistic concept by M. Sorel (*cf.* Lenin's famous "Democracy is a mere bourgeois superstition"). He notes that Pascal had penetrated the absurdity of a *lex naturæ*, as a system of law founded on a set of principles revealed by divine Reason to mankind: "Three degrees elevation of the pole upsets all jurisprudence, a meridian decides truth; in a few years of use fundamental laws are changed; law has its epochs; the entry of Saturn into the Lion marks for us the beginning of some crime. A fine justice that a stream may bound! . . . They say that we must go back to the fundamental and primitive laws of the State that an unjust custom has abolished. That is a gamble sure to lose all; nothing is just on those scales."

The resultant state of ignorance as to what *is* just leads us, Pascal said, to fall back on what is customary—an anti-intellectualistic tendency worth nothing: What is customary is what has had force to survive. So the father of French anti-intellectualism set about the work his legitimate heirs have carried on, linking up justice to force, and showing the vassalage that puts it on its knees before might. "Justice is subject to dispute, force is easily recognizable and indisputable. So we have not been able to give force to justice, because force contradicted justice and declared that it was force that was just. And thus, not being able to make what was just strong, we have made that which was strong just." (*Pensées*, Fragments 294, 297, 299, 309, 312, ed. Brunschviceg, partially quoted by Sorel, p. 26 *et seq.*)

The incurably religious soul of the great mystic took refuge in the Justice of God. Positivism has no such refuge, and rests in the justice of Force, while Sorel's Romanticism comes to rest in the justice of Violence.

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But the real connection between pragmatism and violence for M. Sorel is that pragmatism opens up to him the philosophy of the American people whom he had previously praised as the only really heroic race in modern times capable of favorable comparison with the ancient and piratical Greeks. In all his writings—and he has been fairly prolific, even for an anti-intellectualistic *intellectuel*—M. Sorel has drawn attention to the commendable features of American life, as they were disclosed to him through a remarkable work on American morals and social habits, by M. de Rousiers.[1] Time and time again he quotes with approval some confirmatory evidence from this work to bear out his idea of what a properly behaved capitalistic society should be like. The stratification of society is what an orthodox Marxian has the right to expect; here are the hard-faced captains of industry ruthlessly grinding the faces of the poor, on the one side, and on the other are the workers, made increasingly class-conscious by the pitilessly conducted industrial warfare. One can expect great things in the way of violence from a people which has shown itself so handy with what M. Sorel eulogizes in Lynch law,[2] an institution in the national life for which he finds nothing but praise. Furthermore there is native to the American character, perhaps from its pioneer origins, the altogether praiseworthy temper of risk and adventure necessary to embark on such ventures as M. Sorel has in mind for society: "The Yankees not only 'consent to live on possibilities'," notes M. Sorel (quoting James), "but they even seek out the hazardous in their enterprises." [3]

[1] P. de Rousiers, *La Vie américaine,* a Frenchman's impressions of America, not wanting in psychological insight into the economic motives of American society, but stamped with the characteristic French attitude that is powerless to see any of the larger background of idealism, to which de Tocqueville almost alone among his compatriots has had the perspicacity to do real justice, in the American character.

[2] The pragmatic realism of the Americans is shown by the fact that they "regard the *jus gladii* . . . as imposed so imperiously by the nature of things that they accept it even under the form of Lynch law" (*De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme,* p. 75). *Cf.* Mr. Waldo Frank's *Our America,* in which pragmatism is related to the same tendencies.

[3] *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme,* note, p. 20.

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So it is largely because pragmatism offers him a new point of approach to the problem of discrediting the false intellectualism which he had clearly discerned all along as the enemy of the sublime and the freely heroic, and as the friend of calculation and rationalism, that M. Sorel offers to enlist himself as a disciple of William James. He himself is like a disillusioned Mephistopheles counseling the pleasures of activity to the Faust-spirit of the age, and not at all the honest romanticist that was James. But his doctrine is romanticist, and his perception of the development of James' doctrine shows how the inherent determinism of a pragmatism which tries to pass beyond this romanticism into scientific description is sure to appear.

For it is always well to remember that M. Sorel, although he professes the creed of violent revolution, is still a Marxian, with the conviction that capitalism carries fatally within its own nature the seeds of its destruction. His conception of "artificial nature" is very interesting from this aspect: the mechanism of modern industry and the mechanism of the physical sciences are analogous in being the forms under which we handle this artificial nature. "The former furnish economic utilities under the hands of skilful workers, whereas the latter make laws appear to him who knows how to interrogate them; but this difference of social employment cannot conceal from us the systematic identity of these two means of operation [*moyens de travail*]." Moreover, "the artificial nature of the *savants* and that of the producers are equally submitted to these revolutions which overturn every few years the finest contemporary inventions." These revolutions, like the Marxian catastrophe, are the facts, and the proper pragmatic method would be to proceed from them to scientific description, not from description in its fantastically ideological "scientific" form back to "historic creations". He reproaches James with having been misled in this respect by allies like M. H. Poincaré, for the scientists who follow the ideological method miss the true determinism of history, or as M. Sorel puts it, "they can't come to the comprehension that history can explain itself his-

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torically; pragmatism is at one with the historic materialism of Marx."[1]

In order to sustain the thesis that his own interpretation of pragmatism is the correct one, he begins with the following declaration: "In this book there will be little enough question of the positions held by William James [*les thèses organisées*]; I shall set myself the task of treating some problems whose importance is universally recognized in the spirit of pragmatism; it is only in re-thinking, in a European brain, the philosophy of William James that one can give it the fecundity, the force, and the sureness of application that we exact of every classic doctrine." (Shades of the long-suffering James!) The proper method to follow in this interpretation would be, according to an earlier dictum of M. Sorel's which he repeats with some edification, "to learn pragmatism pragmatically", or as he had said earlier: "The true method to follow in order to discover the defects, the insufficiencies and the errors of any considerable philosophy, consists in criticizing it after its own proper principles."[2]

But instead of applying pragmatism to those concrete social ends by which its fruits could be tested pragmatically, the rest of the book is devoted largely to historical and critical "Observations on Greek Science", on "Experience in Modern Physics", and to a detailed "Critique of *Creative Evolution*" and M. Bergson's theories, with a final chapter on "Renan and the Theology of Saint Sulpice", in the course of which even the spirit of James's pragmatism vanishes utterly.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 85 and note. M. Sorel has pointed out, however, the aptness of pragmatism to the democratic optimism in "*les forces novatrices*" of the American civilization to which the philosophy is indigenous (p. 168 *et seq.*). He thinks, with a good deal of justification, that the adventurous spirit of the Yankees finds its expression in pragmatism because that doctrine is "full of confidence in the "*forces mystérieuses de l'histoire*" (p. 172). As a Marxian, he has faith in a particular form of the same myth, the degeneration of capitalist society.

[2] *Insegnamenti sociali della economia contemporanea*, p. 89. He had written in an article in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, Sept., 1910: "Philosophy should renounce the pretence of bringing solutions. . . . A philosophy is only valuable by reason of the *results that it provokes indirectly*. . . . In a word, a philosophy is only valuable as a means of favoring invention." This was true pragmatic doctrine, in advance of any conscious conversion.

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It happens, however, that all unconsciously M. Sorel has had a practical application of pragmatic romanticism to syndicalist problems before his very eyes—one which has been receiving for some time a very searching pragmatic test. He had given a most striking exhortation, in the spirit of his interpretation of the "Will to Believe", to French and Italian Syndicalism, urging the necessity of creating an heroic "Myth": the catastrophic regeneration of society through the General Strike—a sublime fanaticism of violence to revitalize the sick soul of Europe. The "Myth" was already a stock-in-trade of the revolutionary Syndicalism which had captured the C. G. T. in congress after congress.[1] It had been preached by M. Berth, Griffuelhes, Pouget and other disciples of the more rather than less anarchistic branch of Syndicalism which Pelloutier had organized as the real beginning of the C. G. T.[2] Lagardelle, as M. Bouglé said in his *Syndicalisme et Démocratie*, had "furnished the theme for young socialism, syndicalist and revolutionary," in his war-cry: "Duel to the death between socialism and democracy."[3] Democracy is the bog in which the proletariat remains stuck fast. By reducing all men to an equal fineness, as if they had been ground by the mills of the gods, democracy "mixes the classes" into a single class, and takes away the only protection men find against economic slavery: the right to protection through association. Therefore, down with democracy, at its best a vulgar tyranny of the majority, at its worst, a hypocritical subterfuge, masking from sight the chains they wear! The way out: the General Strike.

[1] See Levine, *op. cit.*, p. 237, note, *supra*. It has been noted and expatiated upon at length by Cole, *World of Labour*, Russell, *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, M. Challaye, *Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire et le syndicalisme réformiste* (1909), M. L. Jouhaux, *Le Syndicalisme français* (1913), M. G. Guy-Grand, *La Philosophie Syndicaliste*, and a host of others. A useful bibliography of the older Syndicalist literature is given by Cole, *op. cit.*, and of the most modern by R. L. M'ott, "The Political Theory of Syndicalism", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXXVII, no. 1, March, 1922. The most important works of recent date are M. Jouhaux's *Le Syndicalisme et le C. G. T.* (1920), M. E. Berth's *Les Derniers Aspects du Socialisme moderne* (1922), M. Maxime Leroy, *Les Techniques Nouvelles du Syndicalisme* (1921).

[2] *Cf.* Cole and Levine for the history of Syndicalism, *op. cit., supra.*

[3] Bouglé, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

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Destroy the old, and the *élan vital* of living will take care of the new.

This Syndicalist doctrine M. Sorel seized upon to turn into Myth, a motive force for that belief he saw with James that men must have in order to act, but which he went about creating in the same rationalistic spirit which had characterized his re-interpretation of the "Will to Believe". It is evident from M. Sorel's entire writings that he "thinks too much" ever to be anything but an *intellectuel* in the labor movement himself. "If one reflects too much, one never does anything,"[1] says M. Griffuelhes, very aptly. But although M. Sorel quite evidently does not believe in the possibility of his social Myth's attaining anything but mythical reality, he has, true to the temperament of the man of thought, an exaggerated idea of the value of "heroic action". His effort, really, was to get people to believe in Violence and the mythical Strike because he thought it would be good for them to do so. Mr. R. L. Mott, in discussing "The Political Theory of Syndicalism" has noticed that: "In general the pragmatic test for goodness is accepted, and the attempts of philosophers to generalize according [as to?] to its nature are discountenanced."[2]

The foundations of the Myth of the General Strike, then, are the same that the cloudy spirit of Pascal laid down in that famous wager on the existence of the deity; the truth of the belief can only be tested by the results it brings in; believe in God because you can't lose by believing in Him. Exactly the same *raisons de cœur* underlie James' "Will to Believe"; and it may be in each case the counsel of romanticism is equally unproductive of pragmatic results. Faith is not to be attained in any such fashion. Fanaticism is, though, even to the point of martyrizing those who do not accept your uneasy "faith". Renan noted with cynical insight that Giordano Bruno felt he must die to offer the supreme proof of martyrdom to the sincerity of his convictions, while Galileo submitted to the Holy

[1] Griffuelhes, *Bibliothèque du mouvement social*, p. 57.

[2] Mott, *op. cit.; cf.* also E. Dimnet, "Syndicalism and its Philosophy", *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1913; and E. C. Fairchild, "Syndicalism and its Philosophy", *English Review*, Oct., 1919.

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Office of the Inquisition in the calm certainty of his scientific rightness—"and yet it does!" he added, after formally denying that the earth moved about the sun. "One is only a martyr for the sake of things about which one is not really sure," Renan concludes. There is something of the same spirit of fanaticism, *a tergo*, in beliefs founded upon Myths which one wills to believe. The very insecurity of the conviction makes it necessary to "prove" it by forcing it upon others.

But the labor movement in France was fertile soil for the seeds of violence, and the Latin temperament of the Italian worker even more productive of the rank weeds of anarchy, their quickly-sprung crop. M. Sorel himself has consistently avoided the pragmatic test for his myths, and has warned his disciples against the querulous attempt to test a "Myth" in terms of its actual consequences.[1] In his despite, however, the C. G. T. and Italian Syndicalism hastened to a proof of the pudding—without finding it very much to their liking in the eating. One has to set M. Sorel's doctrines in their proper Latin background before it seems credible that enough importance should have been attached to them to give them to the test of act. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, in *The World of Labour*, refused to take the General Strike Myth seriously; he could not believe that the real meaning of French Syndicalism was to be had "in copying the opinions of M. Sorel out of one book into another", because he believed, with great justice, that the C. G. T. was more opportunistic than romanticist.[2] He was prepared, though, even before the war, for revolutionary and communistic developments in the Italian labor movement, both because of its lack of stable and responsible organization, and because of the suitability of M. Sorel's doctrine to so excitable and ill-educated a proletariat as the Italian industrialized population comprised.

Possibly one must have seen a popular demonstration in the Latin countries to appreciate the ease with which violence breaks out, and the general suitability of M. Sorel's doctrine to

[1] *Cf. supra*, p. 239, note; also p. 33 *et seq., op. cit.*

[2] Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

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the *milieux* for which it is intended. It was my fortune once to watch the May First demonstration of labor in Paris. It was in the armistice period, 1919, and the threat of Bolshevism was being taken seriously. From the top of the big German "Bertha" that pointed its captive nose up beside the Obelisk in the Place de la Concorde—as if it were still ready to hurl defiance at the heart of Paris and at the Idealist who was trying to create a Peace in the Hotel Crillon opposite—from that point of vantage, I watched the Red Flag go hurly-burly down the Rue Royale, breaking the thick cordons of the *agents de ville* and the special police. "*Debout les damnés de la terre*" the marchers sang, hoarse voices lifting the *Internationale* as once they must have raised the Revolutionary hymns, gathering to pull down the Bastille. The mob debouching from the Place de la Concorde met others coming from the Place de l'Opéra to form a junction at the Madeleine. There had been "incidents": word flew about that barricades were going up in parts of the city, that there was fighting going on at the Place de la Bastille, that the Red Flag had been raised. The crowd swayed and surged uncertainly, its voice rising to a steady roar. The street was packed, and the herd was beginning to trample some under, it almost seemed, in order to make room for the others.

Suddenly there was a sharp bugle blast, and a series of staccato commands from the cavalry which had been waiting, massed along the open Place on the side of the Tuileries, as if in memory of the direction in which the mob had turned its wrath in the days of the Commune. The squadrons began to move, forming with admirable order and in compact array to clear the streets. The crowd saw. There was a moment of dead silence, then pandemonium. The troopers moved steadily forward, sabers drawn, faces set. Incredibly a way opened for the first of them; the crowd seemed to melt back, to shrink like butter under the direct sun. Then the possibility of giving way further ended and people began to be trampled by the cavalry mounts. Some began to seize bridles and try to force the horses back. The troopers used the flats of their swords. An officer ordered the red flag to be seized. There was a con-

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fused fight, and a great outcry—a trooper or two knocked or dragged from their horses, and some of the marchers with sabre wounds. The crowd was beginning to feel the thrill of combat run through it.

I watched from my post on the captive Boche gun, wondering whether I was seeing the beginning of another Quatorze Juillet—wondering, too, I confess, whether I had chosen a healthful spot of observation, and whether an American officer would be reckoned as a neutral—when the situation suddenly dissolved into pure comedy. From somewhere appeared the *pompiers*, more resplendent than the Greeks before Troy, or even the *Garde Républicaine* on a fête day—with their helmets agleam, and their business-like fire hoses playing powerful streams into the midst of the mob. It was literally washed away—spluttering, still full of incoherent wrath, but divided against itself by the Gallic laughter of those who were not being drenched at those who were. Who knows? Had Versailles been protected by *pompiers*, and had all the water in its fountains been brought into play, the Bourbons might have had nothing to forget, nor indeed, anything to learn. Alas for the stupidity of the *ancien régime* and its Swiss Guard, or perhaps their misfortune in not having survived to the day when water might be projected by steam-pressure, and when the sense of humor of Demos had been rendered automatically susceptible of stimulation by episodes which suggest the American "Movie Comic"!

At any rate I left with the feeling that the annual May First General Strike had in it the possibility of becoming, under favorable circumstances, something more than a mere demonstration. The same opinion seems to have led the C. G. T. to attempt the pragmatic test of the Myth in May, 1920, the very next year. M. Duguit, the distinguished French jurist, has summed up the attempt in these words:

> In France, in the month of May, 1920, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* attempted to provoke a Bolshevist revolution by launching first a general strike of the railroads, then a series of assault-waves in succession, a strike of the united transport services, a strike of the

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metallurgists, a strike of seamen and dockers. But the attempt was a lamentable failure. The French conscience revolted. The entire nation rose and fell in line against the enemy within, as it had fallen into line in August, 1914, against the enemy without, and it hammered the Bolsheviks on the spot, just as it had hammered the Boches on the banks of the Marne.[1]

That was the ordeal of the pragmatically-taught Myth, tested in its own pragmatic terms. According to the *Temps* of May 9, 1921, the revolutionary control of the *syndicats* had suffered so great a blow that in the principal railway *syndicat* involved, eighty per cent of the membership had withdrawn within the year. There was a notable change in the attitude of the C. G. T. toward the Third International in the same year, one which resulted in a serious split within the ranks of the C. G. T., the power passing out of the hands of the most revolutionary element, and into the hands of those who refused any longer to do the bidding of Moscow.

The pragmatic test of the Revolution based upon the General Strike Myth which had been preached to them was applied even more thoroughly by the *Rivoluzione Mancata* of the Italian syndicalists. M. Sorel's teachings had proved very congenial indeed to the leaders of the Italian movement, who had, according to an Italian member of Parliament, "preached violence, revolution, and a quantity of other things; but, on the other hand, did not give themselves the trouble of preparing the proletariat technically or politically for the coming revolution."[2] The result was a two-years interim of strikes and utter social disorganization. "The maximalist movement", says the same observer, "revealed itself to be one of incoherent verbosity, but essentially and typically impotent. Revolutionary in word, yet estranged from the economic reality of the country, it demonstrated its incapacity to prepare a rational move-

[1] *Souveraineté et Liberté*, p. 189.

[2] *Il Facismo*, anonymous "*Deputato al Parlamento*" (*La Modernissima*, Milan, 1922), pp. 15-16. This political document contains a very good bibliography of writings on Facismo in French and Italian. *Cf.* also E. A. Mowrer, *Immortal Italy* (1922), "The Revolution that Never Was".

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ment, alienated the sympathies of the very middle classes in whom lay the only possibility and the indispensable elements of the success of a revolution, because of the fact that they furnished the technicians for all industry and commerce." In September the famous episode of the occupation of the factories occurred, just a few months after the complete failure of the C. G. T. in France.

All the elements which M. Sorel had thought necessary to the success of proletarian violence were present. The government, largely Socialist in its composition, behaved with the poltroonery which the Myth attributes to those in power, to the despised bourgeoisie, that is. But in spite of the fact that the workers were permitted to retain unmolested possession of the factories, the General Strike and the Social Revolution which was to accompany it simply "fizzled out". The factories fell idle, because there were no skilled technicians to direct their operation. The "aristocracy of manual labor", inspired by the uncalculating fervor of the producers' morality of which M. Sorel had spoken, came to an abrupt halt before the problem of credit and of exchange. They accepted an increase of wages as a "sop", and vague promises of joint control in the metallurgical industry in which the chief operations of the seizers of factories had occurred, and then subsided. The bubble of the General Strike Myth had been pricked again, and Facismo had found a *raison d'être*.

But M. Sorel, for all his pragmatism, has insisted that the Myth is not to be tested in that way. That is the sort of condemnation which is passed on Violence by English Socialism and milksop parliamentarianism. It is English and Belgian Socialism, and that of Jaurès in France and Kautsky in Germany, against which the special wrath of the *Mouvement Socialiste* is stored up—the Socialism which has recruited "Reformist" leaders who straightway desert it when the chance of power comes their way: "Make an insurrection when we feel ourselves solidly enough organized to conquer the State, that's what M. Viviani and the *attachés* of his office understand," says M. Sorel in disgust at their want of the sublime: "but proletarian violence which has no such end can only be treated

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as folly and the odious caricature of revolt. Do everything that you please, but don't break the butter plate!"[1]

The character of the Myth can never appear to such pusillanimity. On the contrary,

> The men who share in great social movements, represent their approaching action under the form of battle-images, assuring the triumph of their cause. I propose to call these constructions, whose recognition holds so much importance for historians, *myths;* the general strike of the syndicalists and the catastrophic revolution of Marx are myths. I have given as remarkable examples of myths, those which were constructed by primitive Christianity, by the Reformation, by the Revolution, by the Mazzinians; I wish to show that it is not necessary to analyze such systems of images as one decomposes a thing into its elements, that it is necessary to take them *en bloc* as historical forces, and that it is above all necessary to guard against comparing the accomplished facts with the representations which had been accepted before acting.[2]

The myth, then, partakes of the nature of Plato's "noble lies"; its object is to stir men to the heroic and the sublime, to carry them "out of themselves", and it cannot be justly submitted to a "detailed critique" by such intellectualistic critics as "accumulate objections against its practical possibilities". It is a belief, and its justification is the effect it has upon men's lives. It is, in pragmatic terms, the result of willing, not of logical analysis. James himself had said, "Reality falls in passing into conceptual analysis; it mounts in living its own individual life—it buds and burgeons, changes and creates." And it is the romanticist test M. Sorel insists upon applying to his Myth, rather than the Instrumentalist test of Dewey's pragmatism. Good Catholics ask themselves no such questions about the exact nature of their Myth, he insists. They are never discouraged by the hardest trials because they represent life as one perpetual battle between Satan and the army of Christ in which they serve. Let the workers but embrace the faith of the General Strike and they will be preserved similarly from the black doubts that come with failure.

[1] Sorel, *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme,* p. 32.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 33.

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The greatest cross M. Sorel himself has to bear is the accusation that is sometimes made against him that his theory of myths is no more than "a false translation" which turns the real opinions of the revolutionary Syndicalists into a mere "intellectualistic sophism". On the contrary, he maintains, he "wishes to get rid of the whole 'control' of the intellectualistic philosophy" because that can only embarrass the historian who follows it.[1] As an anti-intellectualist and an historian he reproaches Renan for having shown too much respect for that "scientific opinion" which his historian's insight should have shown him was worthless. The sacrifices of the Napoleonic soldier to the glory of his "*épopée éternelle*", of the Roman to the conquest of the world, of the Christian to his other-worldly faith—these are things which no intellectualistic philosophy may explain. History shows such faith rewarded by success, and it is a faith that does not go with intellectualism.

Renan it was who said this, yet could not see the escape from intellectualism through the creation of a sublime myth. "To have seen [the aimlessness of human affairs which he had said were almost without seriousness or precision] is a great result for philosophy, but it is an abdication of every active rôle. The future is to those who are not disabused."[2] One is tempted to say that M. Sorel is so honestly convinced of this that he sets about "abusing" the minds of the proletariat in order that they may have the future. As against the upholders of a false "*scientisme*" in human affairs he sets up the "Right to Believe" in a Myth of one's own choosing. This Myth would lose its moral and motive power if it were turned into an Utopia, an intellectualistic construction. It partakes of the nature of infinity and of Bergson's *vraie* or *pure durée*, because it is "not a description of things", but "an expression of the will". It will not be satisfied, like Utopias, by granting it parts of its wants, because its wants are not formulated. They simply "lead men to prepare themselves for a combat to destroy what exists".[3] The future will take care of itself: we

[1] Sorel, *De l'Utilité du Pragmatisme*, p. 35.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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have the assurance of the prophet for it. Is it not written in *Capital* that the working class is being prepared for its sublime rôle by the development of a new morality, engendered by that capitalistic régime which "is borne, by intimate laws of its own nature, in a road which conducts the present world to the gates of the future world, with the extreme rigor that governs the evolution of organic life"?[1]

The only fear is that reformist Socialism may lull the world into apathetic sleep. The mediocrity of the *haute-bourgeoisie* alone serves to make that a danger. Their sociologists preach a doctrine of conservative mediocrity and humanitarianism, seek to correct the abuses of capitalist economy in a way that the Marxian doctrine of catastrophic social revolution could not foresee, so that the Reformist Socialists actually seem to be gaining power. "Two accidents alone, it seems, are capable of arresting this movement", wrote M. Sorel in 1906; "a great foreign war which would be capable of refreshing their energies, and which, in any case, would bring, without doubt, men into power who had the will to govern; or a great extension of proletarian violence which would make the bourgeois see the revolutionary reality and would disgust them with the humanitarian platitudes with which Jaurès puts them to sleep."[2] The first of these M. Sorel was bad enough prophet to consider improbable when he wrote; so that he turns for hope to the second, which has likewise proved his contention true in the outcome. After the Russian display of "revolutionary reality", he can hardly complain that the bourgeoisie has gone to sleep and refused to accept the Marxian challenge. Smelling out Bolshevism has been the principal occupation of the social alarmists in every country since that time. The United States has deported all those "agitators" suspected of "red" ten-

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 112. Along with the organic rigidity of the evolution of capital, one may well remark that M. Sorel's idea of *devoir*, like that of M. Duguit, is one of social solidarity. But as social solidarity is a contradiction of the Marxian class struggle there can be no *devoir* until the bourgeoisie is suppressed. Then, however, the worker will have an obligation to outdo himself in production.—*Op. cit.*, p. 89; *cf.* "*La Morale des producteurs*", p. 331 *et seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 110. M. Sorel may have good reason to-day to exclaim with Hamlet, "Oh, my prophetic soul!"

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dencies, and its vigilant Department of Justice secured a number of convictions under statutes aimed at "criminal syndicalism". His own France, possibly through the advent to power of men with "the will to govern" during the war, has dealt very hardly with revolutionary spirits among the Communists, witness M. Marty, M. Cachin, M. Peri *et al.*, who have recently seen something of the inside of French prisons.

In short, M. Sorel would find today very little need to counsel the laborer "to pay with black ingratitude the kindness of those who wish to protect the workers, to oppose abuse to the homilies of those who defend human brotherhood, and to reply with blows to the advances of those who would propagate social peace." All this was for the sole end of keeping the bourgeoisie class-conscious, and forcing it to maintain the rigor of the Marxian class-struggle, without which "chance is introduced, and the future of the world is completely indeterminate."[1] The answer to Communist tactics is, as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald recently said in the *Socialist Review*, Facismo.

Anti-intellectualism's answer is set in terms it can understand: Violence begets force, as anarchy begets despotism. "*Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin!*" In Italy the reign of violence, the seizure of the factories, then the anti-communist dictatorship of Bucco in Bologna; the perpetual strikes and petty civil wars, then the Black Shirt enthroned; all through Central Europe, White Terrors succeeded the Red: Bela Kun, then the Whites. In that nightmare land of Russia, violence is maintained in power by force, in a fashion so glaringly tyrannical, so Erastian, and so hideous that it is hard to believe anyone ever found it necessary to preach violence in order to revive the nobility of the sleeping savage in Europe. With Germany convulsed as it is, with Rivera and Mussolini in power, it is not needful to go back to history earlier than that of the second decade of the twentieth century to watch Napoleon climb to power on the shoulders of the Directorate, again, or to see Repression swing its punishing axe over the neck of the Commune. Nor need M. Sorel, in his pragmatic preoccupa-

[1] Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

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tions with history, have gone farther afield to learn the lesson his France could teach him as to the outcome of violence. In the contest between Myths, the *Machtstaat* myth has swallowed instinctive Revolt as a rock-python might an adder. Even with the most Nietzscheian will to worship power, and the sublimity of violent might, one must have the temperament of an ostrich and its habits of hiding the head in order not to see, if one finds a mystic freedom for the proletariat in revolt. Those who have plans and who have the will to mastery are not backward about putting a leash upon the self-destructive power of proletarian violence. And no one drives harder than he who fears the steed he has tamed.

The lesson has not been lost on those radicals of the labor movement who are more interested in its success than in furnishing a spectacle of sublime futility through Myth-worship, and who remember how short a step takes the sublime to the ridiculous. Mr. Robert Hunter, who is one of labor's most sympathetic partisans, published in 1919 a careful study of *Violence and the Labor Movement* in which he developed with overwhelming wealth of instances the obvious thesis that anarchism simply strengthens the reaction against which it is aimed, just as reaction tends to develop violence through repression and injustice. The disciples of the General Strike Myth in America, the I. W. W., or Industrial Workers of the World, by advocating non-participation in the political life of the community, and by a concomitant policy of direct action and revolution, have simply placed the means of repression within the hands of government, and given its use through the "Criminal Syndicalism" Act the support of public opinion. No one can expect the unorganized rabble of casual labor that constitutes the American Syndicalist movement to deal with labor problems in the frame of mind of the British Labour Party, or even that evinced by the cohorts of Mr. Samuel Gompers. Instinctive revolt and violence are natural to them. But it is fairly Mephistophelian to strengthen this hopeless anti-intellectualism by an intellectualistic Myth of violence, as many of the *intellectuels* of the movement have followed M.

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Sorel in doing.[1] American labor of the unskilled and unorganized type is sufficiently prone to violent protests to make it certain that their very real wrongs will not pass unnoticed. A Herrin massacre, a miners' war in West Virginia—these show a native tendency to take the law into their own hands or to have recourse to lawlessness which it needs no Myth to rouse.

The Syndicalist trend in the labor movement, so far as it tends to violence, is only a proof of the unreadiness of labor for any such mastery as the Myth has led them to expect. There is another significance in Syndicalism as it means the broad movement toward industrial organization by occupational groups, one that has been interpreted by a radical like Mr. Tannenbaum in America as conservative in its tendencies. It is the Syndicalism to which M. Duguit looks for a new juridical basis for a social organization, and of which Guild Socialism and kindred doctrines are theoretical expositions. The "associationist" character of modern society is the key to an understanding of its problems, nor can there be any mistaking the importance of the "group movement" in every field of social activity—in religion, in art, in industry, and in politics. Society, that *Great Society* of which Graham Wallas has written with such a comprehensive view, is being forced to develop what he has called "Organizations" in order that the will and thought of groups with a community of purpose may find expression, and may carry weight against the dead inertia of our complex and intricately balanced civilization.[2]

Said Mr. J. A. Penty, in *A Guildsman's Interpretation of History*:

The danger that confronts us is precisely the same as confronted

[1] Haywood, W. D. (imprisoned in 1918 under war-time Criminal Syndicalism Act) and Bohn, F., *Industrial Socialism*, an apologia for the I. W. W. See Brooks, J. G., *American Syndicalism, the I. W. W.*, for a critical study, and Dr. P. Brissenden, *The I. W. W.*

[2] G. Wallas, *op. cit.*, chapters on "Thought Organizations" and "Will Organizations"; *cf.* E. Frankel, "Germany's Industrial Parliament", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXXVII, no. 3, September, 1922.

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France on the eve of the Revolution. It is the danger that a popular though unconscious movement back to medievalism may be frustrated by intellectuals whose eyes are turned in the opposite direction, and revolution be precipitated by the fact that the instinctive impulse of the people, instead of being guided into their proper channels where they would bear fruit a thousandfold, would be brought into conflict with doctrinaire idealists who believe in an economic evolution as it is not.[1]

That is an accurate enough description of what actually took place in Russia. Graham Wallas, again, has pointed out that the origins of the Russian revolution were largely instinctive and in response to the blind push of revolt that says to swollen hearts, "Everything is wrong. Destroy!" He has taken for his illustration the use to which the word *stikhjyny* was put by the people in describing their revolt: *stikhjyny* means, according to Mr. Julius West (from whose article in *The New Statesman* of May 5, 1918, Mr. Wallas gets this information) "elemental" or "intuitive". "One finds Bolshevik leaders", he says, "justifying most of the things for which they are responsible by the statement that they result from elemental forces. Revolution is a matter of these forces rather than of deliberate organization."[2] And so it is, no doubt; but the control of revolutionary force passes into the hands of those with whom organization is a part of a larger plan—into the hands of Lenin and Trotsky, and the All-Russian Executive of the Communist Dictatorship. The Mensheviks waited for the situation to shape itself, in accordance with the doctrines of Liberalism, and because of their general futility before the forces of violence which the Revolution had unleashed. The Bolsheviks, believers in a fatalistic and doctrinaire Marxism, had a plan and put it into execution. No doubt von Robert Müller was right in saying "Bolshevism is not really communism. It is the argument that men suffer, therefore

[1] Penty, *op. cit.*, p. 299. *Cf.* an article on "The Problem of Control in Medieval Industry", Austin P. Evans, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXXVI, no. 4, Dec., 1921.

[2] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 249.

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act."[1] But Bolshevism passed quickly into the power and control of those who had definite, even fixed, ideas about the way in which men should act; and Bolshevism became communism.

M. Sorel himself has seen and approved the development of his Myth. Previously his Myth had been free from any ideology, in particular that of the State: "Proletarian violence changes the aspect of all the conflicts in the course of which one observes it; for it denies the force organized by the bourgeoisie, and aims at suppressing the State which forms its central kernel."[2] In 1919 he had come to see the sublime in force, in the force of repression, as well as in the violence of revolt. It had been suggested by M. Paul Seippels, the Swiss publicist, that Lenin had no doubt derived his ideas of the efficacy of violence from M. Sorel. M. Sorel modestly disclaims any knowledge of such an influence—

but if it were true, I should be uncommonly proud of having contributed to the intellectual formation of a man who seems to me to be at the same time the greatest theorist that Socialism has had since Marx and a *chef d'État* whose genius recalls that of Peter the Great.

At the moment when the Commune of Paris succumbed, Marx was

[1] *Bolshevik und Gentleman* (1920). A brief but comprehensive description of the seizure of power in the Soviets is contained in P. H. Douglas, "Occupational *vs.* Proportional Representation", *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1923.

[2] *Réflexions sur la violence*, p. 29; *cf.* the chapter on the "*Grève générale politique*" where M. Sorel makes some pertinent observations about a General Strike which simply aims at a change of masters—observations especially applicable to Russia to-day. All the bourgeois education has tended toward social solidarity, says M. Sorel (pp. 267-268); "all the revolutionary effort tends to the creation of *free men;* but the democratic rulers set themselves the mission of realizing the moral unity of France. This moral unity is the automatic discipline of producers who would be happy to work for the glory of their intellectual chiefs." (*Cf.* also, *Décomposition du Marxisme*, p. 53.)

But to copy the democratic ideology of the state in this fashion would be to suffer defeat at the outset. "Better to know how to content itself [Syndicalism] for a while with feeble and chaotic organizations than to fall under the domination of syndicates which would copy the political forms of the bourgeoisie" (p. 268). The experience of the soviets and their powerlessness before Communist organization might be of some pragmatic value in weighing such a theory.

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writing a manifesto of the International, in which modern socialists are accustomed to search the most finished expressions of the political doctrines of the master. The speech made in May, 1918, by Lenin on the problems of the power of the soviets has not less importance than Marx's study on the civil war of 1871. It may be that the Bolsheviks will end by succumbing under the blows of the mercenaries engaged by the plutocracies of the Entente; *but the ideology of the new form of proletarian state will not perish* [my italics]; it will survive in amalgamating itself with the myths which will borrow their subject matter from the popular accounts of the struggle sustained by the Republic of the Soviets against the coalition of great capitalist parties.[1]

M. Sorel, like Minever Cheevy, was born out of his time. He should have been a troubador to sing the sublimity of feats of arms. Gone all that aversion to the power of the State, now that its control rests upon might established by violence. His appreciation of *tours de force* is really medieval and thoroughly in line with the romanticist pragmatism he has called in as an ally. Let the dubious go to William James's essay on "Great Men and their Environment." M. Lagardelle had put forward the basic principle of Syndicalism in a way which had formerly commanded M. Sorel's approval: "To-day men believe less and less in the creative force of the State and the magic of Parliamentarism. . . . It is the business of Syndicalism to be self-sufficient."[2] But with the transformation of the State from the organ of bourgeois poltroonery to communist might, even the ideology of the State assumes a value, and an imperishable one. M. Sorel accepts the State which the genius of Lenin has created, or at least preserved. In his own person he has fulfilled the cycle of the Myth; starting with a defense of anarchy he has wound up with a defense of despotism. But how could a politics founded on the sublime

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 442-443. Violence had been the god in whom M. Sorel had put his trust to prevent the erection of a State founded on force. Now that his god has forsaken him, he worships the conqueror, accepting the pragmatic test of history. During the war he became "an admirer of the Italian monarchy". See James Oneal, "Extremists who deserted" in "The Changing Fortunes of American Socialism", *Current History*, April, 1924.

[2] Quoted by Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

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do anything else, in the presence of Lenin, moved dramatically across the world-stage by a "*mysticisme têtu et illuminé*,"[1] and the spectacle of Trotzky and his Red armies beating against the gates of Europe.

For all M. Sorel's refusal to turn his Myth into a Utopia by any specifications beyond its content of destruction, he was not entirely a stranger to the idea of social discipline, and he had eulogized repressive force before—as he does now in the entirety of his "Defence of Lenin"—in the persons of those epic figures of history whose morality had been the Master Morality of Nietzsche.[2] Indeed the morality of the proletariat, he agrees with Kautsky, is only to be reckoned in terms of the sublime. In a very left-handed way this morality of the sublime is very much the same thing which M. Duguit, the jurist, talks of in terms of "social solidarity". For it becomes, when M. Sorel considers it in the setting of production proper to it, the morality of class solidarity, and it knows no laws save the realistic ones of fear and force. It is of course necessary to make the reservation that M. Sorel is consistently a Marxian in his insistence on class solidarity as opposed to social solidarity, and a Romanticist in his anti-intellectualism, while M. Duguit is, in his *solidarisme*, the complete Positivist, with a pragmatic outlook that is Instrumentalist throughout. That is, the sublime gets the emphasis of M. Sorel because of its mystic and heroic side. The realistic and organic sides of society, on the other hand, are most stressed by M. Duguit. But the fact both cling to is force or power. M. Sorel's sublimity is that of Nietzsche's superman and of proletarian might so ruled. M. Duguit's solidarity is that of force, the force of economic needs.

Yet how rude a difference there is between the class morality of producers which M. Sorel had predicted, and that which actually exists in the Russia which has risen out of the application of his Myth! He had compared the worker in the factories with the soldiers of the Revolution, and the artist, and

[1] Taken by Sorel (p. 452) from Etienne Antonelli's description of Lenin in *La Russie Bolchéviste*, p. 272,—with the remarkable observation "*Cette formule n'est pas tres claire*"(!). This from the creator of the Myth of Violence!

[2] *Cf. Réflexions*, especially pp. 322-323, 358-359.

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he had found that under the Syndicalist régime of the future the worker would consider himself a moral person, freely abandoning all idea of exact recompense, striving only to pass all exactly measured production, and solicitous only to be exact in his craftsmanship. The springs of this idealistic morality of service, which would assure the social solidarity of the future could come from only one source: the General Strike Myth, whose motive power, once started, apparently was to go on "impassioning" the souls of the workers forever. "Violence, illuminated by the idea of the general strike," that was to be the syndicalist end: "All the old abstract dissertations on the future socialist régime become useless; we pass to the domain of real history, to the interpretation of facts, to the evaluations of an ethical order of the revolutionary movement."[1]

But when we have actually passed to "the domain of real history" our "interpretation of facts" can only lead us to one evaluation of the position of the worker in Russia. There, if anywhere, Syndicalism was expressed by the Soviet, the Myth by violence. Yet the worker is perhaps more helpless there than in any country in the world. The law offers him its protection only so long as he supports the dictatorship; otherwise he may expect the summary judgment of the Cheka. He is forced to work longer hours, and to accept any pay he is given. He is, to all practical intents, a slave, and without the "wage slave's" little area of legal liberty. As for his morality as a producer, it is a slave's morality. And this is not to reckon that considerable part of the population which Syndicalism ignores in theory, the peasants. In practice they have made their individualistic claims felt.

Stripped of its trappery of the sublime and the violent, M. Sorel's Syndicalism does offer to us, it is still worth noting, the same optimism for a new social order to come out of the organization of society through occupational groups that is implicit in all the theories growing out of the greater Unionism, as Mr. Cole has called it. The attack on the State is in the name of a more vivid reality represented by the *syndicat*, the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 389; *cf.* also p. 331 *et seq.*

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trade union. It is the State of Rousseau, the intellectualist and egalitarian State, consecrated in the American Constitution and in the *Declaration des droits de l'homme*, that he will have none of.[1] The "New State" of Sovietism, conceived in violence and dedicated to the proposition that force is the legitimate weapon of a class-conscious minority, he accepts. Is not the "New State" of Facismo fathered by the same Myth, to the degree in which it rejects constitutional democracy?

Force is the *ultima ratio* of the pragmatic gospel of Syndicalism, at least, and it would be interesting to know whether the sublime quality of Facismo justifies it in the eyes of M. Sorel, after the demonstration of impotence which Italian Syndicalism furnished in 1920. He became an admirer of the Italian Monarchy during the war for less. M. Paul Hazard has pointed out in *L'Italie Vivante*,[2] that the elastic nature of Facismo had even incorporated within itself part of the Italian Syndicalists. Signor Benito Mussolini, well schooled in the doctrines of the sublimity of violence, perhaps, from his earlier rôle as a Socialist leader, simply turned the reverse side of the shield, and showed that the Myth of patriotism which the Syndicalist theorists had considered only a war camouflage for national self-interest, could be used to enlist violence more successfully than the General Strike myth. It remains to be seen how long Italy can be held together by such bonds, particularly as they have been translated into a very unstably organized political majority for the government, unstable despite the travesty on election reform recently passed.[3] Once more, the

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 401-402.

[2] *Cf. Communisme et "Fascio" en Italie* by Jean Alazard, Paris, ed. Bossard (1922), and *Il Fascismo e i Partiti politici*, R. Mondolfo col., Bologna (Cappelli), 4 vols. See also, S. Murphy, "Fascimo Reform or Reaction, the Development of Italian Syndicalism", *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1924.

[3] The electoral law, described as "electoral reform", abolishes the old system of proportional representation in Italy and gives two-thirds of the total seats in Parliament to the party which gains a plurality of the votes cast in the fifteen electoral districts of the nation, the rest being divided among the other parties by means of the quotient system of proportional representation. That means a working majority of considerable proportions for any political party that can command the lead in votes, in contrast to the old system of "group-

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violence aimed at the State idea has rebounded to the injury of its initiators, succeeding only in establishing the rule of an unconstitutional dictatorship, based on popular reaction against lawlessless. Now that Facismo is trying to stifle labor in Italy, shall we see Facismo swallowed in turn?

Surely, too, something like the Facist revolution that is gaining in Europe is happening in Ireland. The land is so weary of violent methods of asserting political opinions that it has sanctioned repressive measures on the part of its own government that have hardly been equaled under English rule except when Cromwell ground order into the Irish with an iron heel. The moral of the story is not hard to guess: The answer to violence is force. It is not in that direction that the promise of Syndicalism lies. Tested by the pragmatic test of history, the romanticist doctrine of instinctive revolution translates itself into calculated despotism. The anti-intellectualist faith in intuition lends itself to the preachers of such Social Myths, just as the pragmatic criterion of the good is used to justify the Nietzscheian gospel of force. But in the issue of fact, the myth of violence suffers a sea-change: slowly it turns to force.

Force is the economic interpretation of morality. It ends by reducing anti-intellectualism to materialistic determinism, as M. Sorel has claimed, for force is the conception under which the physical sciences must construct their deterministic world. In theory and in practice, human conduct treated in these terms resolves itself into the satisfaction of organic needs, what we may sum up as economic interests. Into a world so conceived, the morality of the ideal can never enter. The proper ethical method is that of "scientific" positivism, which Romanticism set out to leave behind. Yet so long as it proceeds on the lines laid out by its pragmatic criteria of value, it can construct only

coalition". Signor Mussolini is apparently confident of his power now to command sufficient votes throughout Italy to make this working majority assured to the Facisti party; but one can only surmise from his manner of treating Parliament in the past what would happen if an opposition party, say the Socialists, won the elections. For a description of the proposed election law, see the London *Times* of June 9, 1923, or the *Trade Bulletin* of the "Italy-America Society" for September, 1923, for a description of the law as finally passed, July 23, 1923 (Sig. D. Bigongiari).—[Since this article was written the Mussolini Government has won a majority in a general election.—ED.]

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in this way. Romanticism is forced into an acceptance of the Instrumentalist test of survival, because its own "subjective satisfactoriness", without more in it than "ability to work", leads no further than mysticism.

So far as man is an organism, and so far as society is organic, it is susceptible to pragmatic treatment. But the normative nature of man and of society is never content with the fulfilment of need alone. It is forever reshaping need into purpose, the necessity it finds into the moral necessity it creates. The actual never represents to it the limits of the possible, as Aristotle showed so finally. It is a future-building function, in terms that set it in relation to its real connection with the organic part of its nature; and it carries the germ of futurity into its every present act.

That is what gives so real an importance to the conception of justice in human societies. Those who set up Force as their god have created a jealous god that will have none other before him. Justice can not exist where he rules: As Pascal said, Force makes Justice in that kingdom. But neither can Force be worshipped where there is a common will to realize Justice through rights reciprocally admitted, and duties mutually assumed. That is, under an Anglo-Saxon conception, through the rule of law.

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THE TURKISH PETROLEUM COMPANY—A STUDY IN OLEAGINOUS DIPLOMACY

IT is doubtful whether before the Great War one American in five hundred could have located Mesopotamia on the map. It is almost certain that in 1914 few Americans would have been bold enough to prophesy, if even to conceive, that Mesopotamia within ten years would become the subject of American diplomatic interest involving long and acrimonious correspondence between Washington and Whitehall. And yet so astonishing were the economic and political changes wrought by the war that in 1920 an American Secretary of State, Mr. Bainbridge Colby, warned His Majesty's Government that "the fact cannot be ignored that the reported resources of Mesopotamia have interested public opinion in the United States as a potential subject of international strife". To cite a single example, continued Mr. Colby, "because of the shortage of petroleum, its constantly increasing commercial importance, and the continuing necessity of replenishing the world's supply by drawing upon the latent resources of undeveloped regions, it is of the highest importance to apply to the petroleum industry the most enlightened principles recognized by nations as appropriate for the peaceful ordering of their economic relations".[1]

Although the American and British Governments have committed themselves to apply "enlightened principles" in the settlement of the Mesopotamian oil controversy, they have emphasized varying degrees of enlightenment and have disagreed upon the facts in the case. The Government of the United States has extolled the enlightened principle of the open door, which would bar exclusive economic advantages and would assure to all equality of treatment in law and in fact.

[1] Mr. Colby to Lord Curzon, November 20, 1920, "Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories", *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmd. 675 (1921).

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His Majesty's Government has paid tribute to the enlightened principle of the sanctity of international engagements and of acquired property rights, without which there is no guarantee of economic security. In Mesopotamia these principles have clashed, and reconciliation requires analysis of the facts, regarding which, unfortunately, there are fundamental differences of opinion. The British Government contends that exploitation of the oil fields of Mesopotamia is vested in an English corporation, the Turkish Petroleum Company, by the terms of a concession granted by the Imperial Ottoman Government June 28, 1914. The American Government, on the other hand, denies that the Turkish Petroleum Company possesses a valid title of the character described. In the first instance, therefore, judgment of the merits of the controversy involves a sifting of the various claims and an examination of the special position of the Turkish Petroleum Company.

At the opening of the twentieth century title to the oilfields of the Ottoman vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad was vested as a government monopoly in the Civil List of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Oil was then being exploited on a small scale and by primitive methods to meet local demands. In 1901, however, a German technical commission reported that Mesopotamian oil resources warranted more extensive operations. Three years later the Deutsche Bank of Berlin, through the Anatolian Railway Company, obtained the privilege of surveying the oilfields of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, with an option within one year of entering into a contract with the Ottoman Government for their operation on joint account. The survey was carried out as planned, but for some reason or other the option was allowed to lapse. Nevertheless, on the basis of preliminary prospecting German promoters were considered to have a priority of interest in any subsequent award of the concession.

The first British claim to the Mesopotamian oilfields was acquired through the activities of Mr. William Knox D'Arcy, an Australasian who laid the foundations of British oil power in Persia. In 1906 Mr. D'Arcy, "with the full support of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople",[1] petitioned the

[1] Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis, February 28, 1921, *ibid.*

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Sultan for the rights which the Deutsche Bank had permitted to lapse. Negotiations continued throughout 1907 without result and were interrupted by the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution the following year. In 1909 control of the Mesopotamian oilfields was transferred from the Sultan's Civil List to the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, and the question of petroleum concessions became involved in the complicated negotiations of 1910–1911 regarding a loan to the new Turkish Government, an increase in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire, and a proposed internationalization of the Bagdad Railway.[1] Because of what the Turks considered the unfriendly policies of Sir Edward Grey during these negotiations no definitive action was taken on Mr. D'Arcy's application of 1906, and in 1911 his position was not much stronger than it had been before the Young Turk Revolution. In the meantime, however, Mr. D'Arcy had incorporated in 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to which he assigned all of his oil claims including whatever consideration he deserved in the Mesopotamian fields. The full importance of this step is appreciated only by reference to the fact that in the spring of 1914 the British Government purchased a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Between 1908 and 1912 the Royal Dutch-Shell combine[2] appears to have joined the scramble for control of the oil resources of Mesopotamia. In some manner, through the good offices of Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, an Ottoman subject of considerable influence and ability, sometimes called the Talleyrand of oil diplomacy, they secured a claim to consideration in the award of Turkish petroleum concessions. Thus, by 1912 there were three groups jostling each other for favorable position in Mesopotamia.

At this stage of the proceedings Sir Ernest Cassel, an English banker of German birth, conceived the idea of forming an

[1] *Cf.* E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923), chapter ix.

[2] The Royal Dutch and Shell interests, represented by Henri Deterding and Sir Marcus Samuel (now Lord Bearsted), respectively, effected a combination of their interests in 1907, doing business in the name of two corporations, the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company.

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Anglo-German syndicate under British control for the purpose of reconciling the divergent interests involved. Sir Ernest Cassel enjoyed the confidence of the Turkish Government and the good-will of the Deutsche Bank, and he had the good fortune to be represented in Constantinople by Sir Henry Babington Smith, president of the National Bank of Turkey[1] and former British representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. In 1912 Sir Ernest Cassel formed an English joint-stock corporation, The Turkish Petroleum Company, with a capital of £80,000, for the purpose of acquiring all claims to the Mesopotamian oilfields, as well as of prospecting for oil in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. At the outset all shares in the new company remained in the control of the National Bank of Turkey, presumably for subsequent allocation to the various interests concerned. Sir Ernest Cassel had the cooperation of the Deutsche Bank and appears to have won over the Royal Dutch-Shell interests,[2] but he did not succeed in winning the support of the D'Arcy group for reasons which will be explained later.

In 1913 the British and German Governments took a hand in the situation, and there ensued a series of delicate negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey and between Great Britain and Germany[3] regarding delimitation of spheres of economic interest in the Ottoman Empire. During 1913 Hakki Pasha, Ottoman ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in London, and Sir Edward Grey, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, signed a number of agreements regularizing British economic rights in Turkish territory. The following spring important Anglo-German agreements sought to define and regulate British and German interests in numerous concessions in Asiatic Turkey.[4]

[1] The National Bank of Turkey was a British-owned institution established in 1909 upon invitation of the Young Turks.

[2] Mr. Gulbenkian subsequently appears as a director of the National Bank of Turkey. *Directory of Directors,* 1919, p. 493.

[3] Simultaneously negotiations were being conducted between Germany and France.

[4] *Cf.* "The Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey", in THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume XXXVIII, No. 1 (March, 1923), pp. 24-44; Earle, *op. cit.,* chapter x.

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Among these agreements is a significant document—the text of which is published for the first time as an appendix to this article—arranging the fusion of interests in Mesopotamian petroleum concessions. This remarkable agreement was signed at the Foreign Office, London, March 19, 1914, by Sir Henry Babington Smith, representing Sir Ernest Cassel and the National Bank of Turkey; Mr. (now Sir) Henri Deterding, representing the Royal Dutch, and Mr. Walter H. Samuel, the Shell, interests in the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company; Dr. Carl Bergmann, representing the Deutsche Bank; Sir Charles Greenway and Mr. H. S. Barnes, representing the D'Arcy interests, otherwise the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It also bore the signatures of Sir Eyre Crowe, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and of Herr R. von Kühlmann, on behalf of the Imperial German Government. Although Hakki Pasha did not sign for the Ottoman Government, he probably took part in the negotiations.

Perhaps the most significant result of the agreement of March 19, 1914, was that it gave control of the Turkish Petroleum Company—which was to have a monopoly of oil production in European and Asiatic Turkey [1]—to the D'Arcy group. In this connection the question naturally arises: Why was Sir Ernest Cassel willing to surrender his interest in Mesopotamian oil to the Anglo-Persian Company? The answer is that the British Government insisted upon it.[2] But the answer, in turn, requires explanation.

There had long been a connection between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the British Admiralty. Lord Strathcona, Chairman of the Anglo-Persian Company, was for a time Chairman of the Admiralty Oil Committee. In 1912—when Sir Ernest Cassel was attempting to merge in the Turkish Petro-

[1] *Cf.* paragraph 10 of the agreement, *infra*, p. 279.

[2] Sir Robert Waley Cohen, of the Royal Dutch-Shell group, in a letter to *The Times*, September 1, 1921, asserted categorically that the interests which he represents took part in these negotiations only as a result of representations by the British Government. Furthermore, according to Sir Robert, the initiative in the reorganization of the Turkish Petroleum Company was taken by the Government.

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leum Company all conflicting claims to the Mesopotamian oil-fields—Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, despatched a mission to Persia to survey the Anglo-Persian fields and to report upon their availability as sources of fuel for the fleet. The report of the commission was favorable, and from that moment Mr. Churchill and other members of Mr. Asquith's cabinet were determined that none of the claims of the Anglo-Persian Company, in Persia or elsewhere, should fall into the hands of "foreign or cosmopolitan companies". In July, 1913, Mr. Churchill informed the House of Commons that the Admiralty was rapidly approaching a point beyond which the Government would "become the owners, or at any rate the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the oil which the navy required". A few months later definite steps were taken toward the purchase by the British Government of a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Indirectly, therefore, the Foreign Office had a very real concern in the allocation of interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company as defined by the agreement of March 19, 1914.[1]

In accordance with their general understanding the British and German Governments by joint notes to the Sublime Porte dated June 18 and 19, 1914, formally requested the Sultan to confer upon the reorganized Turkish Petroleum Company a concession for the exploitation of the oil resources of the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad. Replying on June 28, the Grand Vizier informed the British and German embassies at Constantinople that the Imperial Ottoman Government would lease to the Turkish Petróleum Company all petroleum deposits in the aforementioned provinces, subject, however, to mutual agreement regarding the share of the Ministry of Finance in the enterprise and regarding other details of the concession. It was furthermore stipulated by the Grand Vizier that the concessionaires should stand prepared to indemnify any persons

[1] Regarding the acquisition by the British Government of a share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, see *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, fifth series, Volume LV (1913), pp. 1466 *et seq.*, Volume LXIII (1914), pp. 1131-1250, Volume LXV (1914), *passim*. Also Winston Spencer Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Volume I (London, 1923), pp. 130-135.

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who could legally establish a claim to participation in the concession. The last-named proviso was so nebulous[1] as to bring forth a vehement protest from the British and German ambassadors. On July 8 the Ottoman Government modified its demands, but as late as July 22 no agreement had been reached on this and other points. Thereupon the Sublime Porte notified Hakki Pasha at London that, inasmuch as the negotiations had become protracted and complicated, it appeared advisable to have a representative of the Turkish Petroleum Company proceed to Constantinople, there to settle in agreement with the embassies and with the Ministry of Finance the definitive terms of the concession. This was the status of the Turkish Petroleum Company upon the outbreak of the Great War. It had been granted *not a concession* but *the promise of a concession*.

Nevertheless there is much justification for Lord Curzon's contention that "in the circumstances the oil rights in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad cannot be treated merely as a matter of abstract principle or without reference to the special character of the negotiations which preceded the war. Had no war supervened, and had Mesopotamia remained till now under Turkish rule, the exploitation of these oil deposits would long since have begun. It can hardly be contended that His Majesty's Government should now question the validity of an undertaking granted by the Turkish Government in return for consideration received."[2] If the Turkish Petroleum Company does not possess a definitive concession, it may at least be said to enjoy priority over other competitors for the Mesopotamian oilfields.

The Great War strengthened the hold which British nationals and the British Government held upon Turkish oil resources. By the autumn of 1918 British troops were in possession of Bagdad and Mosul, and it was charged by the Government of the United States, although denied by Lord Curzon, that under

[1] The reference may have been to certain unsubstantiated claims of the American Admiral Chester or to the personal property rights of the Sultans.

[2] Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis, February 28, 1921, *Parl. Papers, loc. cit.*

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the guise of military necessity pipe lines and refineries were constructed, oil wells were operated, and prospecting was permitted under "circumstances which created the impression that some benefit would accrue to British oil interests".[1] In various secret engagements among the Allies during the war appropriate arrangements were made on behalf of the Turkish Petroleum Company. For example, although the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 placed Mosul in the French zone of influence, Sir Edward Grey obtained from M. Cambon a letter pledging the French Government to respect the validity of the economic rights of British nationals in all territory of the Ottoman Empire which was to become French or in which French influence was to become predominant.[2] Subsequently this assurance was made doubly sure by the transfer of Mosul to the British zone[3] and by a provision of the Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, which confirmed Allied nationals in acquired rights in territories detached from Turkey.[4] Furthermore, the treaty of October 10, 1922, between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Irak confers sufficiently wide "advisory" powers upon the British High Commissioner at Bagdad to prevent invalidation of the economic rights of British nationals in Mesopotamia.[5]

[1] Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon, May 12, 1920, *op. cit.* It should be recalled that the original British expedition to Mesopotamia was despatched for the purpose "of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines" of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.—*Parliamentary Papers,* 1917, Cd. 8610.

[2] M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey, May 15, 1916. Text published in A. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria* (London, 1923), pp. 163-164.

[3] By an agreement of December, 1918, between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. *Cf.* Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 volumes, Garden City, 1922), Volume I, pp. 70-72.

[4] Article 311 of the Treaty of Sèvres reads as follows: "In territories detached from Turkey to be placed under the authority or tutelage of one of the Principal Allied Powers, Allied nationals and companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals holding concessions granted before October 29, 1914, by the Turkish Government or by any Turkish local authority shall continue in complete enjoyment of their duly acquired rights, and the Power concerned shall maintain the guarantees granted or shall assign equivalent ones."

[5] *Cf.* especially Article IV of the Treaty, *Parliamentary Papers,* Cmd. 1757, 1922.

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The British Government not only gained effective political control of the territory within which lie the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but it strengthened British control of the company itself. In December, 1918, the twenty-five per cent interest of the Deutsche Bank was expropriated as enemy property and was transferred shortly thereafter to a trustee for the British Government, Lancelot Hugh Smith. The expropriated German interest, together with the fifty per cent participation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,[1] gave the British Government control of three-quarters of the stock of the Turkish Petroleum Company. This control was accentuated by the fact that in 1915 Mr. Henri Deterding became a naturalized British subject, thus Anglicizing the Royal Dutch Company in managership if not in control and reenforcing British official participation in the Turkish Petroleum concessions with the remarkable perspicacity of an oil magnate whom Lord Fisher described as "Napoleonic in his audacity and Cromwellian in his thoroughness". In recognition of war-time and post-war services Mr. Deterding in 1920 was created a Knight of the British Empire.

Complete British control of the Mesopotamian oilfields was modified by the terms of the San Remo Oil Agreement of April 25, 1920,[2] by which the British Government consented to allow to France the former German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company. In return, the French Government agreed to put no legal or fiscal obstacles in the way of the construction of two separate pipe-lines (together with railways necessary for their maintenance) "for the transportation of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean", the oil

[1] According to the latest available figures the British Government owns five million ordinary and one million preference shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and controls 10,200,000 of 20,000,000 votes at shareholders' meetings. *Cf. The Oil Encyclopedia* (London, 1922), pp. 376-380, and *The Petroleum Yearbook* (London, 1923), pp. 267-268.

[2] Negotiated by M. Philippe Berthelot, of the Quai d'Orsay, and Professor Sir John Cadman, Director of His Majesty's Petroleum Department, and approved by their respective superiors, M. A. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George. Text in *Parliamentary Papers,* Cmd. 675, 1920.

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thus transported to be free of any transit or export duties. Similarly, France was to grant facilities at the terminal ports for the erection of depots, railways, refineries, loading wharves and other equipment. Additional provisions of the agreement dealt with Franco-British cooperation in the exploitation of oil-fields in the British and French colonies, Rumania, Galicia and territories of the former Russian Empire.[1]

The San Remo Agreement aroused the wrath of Mr. Bainbridge Colby, Mr. Wilson's Secretary of State, who saw in it a monopolistic combination designed to ignore American interests and to exclude all but British and French nationals from access to the unappropriated oil resources of the world. The result was a tart note to Lord Curzon dated November 20, 1920, and delivered to the Foreign Office in London on December 7 following. In this note it was the contention of the American Government: (1) that the San Remo Agreement was in violation of the principle that the mandated areas "should be held and administered in such a way as to assure equal treatment to the commerce and to the citizens of all nations"; (2) that it appeared to violate British pledges that "the natural resources of Mesopotamia are to be secured to the people of Mesopotamia and to the future Arab State to be established in that region"; (3) that it constituted a premature and *ex parte* judgment by the British Government of the validity of the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company—a judgment to which the American Government would not subscribe; (4) that it ignored American interests which must be considered inasmuch as such rights as the Allied Powers possessed in the mandated areas accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers, in which the United States had been a participant and to the winning of which the United States had made substantial contributions. To this strenuous presentation of the American official point of view Lord Curzon delayed his acknowledgment until February 28, 1921, on the eve of the passing of the Wilson administration.

[1] According to the latest available report of the Turkish Petroleum Company (January, 1923) the former German interests have not been transferred to the French Government or any of its agents.

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The British Government and the officials of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have since acted on the assumption that what most concerns American statesmen is the rights of American nationals, not the open door and other abstract principles of international conduct. In any case, instead of entertaining the objection that the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company are invalid, and instead of considering the proposal that the oil of Mesopotamia should be preserved as one of the natural resources of the Arab State, British statesmen have sought to quiet American protests by offering to American companies a participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company. During the autumn of 1921 and the winter and spring of 1922, for example, Sir John Cadman, then a technical adviser to the Anglo-Persian Company, was in the United States conducting negotiations with American oil companies looking toward a working agreement between them and their British competitors. These negotiations were continued in London during the summer and autumn of 1922, apparently with the active cooperation of Ambassador Harvey. Although it has been suggested that an agreement regarding the Near East was consummated between the Anglo-Persian and Standard Oil Companies in October, 1922, subsequent developments in Persia and at the Lausanne Conference have upset the bases of the supposed settlement.[1]

The Lausanne Conference did little to simplify the Anglo-

[1] Messrs. E. H. Davenport and S. R. Cooke in their work *The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations* (New York, 1924), pp. 112-116, 144, 191, have stated that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company consented to grant to the Standard Oil Company a twenty-five per cent participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, a fifty per cent participation in the North Persian fields, and validation of certain pre-war prospecting licenses held by the Standard Oil Company in Palestine. The entry of the Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company into the Persian field in 1922, with the encouragement of the Persian minister at Washington, prevented any Standard-Anglo-Persian operations in the five northern provinces of Persia. And the unwillingness of the Harding Administration to recognize any special rights of the Standard, as compared with other American oil companies, appears to have forestalled the Turkish Petroleum aspect of the agreement. See, also, *The National Petroleum News* (New York), February-April, 1922; *The New York Times*, February 18, 1922, and March 23, 1924; *The World* (New York), October 27, 1922.

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American controversy regarding the Turkish Petroleum Company. The attempt of the British Government to have the company's concessions confirmed as of 1914 by the Turkish Nationalists was blocked by the American delegation; therefore in the special protocol regarding concessions signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, there is no reference to the Turkish Petroleum Company.[1] The validity of the company's claims was further challenged by counter-claims filed on behalf of the heirs of the former Sultan Abdul Hamid, who claimed personal property rights in the Mesopotamian oilfields, and the Ottoman-American Development Company, owners of the so-called Chester Concession. To confound confusion, the Mosul area, including its oilfields, was claimed by the Turks as theirs by reason of racial, historical, geographical, economic and political relationships. The result was a provision of the Lausanne Treaty by the terms of which the frontier between Turkey and Irak is to be determined in friendly negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain or by the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations.[2] Validation or invalidation of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concessions, therefore, is partially dependent upon the ultimate disposition of Mosul.

In the meantime, negotiations are proceeding between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and some six or seven American companies regarding American participation in the Turkish Petroleum concessions. This fact raises an interesting question. If a satisfactory share in the Mesopotamian oilfields is granted American petroleum interests, will the State Department recognize the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company, which from the first it has claimed to be invalid? And if it does so recognize these concessions, what will become of the much-vaunted principle of the open door?

[1] Certain other uncompleted and unratified concessions, however, were wholly or partially confirmed. *Cf. Parliamentary Papers,* Cmd. 1929 (1923), pp. 203 *et seq.* Regarding the American position on this question, see a speech of Secretary Hughes to the Council on Foreign Relations, reported in *The New York Times,* January 24, 1924.

[2] Article 4 of the Treaty of Lausanne. *Parliamentary Papers,* Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series No. 16, 1923.

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Legally, the position of the Turkish Petroleum Company is no stronger today than it was in June, 1914. Legally, the position of the Turkish Petroleum Company will be no stronger if American companies obtain twenty-five per cent of its stock than it is today under almost exclusive British ownership. But there are larger issues involved than purely legal issues. Is it the business of the American Department of State so actively to concern itself with the ventures of American petroleum companies in the four corners of the earth? In particular, is it the business of the Department of State to paddle in Mesopotamian oil? Even more important, is there any advantage to be gained by the promotion of these so-called national interests which will not be more than offset by possible friction between the American and British peoples? How can the United States expect European Powers to recognize the economic implications of the Monroe Doctrine if the United States is unwilling to recognize that European Powers have their particular spheres of interest? If the principle of the open door and of equality of economic opportunity is to be a contribution to international peace, it must be honestly applied. And it will not be honestly applied if it is compromised for the achievement of a temporary national advantage or if its advantages are acquired without its responsibilities being recognized.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE

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APPENDIX

Arrangements for Fusion of Interests in Turkish Petroleum Concessions of the d'Arcy Group and of the Turkish Petroleum Company

It is agreed that the interests shall be divided as follows:

Fifty per cent to the d'Arcy group,

Twenty-five per cent to the Deutsche Bank,

Twenty-five per cent to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company,[1]

and that, in order to carry out this division,

[1] The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company is a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch and Shell companies, sixty per cent of the shares being controlled by the former and forty per cent by the latter. *Supra*, p. 267, note 2.

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1. The shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company now held by the National Bank of Turkey shall be transferred in equal moieties to the Deutsche Bank and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company.

2. The capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company shall be increased to £160,000 by the creation of 80,000 new shares of £1 each of the same class as those now existing.

3. These 80,000 new shares shall be allotted to the d'Arcy group on terms to be agreed upon between the parties.

4. The Board of the Company shall consist of eight members, of whom four will be nominated by the d'Arcy group, two by the Deutsche Bank, and two by the Anglo-Saxon Company.

5. The capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company shall be employed only in exploring, testing, and proving oil fields, a separate public company or companies being formed to work any field or fields the examination of which has proved satisfactory.[1]

6. Such working company or companies shall issue to the Turkish Petroleum Company fully paid ordinary shares as consideration for the properties to be acquired; such ordinary shares shall carry full control of the working company or companies, which control shall in no circumstances be parted with by the Turkish Petroleum Company.

7. The working capital required by such working company or companies shall be raised by means of preference shares and (or) debentures which shall be offered to the public to such extent as the members of the Turkish Petroleum Company or any one of them shall elect not to subscribe for themselves.

8. The alterations in the memorandum and (or) articles of association of the Turkish Petroleum Company necessary to carry out the above conditions shall be made forthwith.

9. Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian shall be entitled to a beneficiary five per cent interest without voting rights in the Turkish Petroleum Company, this five per cent being contributed equally by the d'Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company out of their respective holdings. The shares representing Mr. Gulbenkian's interest shall be registered in the names of nominees of the d'Arcy group and of the Anglo-Saxon Company, and shall be held by them, but undertakings shall be exchanged between these parties whereby

(1) Mr. Gulbenkian undertakes to pay the calls on the shares, and

[1] The policy of having separate operating companies is well established.

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(2) The d'Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company undertake that Mr. Gulbenkian shall be [entitled to] all financial benefits of the shares.

(3) If Mr. Gulbenkian shall desire to dispose of this interest, and also in the event of his death, the d'Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company shall have the option of purchasing the interests standing in their names as defined in Article 36 (b) of the articles of association of the Turkish Petroleum Company.

10. The three groups participating in the Turkish Petroleum Company shall give undertakings on their own behalf and on behalf of the companies associated with them not to be interested directly or indirectly in the production or manufacture of crude oil in the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia, except in that part which is under the administration of the Egyptian Government or of the Sheikh of Koweit, or in the "transferred territories" on the Turco-Persian frontier,[1] otherwise than through the Turkish Petroleum Company.

For the Imperial German Government
R. VON KÜHLMANN

For His Britannic Majesty's Government
EYRE A. CROWE

For the National Bank of Turkey
H. BABINGTON SMITH

For the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, Ltd.
H. DETERDING
WALTER H. SAMUEL

For the Deutsche Bank
C. BERGMANN

For the d'Arcy Group
C. GREENWAY
H. S. BARNES

THE FOREIGN OFFICE (LONDON)
19 MARCH, 1914

[1] By a protocol of November, 1913, regarding the Turco-Persian frontier, certain Persian territories (the Mendeli region) within which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company possessed oil rights were transferred to Turkey.

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SOME CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN REACTIONS TO CLEVELAND'S VENEZUELAN MESSAGE

THE contemporary attitude of the Hispanic Americans toward what might for the sake of convenience be termed the American policy of the United States, presents a large, an interesting and a profitable field of research for students of Inter-American relations. Something is known of the reception accorded the Monroe Doctrine by the Iberian states of America at the time it was promulgated; there is a vague conviction that the Pan-American movement has not made rapid progress; it is suspected that the Panama Canal episode did not contribute to the friendly relations of the American states; and citizens of the United States have had reason to feel that the recent applications of the Monroe Doctrine to the Caribbean area have not enhanced its popularity south of the Rio Grande. But how meager is our definite knowledge of the historical reactions of the Americans of Spanish and Portuguese descent to the general procedure of the United States in and with reference to the Western Hemisphere![1]

What did the Latin Americans think of our vacillating, hedging policy with respect to the Panama Congress? What attitude did they assume toward the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War? What did they think of our ultimatum to Chile in 1891, and of the Spanish-American War? How were they impressed with the two Venezuelan episodes, the so-called Dollar Diplomacy, and the Lodge Resolution (1912)? How did they receive Woodrow Wilson's New Pan-Americanism? What effect was produced in Hispanic America by the attempt to incorporate the Monroe Doctrine into the League of Nations

[1] See J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings*, ch. vi; and two brief articles by W. S. Robertson, in POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXX (1915), p. 82 *et seq.*, and in *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. III (1920), p. 1 *et seq.*

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and by the failure of the United States to ratify that pact? These are a few of the questions which must be answered if we are to have anything approaching an adequate appreciation of our American neighbors.

A small, but perhaps not an insignificant, contribution may be made to this vast subject by a survey of the Mexican reaction to the stand taken by the United States in regard to the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895–96. In this instance, and so far as the Hispanic American states were concerned, the Monroe Doctrine was applied in perhaps the most magnanimous spirit of its entire history. A weak American nation, within whose borders citizens of the United States had little or no money invested, and whose trade with the United States was insignificant, appeared to be threatened by a powerful European state; and the United States, intervening at the invitation of the former, served notice on the latter that it must submit its dispute to arbitration. Of course, the Democrats were in need of campaign issues and catchwords for the next elections, there were many reasons for unfriendliness toward Great Britain, Venezuela was dangerously near the projected Panama Canal, and the carrying of Cleveland's point would greatly enhance the prestige of the United States; but it is unlikely that the Anglo-American republic will ever have an opportunity for the application of the doctrine which will tend more to elicit the good will of the Hispanic Americans. What was Mexico's reaction to the attitude assumed by the United States on this occasion?

It may be remarked in the beginning that Cleveland's message of December 17, 1895, which declared that the altercation between Great Britain and Venezuela constituted a case under the Monroe Doctrine and called upon Congress for action, and not Secretary Olney's dispatch to Lord Salisbury, was the state paper which attracted attention in Mexico. Cleveland's message was the subject of general comment in the Mexican press from the last days of December until the following April. As a rule the Mexican journals looked upon it with favor, but adverse comments were not entirely lacking; and, as will appear from the excerpts presented herewith, the applause of even the most kindly disposed was not unqualified.

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El Universal (Mexico City), perhaps the foremost liberal journal of the country, characterized Cleveland's attitude as both "gallant and profoundly politic." "Once more," declared the editor of this paper, "the strong people *par excellence* of the continent have come to the aid of the weak and championed it against aggression; the Eagle of the North which has been falsely accused of voracity has held in awe the insatiable British Lion."

According to the view of this paper the most significant feature of Cleveland's message was the light it threw upon the Monroe Doctrine. In this connection it was said:

> Hitherto the Monroe Doctrine had been a sphinx guarding its own secrets. The classic formula, America for the Americans, had not been clearly comprehended or satisfactorily interpreted. Some saw in it the absorbent design of the North upon the Latin American nationalities. According to these commentators the formula involved the resolution of gradual absorption and invasion, the inundating overflow of the Anglo-Saxon race and its anxiety to found a single colossal state extending from the North to the South Pole. This supposed impending extinguishment of so many nationalities under the suffocating pressure of the Colossus . . . was justly opposed; and the doctrine, thus understood, was unpopular throughout Latin America. There is no justification for this pessimistic point of view either in the conduct of the United States, or in the declaration of its statesmen, or in the views of its writers.
>
> In another sense, it was believed that the Monroe Doctrine, without revealing expansionist or monopolistic tendencies, looked toward the progressive exclusion of the European powers from their American possessions. According to their interpretation, the doctrine was pregnant with danger . . . a sword of Damocles suspended over the European nations and likely to occasion . . . an intercontinental war. . . . There is no proof that this interpretation is authentic, and the prudent reserve of the American government on the Cuban question demonstrates the contrary.
>
> Lastly, the Monroe Doctrine may be considered as the resolute determination [of the United States] to oppose all foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of America; respect on the part of Europe for the autonomy of the independent peoples; neutrality [of the United States] towards such movements for emancipation as

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may occur; but the recognition of the acquired rights and of the dominion of Europe over its American colonies.

This interpretation, the most sensible, the most statesmanlike, the least likely to occasion conflicts, has just received express sanction from the lips of President Cleveland. . . . Henceforth peace, industry and justice may rule in the free continent of America and in the American colonies of Europe. Adapting a memorable phrase of Victor Hugo, one might say that, thanks to Cleveland and the good sense of the American people, the insomnia of America has ceased.[1]

If the comment of *El Monitor* (Mexico City), another Liberal journal, is not based upon that of *El Universal*, the striking similarity in the reaction of these two papers is worthy of special attention. An article which appeared in *El Monitor* on December 25, above the signature of Luís del Toro, began by noting the applause with which Cleveland's decipherment of the enigmatic doctrine had been received throughout Hispanic America, and then proceeded to the following analysis of the manifesto:

The Monroe Doctrine has had diverse interpretations in America. The term "*America for the Americans*" has signified for some the terrifying design of the United States to absorb all the Latin American nations. It is clear that if this interpretation had been correct, nothing could have been more odious to the Latin American countries . . . ; but events have proven . . . that this view, far as it is from being felicitous, is still farther from the mind . . . of the North American government.

Some supposed that the formula in question was in open conflict with the rights of Europe over its American properties. It was thought that the Monroe Doctrine embodied the tendency to snatch from the European powers their American colonies; and the conclusion that it was predicated upon violence and, when once put into operation, would give rise to a continental catastrophe, was easily arrived at. Experience has likewise demonstrated that this is not the spirit of the doctrine, for never has the United States manifested a desire to seize European properties. . . . Entirely the con-

[1] Dec. 24, 1895.

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trary has been demonstrated by the attitude assumed in the Cuban question.

Those who by virtue of observation and experience have seen themselves compelled to reject the former interpretations, have adopted a new one whereby the aforesaid doctrine is conceived to embrace the unbending proposition of openly opposing all interference in the domestic affairs of the American continent, of forcing Europe to respect the autonomy of the independent peoples, and of adopting neutrality with respect to the movements for independence which shall take place, while recognizing the right of the European powers to their possessions in America. . . .

The Message of President Cleveland has served eloquently to demonstrate that this last interpretation is the only correct one, the only one which the United States propose to realize. . . . Therefore, there has been good reason for the unanimous applause which has been raised on the American continent. . . . In America an unknown quantity has been revealed; the Monroe Doctrine has cast aside the thick veil which has covered it and come forth clear, luminous and civilizing.

El Partido Liberal (Mexico City) referred to the message in somewhat analogous fashion. After pointing out the unfavorable impression which it had produced in Europe and the "enthusiasm with which the words of Mr. Cleveland had been received in America, from the southern frontier of Canada to Patagonia," the editor remarked:

The Monroe Doctrine so disfigured by the European press does not signify, nor can it signify, the absorption of the whole continent by the North Americans. What really forms the basis of this doctrine is the design of preventing the European powers from enlarging their possessions in America. Hence, the United States did not intervene in the Anglo-Central American question which did not involve conquest, but merely the collection of money; and hence they assume a threatening attitude with respect to the Anglo-Venezuelan contest, in which England apparently desires to augment her territory. The Monroe Doctrine does not propose to dispossess the European nations of the colonies which they have in America, and, for this reason, neutrality is observed . . . in the Hispano-Cuban question.

It is maintained that the attitude of Cleveland is nothing more

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than an electoral trick. It may well be; but what is certain is that this attitude has received the applause of all parties and his declarations are unanimously supported by a powerful, energetic, rich, bold and patriotic people. And it is also certain that England has paused to reflect. . . .

In the eyes of the press and the statesmen of Europe the conduct of the President of the United States is not in conformity with the rules of international law. And, considering the situation from the viewpoint of *European* international law, they are right; but they are wrong, if the affair is observed from the point of view of *American* international law, which differs from the former in many particulars. . . .

In this instance, Mr. Cleveland has been, not the interpreter of the United States alone, but the spokesman of the desires and the aspirations of the entire American continent.[1]

Another writer, setting forth his views in *El Contemporaneo* (San Luís Potosí), rejected the European contention that the Monroe Doctrine was not an internationally recognized principle and attempted to demonstrate that it was merely the American adaptation of the European notion of non-intervention which Castlereagh had announced to the courts of the continent in 1822, which various European powers had insisted upon from time to time with respect to Turkey, and which had led England and Spain to withdraw from Mexico in 1862. In order to induce the European powers to accept this view of the matter, he urged repeatedly that the self-denying clause of the Monroe Doctrine would restrain the United States from interfering with the American possessions of these powers.

The same writer also attempted to refute some of the arguments advanced by his fellow-countrymen against the manifesto. Space will permit only one illustration from this phase of the article. It had been contended in Mexico that the rejection of the Monroe Doctrine would enable Europe to defend the small states of America against the United States. To this he replied that "accomplished facts and our own experience" had demonstrated the vanity of that expectation; that it would be folly for the weak states of Hispanic America to expose

[1] Dec. 25, 1895.

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themselves to the danger of being invaded and conquered by the great powers of Europe in the delusory hope of ridding themselves of the supposititious menace of the United States.

If these states [said he] have two formidable enemies: on the one hand, the great powers of Europe, and on the other, the great North American power, as it is claimed, it is clear that they will secure a great advantage by freeing themselves immediately from the first; and the very weight of the principle which defends them from the former, once having found its way into the universal conscience and received explicit proclamation as international law reciprocally obligatory, will protect them from the latter and more dreaded enemy.

A recognized law, when . . . it has the sanction of practice and the support of public opinion, is the only defense of the weak, and such law always constitutes its best shield against the attacks of that brute force which often hesitates and restrains itself in the face of the unanimous protest that injustice always provokes.[1]

Of all the comments occasioned by Cleveland's message in Mexico, none have come to the attention of the present writer which show so much of generosity and of frank admiration for the United States as those of the eminent Mexican publicist, Rafael de Zayas Enríquez, which appeared in *El Partido Liberal* on January 8 and 9, 1896. The first of these articles amounted almost to an apology for the Mexican policy of the United States:

If distorted notions about Mexico prevail in the United States, it is no less certain that, in Mexico, there are very false ideas with respect to our neighbors. With us every American is a *Yankee*, . . . a term which we interpret in disrespectful fashion, making it a synonym for a rude, coarse, violent, criminal, savage man.

Nothing could be more unjust. In the United States, as elsewhere, there are all sorts of men. . . Taking the average and studying that people dispassionately, it will be seen that they are no worse than any other; and that from many points of view they are superior to almost all those of the Old World.

To a large portion of our people, the Jews of to-day are those

[1] Jan. 23, 1896.

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who crucified Christ, and they cannot pardon this murder of divinity; the Spaniards are those who tormented Cuauhtemoc [the Aztec chief], and they cannot forgive this act of barbarism; the Americans of to-day are those who provoked the unjust war in which we lost nearly half of our territory, and they are not able to pardon this abuse of force.

With reference to this last point, we believe that patriotism constrains us not to forget such an act, and that prudence requires us to take due precaution for the future. But we should not, on this account, be so blinded by passion as to deny what is evident and commit the injustice of expressing prejudicial opinions of the United States. Even with respect to that war itself we might say something to demonstrate that never did [conquering] people conduct themselves as did the North Americans toward Mexico. They endeavored to do as little violence as possible to life and property, confining themselves to the indispensable; they refrained from torturing the vanquished, and accorded them all possible honors and comforts; they did not oppress the conquered area by levying forced loans or living off of the country; as victors they withdrew, and instead of imposing a war contribution, they paid us for the domain they seized. Compare the conduct of the United States while triumphing over Mexico with that of Germany when victorious over France and pass judgment conscientiously.

In his second article Enríquez analyzed the state papers of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe in order to show that the two expressions: "friendship towards all people; alliance with none"; and "America for the Americans (or the sons of America)", form the "fundamental principles of the international policy of the United States." He then proceeded to interpret the Monroe Doctrine in the following fashion:

They [i. e., the Anglo-Americans] have not attempted, nor do they attempt, to dispossess the European powers of the colonies which they hold on our continent; and the best proof we have of it lies in the fact that their government has not intervened in the bloody conflicts fought by the Cubans for their independence from Spain.

To be sure, the United States would prefer the independence of the island, if only because of a continental consciousness; but it is

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also certain that, officially at least, it will not assist the insurgents. Neither has it sought to annex Canada, although such an undertaking offers less difficulty than one might suppose.

Likewise, when two American powers have appealed to arms, the United States government has not interfered in the conflict, and much less has it intervened in the civil wars unfortunately so prevalent among the Spanish-American states. Moreover, recently when England quarreled with a Central-American republic and occupied one of its fortifications in order to support and collect an apparently legitimate claim, the United States refused to intervene, and thus furnished those who were ignorant of the true meaning of the doctrine an occasion for making fun of it and representing it to be an old and worthless piece of rubbish.

But when an attempt was made to extend the French imperial system to a part of our hemisphere . . . ; and to-day, when there is a threatened extension of the limits of English Guiana to the injury of an American power, the United States have resorted . . . . to the doctrine and manifested that it is something more than a bluff, that it epitomizes the international political creed of a powerful people which knows how to sustain the force of right by the right of force.

Two brief illustrations must serve to present the more unfriendly attitude assumed in certain Mexican circles toward Cleveland's message.

Soon after this state paper was published in Mexico one of the Mexican journals contained the facetious and sarcastic announcement that a large group of state governors and national senators of the United States were preparing solemnly to request that all the territories which had been "usurped" from their neighbor, "from the infamous perfidy of Austin to the present time, should be returned." This step they felt compelled to take because of the incontrovertible fact that the Monroe Doctrine had proclaimed the "inviolability of the independence, the autonomy, and the territory of all the American countries"![1]

On December 24, 1895, *El Tiempo*, a Conservative journal of Mexico City, contained an editorial on the importance of

[1] Quoted in *El Partido Liberal*, Jan. 9, 1896.

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the Venezuelan question to Mexico. The writer began by calling attention to the elements in the situation which appeared to indicate that war would not occur. He noted, on the one hand, that the Democrats in the United States were "seeking something to recommend them to their constituency, some catchword to win votes, some sensation which would enable them to triumph in the coming campaign", but that after the election, they would forget their promises and relegate the Venezuelan question to oblivion. On the other hand, he pointed out that in recent years England had shown a disposition to give way to the United States.

The editor then indicated what he thought would be the result of a war between the United States and Great Britain over the Venezuelan affair. He maintained that, as was usually the case where a weak nation was concerned, Venezuela would be sacrificed. Nevertheless, he felt that the struggle would not be without its compensating features for Hispanic America in general. Since such a war would probably be disastrous to the United States, the Yankee republic would lose its prestige and become "an object of ridicule among all nations"; and the Ibero-Americans, convinced at last of the "emptiness and impotence" of the manifesto of Monroe, would be forced to give up the "delusion of North American aid against Europe and to assume a distrustful attitude with reference to the Yankees and their hypocritical protective rôle."

And yet, in spite of this evident hostility toward the United States, the editor could not content himself with thus dismissing the question. Dislike for Great Britain weighed too heavily upon his mind. Might not this threatened outbreak of hostilities furnish opportunity for the recovery of *irredenta* now in the hands of the British Lion? "There is Brazil with . . . her Isle of Trinidad usurped by Great Britain; there is Argentina which has awaited a better opportunity of recovering the Malvinas Islands, likewise usurped in the most violent manner. . ." What if these powers should form an alliance with the United States and make a joint attack upon Great Britain? Would not this furnish Mexico a tempting opportunity for recovering her lost territory of Belice?

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El Tiempo believed that the Mexican government should remain neutral during the preliminary negotiations; but that, in case the alliance indicated should be formed, Mexico should become a member with the view of ridding itself of an "inconvenient neighbor" and evading "many future complications". This course was deemed all the more advisable, in view of the virtual certainty that England, compelled as she would be to keep an eye on the European situation, would be defeated, and that the war would be fought, not upon Mexican soil, but upon the ocean and in the ports of the United States, Venezuela, Brazil and the Argentine. Let Mexico, therefore, look well to the possibilities of the situation. This struggle, if it should occur, might present an opportunity which "would not return in many years."

While the Mexican press was thus engrossed in the discussion of the Venezuelan affair, President Díaz was approached by correspondents and his opinion solicited. But the dictator refused to commit himself. On January 10, 1896, *El Dairio Oficial* contained the announcement that the chief executive was "in favor of the Monroe Doctrine, rightly interpreted, but that he could not give out to the press an opinion with reference to the applicability of this doctrine to the question pending between England and Venezuela."

Three months later, however, when the settlement of the dispute appeared to be well under way, Díaz considered it advisable to refer to the matter in a public message to Congress. In this communication he said, in part:

> Among the incidents . . . which have most powerfully attracted the attention and aroused the interest of American nations, there is one with reference to which reasons of national self-respect and expediency constrain me to say a few words. . . . Naturally the evocation of that doctrine which condemns all attempts at European aggression and all tendencies to modify the republican institutions of the New World in a monarchical direction, aroused enthusiasm among the free nations of this continent and gave occasions for the demonstration of sympathy, both popular and governmental.
>
> Invitations of an international character were not lacking that the Mexican government should at once state its opinion in such a

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matter. But the executive considered that haste was not proper in expressing an opinion as to a subject which not only involved the Monroe doctrine, but also its applicability to the concrete case of the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela. . . .

Now that happily . . . the crisis has passed which seemed to threaten war between the two great Nations into which the Anglo-Saxon race is divided, now that our sister Republic of Venezuela is carrying on at Washington peaceful negotiations with her powerful adversary, it may not be out of place to accede to the desires of those . . . who have requested the Mexican Government to state its opinion with regard to the Monroe Doctrine. . . . The Mexican Government cannot but declare its partiality for a doctrine which condemns as criminal any attack on the part of the Monarchies of Europe against the Republics of America. . . .

But it is not our opinion that to the United States, alone . . . belongs the obligation of assisting the other Republics of this hemisphere against the attacks of Europe, if such attacks are still to be considered as possible; but for the attainment of the end to which we all aspire, each one of those Republics ought, by means of a declaration like that of President Monroe, to proclaim that every attack upon the part of a foreign power with the view of curtailing the territory or the independence or of altering the institutions of any one of the Republics of America, would be considered by the Nation making such declaration as an attack on itself, provided that the Nation directly attacked or threatened in such manner sought the aid of the other Nations.

In this way, that doctrine now called by the name of Monroe would become the doctrine of America in the fullest sense of the word, and although originating in the United States, would belong to the International Law of this Continent.[1]

From the foregoing excerpts several important conclusions seem warranted. In the first place, it appears that for some time prior to the publication of Cleveland's message the Mexican people—and indeed, if one may judge from the statements of the Mexican press, the Hispanic Americans in general—had looked with dread and suspicion upon the United States and its Monroe Doctrine. Second, Cleveland's message attracted

[1] As quoted by the *Two Republics* (April 10, 1896), a newspaper published in the English language in Mexico City.

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much attention in Mexico, as elsewhere in America. Third, the attitude of the Mexican journalists was generally friendly, but cynical and sarcastic reactions were not wanting; and, moreover, this friendliness was not unqualified, for in almost every instance the doctrine was carefully defined before it was accepted and applauded. In interpreting the doctrine the Mexican press usually gave it just the significance which the Hispanic American states preferred it should have and hoped it had; they saw, or pretended to see, in Cleveland's message a definition of the doctrine agreeable to Hispanic Americans and in harmony with their interpretation, and then proceeded to praise the Anglo-American executive in the highest terms. Fourth, these attempts to define the manifesto revealed the main sources of apprehensiveness with reference to it. It was almost universally declared, for instance, that the Monroe Doctrine did not signify a design on the part of the United States gradually to absorb Hispanic America, or a purpose to constitute itself the tutor of the other states of the hemisphere or to exclude the European powers from their American colonies. It was asserted time after time that the United States would not intervene in Cuba! Fifth, President Porfirio Díaz expressed a desire that the doctrine should be modified in such fashion as to make it a principle of American international law, a Pan-American instead of merely an Anglo-American policy, while another journalist sought to contrast American and European international law, thus in a measure forecasting the contentions of Alejandro Álvarez and of some of those jurisconsults who two decades later were to found the American Institute of International Law, as well as those of several of the Hispanic American delegates at the recent Santiago conference.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN GERMANY

IN the smoke of battle between the government printing presses and the mark, the German working class suffered a crushing injury, the consequences of which are just now beginning to be felt on the various fronts of the movement. Trapped in the maze of zeros, the individual workman was forced to devote all his free time and energy to the problem of how to make ends meet. He could not for a moment turn his eyes away from his daily cares to see what was happening immediately outside his family circle, to his union or the labor movement as a whole. Besides, the series of problems that were constantly emerging in the wake of the sinking mark were too complex for the intelligence of the average worker, or for that matter, for his union leader. Neither could tell exactly what was occurring or whither they were bound. There were many who profited from this abnormal situation, for in spite of the constant, almost perpendicular, fall of the mark, prompt action on the part of the worker in buying his necessities, or purchasing a few dollars, or any other foreign money, was often sufficient to recompense him for the losses he suffered in getting paid in marks. As a matter of fact, the professional money man was not the only one who took part in the hunt for *Devisen*—everyone who could spare his millions or milliards and later billions of marks for a day or two and who had the opportunity to acquire some foreign currency, participated in the frenzied speculation.

But this abnormal condition was suddenly brought to a stop. The stabilization (?) of the mark in the last days of November, 1923, as a result of the introduction of the Rentenmark and the decision of the government finally to give up the printing of more paper notes, the introduction of reckoning on the basis of gold marks in retail businesses and lastly in the payment of salaries and wages, brought the mass of German workmen and salaried employes face to face with the naked reality. The high nervous tension of the days of the falling mark grad-

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ually disappeared from their faces. For the first time in many months, they knew exactly, that is, if they still had jobs and did not run the danger of losing them at any moment, how much they were getting for their work and what they could do with it. It is the purpose of this paper to describe the results of this stabilization of the mark and the actual situation of the German workers at the time that the experts were drafting their report on "Germany's Capacity to Pay Reparations."

First of course is the problem of unemployment. It appears to have been the fate of Germany to present the world with examples of the most curious economic phenomena—this time, a combination of a depreciating currency with a rapidly growing unemployment problem. The curves given on another page and the data following are taken from the Statistical Supplement to the *Reichsarbeitblatt* for March 1, 1924, Number 5, and show the purchasing power of the paper mark expressed in gold marks and the conditions of employment in Germany from January, 1923, up to and through January, 1924. It will be seen from the curves that the number of unemployed begins to go up at the end of July, just at the time when the mark experienced its first really tremendous fall, one gold mark having had on the average the value of only 33,000 paper marks in July and an average value of 585,000 paper marks in August. Since then during the months of August, September, October and November, the paper mark experienced the following sensational drops:

1 gold mark in August was equal to 585,000 paper marks.
1 gold mark in September was equal to 15 million paper marks.
1 gold mark in October was equal to 5 billion paper marks.
1 gold mark in November was equal to over 1 trillion paper marks.

The numbers of unemployed jumped from 6.3 per cent of the basis used in the government reports, in August, to 9.9 per cent on the same basis in September, 19.1 per cent in October, and 23.4 per cent in November. The base of the government report is the registered membership of the three big trade-union organizations, Socialist, Christian and Hirsch-Duncker, and the exact figures of the unemployed in the month of January, 1924, were:

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Industry	Trade Union Membership (Round figures)	Unemployed (Round figures)	Per cent Unemployed	Per cent Part time
Metal	1,352,000	366,000	27.1	60.2
Textile	687,000	64,000	9.4	16.4
Building Trades	496,000	352,000	71.1	8.5
Transportation	437,000	81,000	18.5	13.5
Woodworkers	383,000	80,000	21.0	17.0
Foodstuffs	240,000	35,000	14.4	8.9
Leather	199,000	27,000	13.7	18.0
Clothing	166,000	35,000	20.8	10.5
Stone and Marble	128,000	56,000	43.8	14.6
Printing	108,000	23,000	21.4	14.2
Bookbinding	63,000	17,000	27.6	30.9
Other industries together	1,000,000	232,000	23.2	20.6
Total	5,259,000	1,368,000	26.5	....

These figures for January, 1924, showed a slight improvement over those for the month of December, when the unemployment percentage was 28.2 of the trade-union membership registered with the government. The improvement was especially noticeable in the textile and clothing industries, both of which were almost at a standstill during the months of November and December; also in the leather industry and in the production of foodstuffs intended primarily for internal markets. But the numbers of unemployed alone do not tell the whole story. To these must be added also the part-time workers employed on the average for two or three days per week. The figures for these workers, too, show an improvement as against those of December, although they are still running, as may be seen above, from 8.5 per cent in the building trades to 30.9 per cent of the bookbinders and 60.2 per cent in the metal industry.

With the rate of unemployment as presented above, what were then the conditions of those workers who were lucky enough to retain their jobs? The two fundamental problems with which both the employers and employees were concerned were, of course, as usual, wages and hours of work.

In the printing industry the wages were put on a gold mark basis on November 9. In the agreement signed on that date and covering the entire country the wages were set for the week

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Rate of decline of value of 1,000,000,000 paper marks in Berlin, from January, 1923 to January, 1924.



of November 10–16 at 25 gold marks, which is 72.72 per cent of the pre-war wage, and for the period of November 17–December 31 at 27 gold marks per week or 78.53 per cent of the pre-war wage (34.38 M.). This was the wage of a first-class printer and included the highest additional social payment to

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Percentages of Unemployment January, 1923—January, 1924



which a married man with a wife and two minor children was entitled.

In the chemical industry a skilled first-class worker in Berlin received in the period of November 21–December 11 a wage of 24.96 gold marks per week, or 78.53 per cent of his pre-war wage (36.18) and an unskilled factory laborer received at the same time 22.80 gold marks per week, or over 90 per cent of the 25.47 marks he received prior to the war.

In the metal industry in Berlin a first-class skilled worker received on December 1, 1923, some 65½ pfennigs per hour, which made for a 48-hour week 31.44 gold marks, or 77 per cent of the pre-war wage of 42.44 marks, while the unskilled worker received at the same time 49 pfennigs per hour, or 23.52 gold marks per week, which is also 77 per cent of the 30.52 marks which he received as the average wage in 1913–14. On

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January 3, 1924, this agreement was suddenly broken by the Association of the Metal Employers of Greater Berlin, and more than 150,000 metal workers were thrown out of their shops because of the refusal of their union to agree to a fourteen per cent cut in their wages. The newly appointed Government Arbitrator for the city of Berlin immediately invited the representatives of the two sides to a conference in his office, but the employers refused to recognize the authority of the Arbitrator because of his political and trade-union affiliations.[1] They preferred to deal with the union direct. Their attempt to connect the question of wages with the problem of increased hours failed, but the new agreement which was signed called for a reduction of from four to five per cent instead of the fourteen per cent demanded.

The government, too, has gone over to the gold mark basis of remunerating its own employees and officials. The employees were given a weekly wage of 24 gold marks for the skilled workers, which is 64.06 per cent of their pre-war earnings, and 20.64 gold marks for the unskilled workers, or 65.9 per cent of their pre-war wage. The officials were divided into thirteen large groups, which were again subdivided into a number of smaller sub-groups. An official in the highest sub-group of the highest group, if married and with two children under thirteen, received 5034.00 gold marks per annum, which is 43.1 per cent of the 11,680 marks he would have been entitled to on the basis of 1913–1914, while an official in the highest sub-group of the next to the lowest group, also when married and with two minor children, was given 1212.00 gold marks per annum, or 78.04 per cent of his pre-war salary of 1680 marks a year.

Although, as shown above, the earnings of a large majority of the German workers and salaried employees were on the average from 25 per cent to 35 per cent below their pre-war standard,[2] the gold prices of foodstuffs and other necessities for the month of February, 1924, were still above their 1913–1914

[1] He is a Socialist and up to the time of his appointment had belonged to the Metal Workers Union.

[2] In addition there should be deducted the general ten per cent employment tax, which must be paid at the source under present German tax laws.

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level, notwithstanding a sensational drop in the last days of November and in the first week of December. The relative price levels are indicated by the following table:

Article	Price 1913–1914 Average Gold Marks	Price Month of Feb. 1924 Gold Marks	Percentage of 1913–1914 Average
Black bread, per lb. (500 gram)	.14	.14	100
Beef " "	.88	1.10	125
Potatoes " "	.04	.04	100
Lard " "	.70	.80	114
Butter " "	1.35	2.50	190
Margarine " "	.90	.75	83
Rice " "	.25	.24	96
Sugar " "	.22	.44	200
Eggs (each) " "	.09	.20	220
Milk, per liter	.24	.33	138
Laundry soap (bar)	.25	.30	120
Haircut	.25	.80	320
Car fare	.10	.15	150

Rent is the only item which until very recently was still on a paper money basis and constituted a small fraction of the 1913–1914 average. But from February 1, 1924, the gold mark rents were introduced with a rate of 28 per cent of the pre-war basis to begin with, to be followed by monthly increases of 5 per cent until in little more than a year the full pre-war rents shall be reestablished.

This was the time which German employers selected as the most favorable moment for an attack on the eight-hour day. They had never been really reconciled to the principles on which it is based, and in the 1922 Yearly Report of the United Employers' Associations of Germany, although admitting the fact that the efficiency of the German workers was raised during that year, they maintained, nevertheless, that unless the eight-hour day was given up and more work done, even more than before the war, Germany would never be in a position to rise from the chaos into which it had been plunged since the Revolution.

The late Hugo Stinnes, the strongest man in Germany and probably the richest man in the world, was even more explicit in his opinion of the eight-hour day than the above statement

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indicates. In his speech of November 9, 1922, made before the Federal Economic Council, he said, among other things,

> I do not regard the eight-hour day merely as a question with which the working class alone is concerned, but as a problem in connection with which the entire industry, and with it all of Germany, is at stake. I believe that the leaders of the unions will soon realize that if the workers are to make a living, or perhaps a decent living at that, they will have to work more, two hours more per day. . . . Otherwise they will not have enough to eat, and with their ruin will also come the ruin of the rest of Germany.

The prophecy of Herr Stinnes soon came to realization. The German working class was already living in a state of misery and starvation and was no longer in a position to defend itself against the attack of the employers. The eight-hour day rapidly became a thing of the past in practice at least if not in theory. The Government, as will be shown later, did not fully accede to the employers' demands to replace the legalized eight hour day by a compulsory nine or ten-hour day, nor could they secure the change from the Joint Councils (*Arbeitsgemeinschaften*) which at one time admittedly saved German industry from the hands of the revolutionists. The spirit of cooperation as represented by the Joint Councils was completely thrown overboard in this crisis and full play was given to the frank and brutal methods of the class struggle of the pre-revolutionary days, so much so, that wherever they saw the slightest chance of success, the employers refused to recognize the unions and proceeded to make separate agreements with their individual employees. By this means quite a number of the smaller industries and some of the larger ones were put on a ten-hour basis. When the workers refused to follow the dictates of the employer they were locked out, with the result that now there is not a single trade in which the eight-hour day either has not been lost or is not maintained only against continuous opposition on the part of the employers.

While the class struggle was thus again reigning supreme in and around the shop, the Government, in its turn, was not only doing little to curb it but was revoking every bit of legislation that might stand in its way. Armed with the Emergency Law

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of October 13; 1923, which gave the Government the right to decree laws without the approval of the Reichstag, it proceeded on the very same day to issue the decree changing the "work stretching" law of February 12, 1920. According to this law, every employer who, because of lack of work or changes in methods of production, found it necessary to reduce considerably his force of employees, could not proceed to discharge them without previously "stretching" the work, by placing the entire plant on a part-time basis. Only when it could be proved that the nature of the industry did not permit the introduction of part-time work, or when the part-time had to be reduced to less than twenty-four hours per week, could the employer proceed with the discharges, in which case he had to follow the regulations which determined who and in which order the employees were to be let go. This provision of the Law of February 12, 1920, was completely eliminated by the new decree, and the employers were permitted to discharge as many of their employees and whomsoever they pleased. The only protection left to the discharged workers was to complain through their Works Council to the Arbitration Boards on the ground of Article 87 of the Works Council Law, "that his or her discharge constitutes an *unfair disadvantage*, not justified either by the behavior of the worker or by the economic conditions in the industry."

As a result of this decree, the Arbitration Boards of Berlin and other centers were literally swamped with such complaints of individual employees who had been discharged the first few days after the new decree went into effect. Each case had to be handled separately, and as the Boards were made up of six members, three from the employers' side and three from the employees' side, and sometimes also an impartial chairman as a seventh, their work progressed very slowly and in a cumbersome fashion. Besides, they became too large a financial burden on the limited resources of the Government, as the entire impartial machinery was a governmental institution and each member of the Board was entitled to remuneration for the time spent in session.

The consequence was a new decree (October 30) which brought about a complete change in the process as well as in

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the machinery of arbitration provided for in the Law of December 23, 1918. From that time on all the individual cases were to be handled by the so-called Labor Courts. (Until these courts were established their place was to be taken by the Industrial Courts for the wage workers, and by the Commercial Courts for the salaried employees.) This included, of course, all the cases mentioned above and a large number of others arising under the Works Councils Law, the Industrial Regulations Order, the Workmen's Insurance Law, etc. Group disputes, especially those arising from the collective agreements, were placed in the hands of new Boards, this time consisting of but two members from each side and one impartial chairman, and in special cases of the so-called Arbitrator, especially appointed by the government, one for each industrial district. The board can be appealed to by any one party as heretofore, but the Arbitrator has now the right, if he considers it necessary, of his own accord to invite the two parties to settle their dispute by his mediation. If this fails, he has the right to make the Board pronounce a final decision which can then be made compulsory by the Minister of Labor. The salaries of the Arbitrators are to be borne by the federal government, while all the other expenses are to fall on the separate states, so soon as the differentiation between the incomes of the state and federal governments shall have been established.

In the meantime the much talked of and anxiously awaited law regulating the hours of work was finally decreed on December 24, 1923, to become effective on January 1, 1924. The old law, which had also been established by a decree (November 23, 1918), and which proclaimed eight hours to be the maximum length of the working day except in emergencies approved by a demobilization officer, expired on November 17, 1923. The fact that the Government did not immediately renew the law at a time when the eight-hour day had become the chief bone of contention between the employers and the unions, and that as an employer it had itself partially gone over to the 54-hour week, gave both sides cause to believe that it had at last succumbed to the persistent demands of the employers finally to abolish the eight-hour day. In fact, the employers were so certain of this, that even before the new law was passed,

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the Printing Trades Employers Association of Berlin proceeded to draw up an agreement for its employees, which included a 54-hour week, and when the printers' union refused to sign it, the Association applied to the Minister of Labor to declare the agreement compulsory and thus make unnecessary formal agreement by the union.

The Minister refused the application of the Association to declare the agreement compulsory, and when the new law was finally published, it caused disappointment to both sides, but especially to the employers. In an article published in the Sunday, December 30, edition of the *Berliner Börsen Courier*, entitled "Hours of Work and Collective Agreements", a representative of the United Employers Associations made a bitter attack on the Marx Government, especially on the Minister of Labor, Dr. Brauns, for the passing of the Arbitration Law, but chiefly for the failure to set aside the eight-hour day. He branded the two laws as a return to the destructive policies of the year immediately after the revolution, which brought the German people to their present state of misery and starvation. He ended up with a demand for the abolition of the Labor Ministry and the transfer of its necessary functions to the Economic Ministry.

What then are the provisions of the new law by which the head of Dr. Brauns was placed in jeopardy? It contains sixteen paragraphs of which only the following are of importance to the problem with which we are concerned.

Paragraph I. The Government officially recognizes the eight-hour day as a maximum. Longer hours in an individual plant or its branches are to be allowed only with the approval of representatives of the workers concerned, and are to be equalized by a corresponding shortening of the hours of some day of the same or the following week.

Paragraph II. The provisions of Paragraph I may be disregarded and the hours of work regulated by a Collective Agreement of the two opposing organizations. If no agreement is reached, a decision may be made by the Minister of Labor after the opinions of the two sides have been heard.

Paragraph III. In addition to the overtime work that may become necessary in exceptional cases, as in the delivery of

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foodstuffs to save them from deterioration, etc., each employer is permitted at his own discretion to choose thirty days a year when overtime will be allowed to the extent of two hours per day.

Paragraph V. The provisions of Paragraph III apply also when the hours of work are regulated by a Collective Agreement or by a compulsory decision of the Minister of Labor.

Paragraph IX. In any case the hours of work shall not be extended beyond ten hours per day.

Paragraph XII. Collective agreements which have been concluded prior to the passing of this law, and which provide for hours of work less than the maximum permitted (ten hours), may be declared void by either party merely giving thirty days' notice to the other side.

To anyone who is at all acquainted with the recent political and economic events in Germany, the meaning of the above law will present no difficulties. The Government, no longer in a position to rely for its income on the printing presses, was left entirely at the mercy of the newly organized Rentenbank and the industrial and agricultural powers behind it. It could therefore no longer proceed with a social policy to which its benefactors were opposed, and the best it could do was to declare itself neutral and leave the two sides to fight their battle in the open. Paragraph One of the law was simply a necessary concession to the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag Committee of Fifteen to overcome their opposition to the whole law.

In spite of the apparent dissatisfaction in the ranks of the employers, of whose views the article in the *Börsen Courier* is a fair example, they did not for a moment hesitate to utilize the service the law rendered their cause. What happened in the industries of Germany during the two months after the law came into operation is proof of this statement. Not a single agreement with the unions was left intact, and orders were issued that no new agreements were to be concluded unless the unions agreed to a nine to ten-hour working day.

Confronted thus with a strongly organized and aggressive group of employers and with a Government which at best in-

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tended to remain neutral, if not actually lean more to the side of the stronger, what did the German trade unions do to defend their membership? Were they in a position to resist the united attack of the employers and come out of the fight whole and unscathed? To be able to answer these questions we must first give a brief account of the trade-union movement in Germany since the days of the revolution. I have here in mind the Socialist trade unions only, for the attack was concentrated primarily against them. The two other large union organizations, the Christians and the Liberal Hirsch-Dunker, had already acceded to the demands of the employers in favor of a 54-hour week.

The revolution of November 9, 1918, took the leaders of the Socialist trade unions by surprise. This accounts for the agreement of November 15, only six days after the revolution, with the United Employers' Associations, which at once estranged the revolutionary masses from the unions, and which is now known and will probably go down in the history of the German labor movement as *Der Grosse Betrug*—the Great Betrayal. The last months of 1918 and the whole of 1919, during which time the spirit of the Russian Revolution, embodied in the slogan "All Power to the Soviets", was dominating the laboring masses of Germany, the trade unions found themselves in the background, and played no important rôle in shaping events. Then the Kapp *Putsch* came in March, 1920, and the successful general strike at once placed the *Gewerkschaften* in the fore of the economic and political life of Germany. In the meantime, the Works Councils Law, passed on February 4, 1920, was put into effect, and the unions concentrated all their energy to eliminate from their midst that element which was still preaching the doctrine of Works Councils above everything, including the union. This, too, culminated in a triumph for the trade unions at the first General Congress of the Works Councils, which took place in Berlin, October 5 to 7, 1920. Since then the Works Councils have become merely the executive organs of the unions in the shops, and the trade unions entered an era of rapid growth in membership and power. In 1922, the total membership of the Socialist trade unions as given in the *Jahrbuch des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerk-*

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schaftsbundes,[1] only recently issued, was 7,895,065, of whom the Metal Workers' Union alone claimed a membership of one and a half million workers. The number of trade papers, mostly weeklies, issued by the various unions had surpassed forty, and this did not include the dozen or so monthlies devoted primarily to the interests of the members of the Works Councils within the trades.

But toward the end of 1922, the inflationist policy of the German Government began to exert its disastrous economic effects on the whole nation. There followed a rapid disintegration of the resources and powers of the unions. No other organizations, small or large, suffered as much from the depreciation of the mark as the Socialist trade unions, especially in the last half of 1923, when to the evil of the falling mark was added the worse evil of rapidly growing unemployment. Things went on from bad to worse, so that by November last, the General Office, as well as the individual unions, were left absolutely without funds, without a press, and some of the more pessimistic observers would say, also without a membership. All the Works Council papers and many of the trade weeklies, which had been in existence for from thirty-five to forty years, had ceased to appear, while the majority of the others appeared only irregularly, whenever the union could secure enough funds to bear the expenses of a single issue.

It looked as if the employers had finally chosen the right moment to deliver their blow, and would have an easy task in crushing the entire trade-union movement of Germany. But the blow came one month too late, and that month may prove to have been the salvation of the unions. With the stabilization of the mark a new spirit began to make itself felt within the ranks and among the leaders of the unions, a spirit of consolidation in preparation for the coming struggle. The method of *Realpolitik* in which the Socialist unions failed so miserably has been cast aside, and again in the shops and in the meetings are to be heard the old slogans of the class struggle, which were characteristic of the movement in pre-revolutionary years. The press, too, has been revived and is now appearing regu-

[1] P. 87.

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larly, although in a very diminished form, mostly one sheet of about seven by ten. The General Office in Berlin (*A. D. G. B.*) although forced to discharge more than half its own employees, and to replace the *Correspondenzblatt* (a weekly which dates its birth at the time of the big strikes of 1891), the *Betriebsrätezeitung* (a monthly existing since 1920 and devoted to the interests of the Works Councils), the *Gewerkschaftliche Frauenzeitung* (which was published fortnightly), and the *Gewerkschaftliche Nachrichtdienst* (which used to be published irregularly when there was a special need for it) by a single new weekly paper, the *Gewerkschaftszeitung*—has already issued the call to the mobilization. And the response did not fail to appear. In spite of the big inroads the Communists have recently made into some of the Socialist trade unions, such as the Factory Workers' Union and the Metal Workers' Union;[1] in spite of the apathy into which many of the workers have fallen as a reaction from the six years of continuous industrial and political agitation; in spite of the considerable thinning out of the ranks of the trade unions, there still remains a strong nucleus which has the experience of half a century's struggle behind it and is determined to continue it into the future. The eight-hour day has been lost. There will be other concessions which the workers will have to make in their unequal struggle against reaction. But the trade unions remain, and with them remains in Germany today the only element upon which a real democratic government can be built. Just now the wind seems to be blowing in the opposite direction, but the maintenance of a sound currency and the adoption of a sensible solution of the Ruhr and reparation problems may yet stem the tide of reaction and save the German Republic from the hands of Hitler-Ludendorff and Company.

BORIS STERN

NEW YORK CITY

[1] At a recent congress of the Metal Workers' Union held in Cassel during the week of February 17 to February 24, the Communists were represented by 130 out of a total of 400 delegates.

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

I

THE fact that diplomacy failed to prevent—and as some will have it, actually caused—the Great War has put that profession under a cloud, and the mist is hardly dispelled by the voluminous collections of documents which the present rulers of Germany, Austria and Russia are issuing from the archives of the old governments. It is therefore all the more courageous for a University Press to undertake a *History of British Foreign Policy*[1] which offers, on a scale not hitherto attempted, a survey of the complicated relations of Great Britain with the rest of the world from one Treaty of Versailles (1783) to another (1919). Obviously so ambitious an enterprise must be the product of composite scholarship, and the twenty-eight chapters are the work of twenty hands. The editors need no introduction; many of the contributors are distinguished historians, and there are few, if any, apprentices of Clio. For the period before 1860 and in some instances apparently after that date, the archives of the British foreign office have been freely used; sundry collections of private papers have also been made available. The highest expectations are therefore raised by a work produced under such favorable conditions. Unfortunately they are not altogether realized.

The purpose of the book, we are told (I, v), is "to combine with strict historical truth, wherever ascertainable, a national point of view —in other words, an avowed regard for the interests, and above all for the honour of Great Britain". Certainly considerations of "honour" are not lost sight of, for although the writers are all "historical scholars who are British subjects by birth", they are not afraid to condemn outrageous or shady performances of British diplomacy, such as the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 (I, 364), the brutal exercise of the right of search (I, 524), Aberdeen's intrigues in Texas (II, 256), Palmerston's treatment of Greece in the Don Pacifico case (II, 596), or Beaconsfield's abandonment of Turkey in 1878 (III, 123–125). Nevertheless there is observable from time to time a certain insular complacency which is irritating. Thus Dr. Holland Rose can write:

[1] *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.* Edited by Sir A. W. Ward, Litt. D., F. B. A., and G. P. Gooch, M. A., Litt. D. Cambridge, University Press; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922–1923.—xiii, 628; xviii, 688; xix, 664 pp.

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"Great Britain's Foreign Policy [in the Napoleonic war] was honest and disinterested, when compared with that of her great antagonist or of her Allies" (I, 391); which, even if it be true, is the kind of language that makes the accusation of hypocrisy appear reasonable to non-Britishers. Or Mr. W. H. Dawson complains of "France pursuing her imperialistic designs" in Siam "with determined pertinacity" (III, 199), without suggesting that British activities in Burma might be similarly described. Even Dr. Gooch, who usually has no illusions, lets himself speak of the "disinterested sympathy of Great Britain" for the Young Turk revolution of 1908 (III, 401), as if that revolution were not expected to put an end to German influence at Constantinople.

The problem of setting British policy in its proper perspective has not been an easy one to solve, for account must be taken, first, of *la grande politique*, or relations with other Great Powers; next, of imperial interests in all parts of the world; and lastly, of the play of party politics which causes sudden changes of front. In the first volume, which treats the period from 1783 to 1815 in a single "Book", the three factors are easily carried along together, for policy towards particular questions was determined largely by the war with France and was controlled throughout by the same party. But after 1815 this unity gradually disappears. In the admirable chapters by Professor Alison Phillips on "Great Britain and the Continental Alliance, 1815–1822" (II, 1–50) and Mr. H. W. V. Temperly on "The Foreign Policy of Canning" (II, 51–118), the threads are still held together, but quite apart from Canning's dislike of "the European police system" (II, 57), as he called Castlereagh's policy of cooperation with the Continental Powers, there was no one Power or problem to absorb the attention of the British foreign office. After 1830 the treatment is topical, the emphasis shifting as the century progresses from Europe —Belgium, Near East, revolutions of 1848, Crimean War, Italy, Schleswig-Holstein—to the outer world—Afghanistan, Egypt, Africa, China. This method of approach in no way obscures either the frequent hostility to Russia or the alternating friendship and friction with France and the German Powers, and it serves to emphasize how casual were the relations of Great Britain with the Continental Powers. The moral would have been driven home by some reference to the "war scare of 1875", when Great Britain unexpectedly joined with Russia to prevent Germany from going to war with France. It is only with the turn of the century that an analysis of the international situation as a whole becomes necessary, and Sir Valentine Chirol's chapter on "The International Situation, 1899–1902" (III, 263–293) prepares

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the ground for a survey of the strictly European policy pursued, after 1902, in face of the rising power of Germany.

On only one point can there be any serious quarrel with the general scheme. Volume II ends with the resignation of Russell in 1866, and Volume III is divided into "Books" entitled "From the Third Ministry of Lord Derby to the First Ministry of Lord Salisbury, 1866–1886", "The Second and Third Salisbury Administrations and After, 1886–1907", and "Before and in the World War, 1907–1919". The implication that after 1866 foreign policy was determined by party politics seems, to the reviewer, quite unsound. The year 1866 was indeed a turning point in the history of Europe, for it marked the advent of Prussia to the leadership of Germany. But British policy was not immediately affected and underwent no real change. The neutrality observed in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German wars signified merely that British interests were not directly involved, and that Clarendon and Granville were less inclined to meddle in Continental affairs than Palmerston and Russell. The real change came in 1874 with the aggressive policy of Disraeli, a policy continued to the end of the century. No doubt there was a certain drawing-back under Gladstone's second ministry (1880–1885), as regards South Africa and Afghanistan, but imperialism went ahead in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa. Mr. W. H. Dawson, who writes on "Foreign Policy and Reaction, 1874–1885", continues his narrative in the next "Book" as "Imperial Policy in the Old and the New World, 1885–1899", without the slightest indication that the vicissitudes of party politics seriously affected the main lines of British activity. Also it is hard to understand why Dr. Gooch's chapter on "Continental Agreements, 1902–1907" is placed in one "Book", and his second on "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1907–1914" in the next. Surely the twelve years covered by him form a period which has little in common with the preceding thirty years. From 1874 to 1899 the cue was to increase the Empire and glory in isolation: after 1902 the policy was to desist from conquest and return to Europe. Before 1902 Anglo-German relations were usually correct and often friendly: after that date they grew steadily worse. To introduce a dividing line of 1907, in the middle of Sir Edward Grey's tenure of office, is highly artificial, for it is notorious that he continued and developed the policy of Lord Lansdowne.

Defective organization is also evident in the double treatment of the Tahiti dispute of 1834 and the Spanish marriages of 1846; the argument against "marring the cohesion of the particular chapters or sections" fails to convince when the responsibility for the Crimean

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War is differently ascribed by the two writers. Or take the case of Anglo-American relations in the 'sixties. The difficult problems arising out of the Civil War are discussed, up to 1863, in Volume II. But the settlement of those problems is put over to Volume III and given to another author, who, to make his treatment clear, has to repeat much that has already been more fully explained.

Then there are some strange omissions. If it were necessary to devote a chapter to the events that brought on the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and to follow the course of that upheaval, something should have been said about the wars fought by the East India Company from 1798 to 1818: the one set of events was as much "foreign policy" as the other. The part played by Persia in the Mutiny is explained and the outbreak of war with England recorded, but the end of the war is not indicated; and there is no further mention of Persia till 1899, although as Lord Curzon said, "She is one of those countries which must have inevitably attracted the attention of Europe" (III, 319), and was the scene of sharp Anglo-Russian rivalry. Arabia is ignored from the occupation of Aden in 1839 to the promises made to the Sherif of Mecca in 1916; nor is there a word about British policy in the Cretan troubles of 1866–68. China drops out of sight after the Russo-Japanese War, as if the opium question and the revolution of 1911 were without interest. Anglo-American relations, which are fully handled up to 1872, receive thereafter such summary consideration that the Newfoundland fisheries arbitration, the Taft arbitration treaty, and the question of the Panama Canal tolls are entirely forgotten. Even such strictly European matters are neglected as the North Sea Agreement of 1908, to which Great Britain was a party, and the delicate question of the Aegean Islands in 1913–1914, to the settlement of which Sir Edward Grey gave much attention. It is also remarkable that the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–1888, in which British diplomacy played a most important rôle, should get less than a page, and that only one of the two Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 with Austria and Italy should be mentioned, although the text of both has been published.

All things considered, the first and second volumes, in spite of some defects, are excellent and in most points definitive. The third volume, however, is far from satisfactory, largely because the publication has been rushed. It would have been far wiser to wait until the German, Austrian and Russian archives finish disgorging their priceless treasures, for these documents are filled with confidences from British foreign secretaries and ambassadors that reveal British policy far more clearly than Blue Books and speeches in Parliament. Thus Mr. Dawson was not able to make proper use of *Die Grosse Politik der Euro-*

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päischen Kabinette, 1871–1914, although he does refer in footnotes, evidently added at the last minute, to the early volumes; his account of Anglo-German difficulties in Africa would have gained much from the use of this material. When the German collection is completed next year, a large part of Volume III will have to be rewritten. The "Epilogue" does little more than sketch the diplomatic history of the war period and outline the terms of peace, and had better have been omitted, for the time has not come to write authoritatively of those things. A word must be added in praise of the chapter on "The Foreign Office" (III, 539–630), by Mr. Algernon Cecil, which is written in a lively style and from inside knowledge. This chapter, and one on "Commercial Relations, 1828–1865" (II, 465–487), by Messrs. J. H. Clapham and E. A. Benians, break new ground and are the most distinct contributions to the *History;* Professor A. P. Newton's account of "United States and Colonial Developments, 1815–1856" (II, 220–283), although based on secondary authorities, provides a summary that is not to be found elsewhere.

The bibliographies are continuations of those in the *Cambridge Modern History*, which are not reprinted. Unfortunately, here, as in the earlier work, they are, with a few exceptions, mere lists of books without any explanatory or evaluating comment. The specialist in any period will not need such lists, and the beginner will be merely confused. Once again the complaint must be made that the work of American scholars is not sufficiently appreciated, for no place is found for the works of G. L. Rives and Justin H. Smith, on American relations with Mexico, *The Education of Henry Adams* (curiously enough, it is referred to in footnotes), W. R. Thayer's *Cavour*, or Mrs. Raymond's *British Policy and Public Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War*. L. P. Lawson's *Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine* and C. C. Tansill's *Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* may have appeared too late, although other books of the year 1922 find their appropriate places. A number of articles in the *American Historical Review* have been overlooked. No uniformity has been observed in describing the unpublished material, some entries being as laconic as "Foreign Office Papers, 1857–1863, Record Office," while others are set forth with great particularity. Also, it is not always easy to determine from the footnotes whether the reference is to published or unpublished papers. It is not clear on just what principle the capital of Russia is always called "Petrograd," while the old spelling "Servia" is retained. Finally, although the cost would doubtless have been increased, some illustrative maps, if only sketches in the text, would

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have added not a little to the value of the *History*, for the maps available in historical atlases are frequently not detailed enough to show the issues that diplomacy has to settle.

II

In the Preface to Volume I the purpose is expressed of "seeking to vindicate for British Foreign Policy that claim to consistency which in certain respects has been denied to it by some of its censors, and in others allowed to it only in the way of sarcasm". Now if a policy is to be vindicated and its consistency proved, that policy must be explained. And explained it is not in this *History*—it is only narrated. Certainly the virtue of consistency will not be apparent to an unimaginative reader. Thus Dr. Holland Rose flatly says that Pitt's willingness to yield the Netherlands to France in 1801 was "not consistent" with his previous attitude (I, 305); a little later he describes Fox's policy in 1806 as a decision to "withdraw from Continental entanglements and to embark on a more purely British policy" (I, 438). The doctrine of intervention, proclaimed by the Holy Alliance in the interest of Conservatism, was repudiated by Castlereagh as unwarranted by the Treaties of 1815: it was adopted and applied by Canning to preserve Liberalism in Portugal and to aid the Greeks against the Turks. Or what kind of consistency was there in the Russophil policies of the Tory Aberdeen and the Liberal Gladstone on the one hand, and the Russophobe actions of the Whig Palmerston and the Conservative Disraeli on the other? Is it necessary to speak of the *volte face* in our own day, when isolation gave way to association and bitter rivals became cherished friends? It all looks very much like sheer expediency, the practice on a grand scale of the opportunism exhibited by Lord John Russell in the Italian complications of 1859–1860 (II, 438–451). Lord Palmerston came near to confessing as much in the famous words: "It is a narrow policy to suppose this country or that to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. The interests of England are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow" (II, 160).

Here of course is the root of the matter, the clue to British policy. Not that other countries have been less resolute in "following their interests"; but whereas Continental states have often professed principles or subscribed to formulas, Downing Street has boldly admitted, as any reader of the despatches must know, that its policy is dictated by "British interests." Interests that do seem to be "eternal." In the "Introduction," Sir Adolphus Ward mentions certain features

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of British policy that were manifest at an early date—protection of trade, the balance of power, maritime supremacy, colonial expansion (I, 3–9)—all before the days of Cromwell. Professor Webster speaks, with regard to the Congress of Vienna, of "the maintenance of the colonial and maritime supremacy of Great Britain," and of "the political arrangement of the Continent" (I, 397–398). And Dr. Gooch ends the story as follows: "The British Empire emerged from the titanic struggle with a large accession of territory, and with the German navy at the bottom of the sea" (III, 538); and although he goes on to say that "the Balance of Power has ceased to exist, for the supremacy of France on land is as unchallengeable as the British supremacy at sea," his own words indicate that there is no dominant Power in Europe. In face of such a demonstrated continuity of interests, ought it to be said that there has been no consistency of policy? The editors would have done well to provide a synthesis in which, by references to the narrative, the tangled threads would be drawn together, the relative importance of different motives and interests estimated, and the questions debated, not of consistency alone, but of honesty and sincerity as well.

This would no doubt be difficult, requiring a mind more French than English, one accustomed to generalize and to philosophize; but it would be very valuable for students, and perhaps also for statesmen, who are invited to profit by "the lessons taught by history as to the endeavours and failures of the past" (III, v). Some such exposition was also needed to grapple with the question of "hypocrisy." The Continental charge that Great Britain is constantly trying to have some one else rescue her chestnuts from the flames can hardly be ignored. For in the Crimean War (II, 577), and in the crisis of 1877–1878 (III, 119, 134–135), she urged Austria forward as the opponent of Russia, and it would be easy to show a similar inclination during the Bulgarian revolution of 1885–1887. Prince Bülow gave as his reason for rejecting a British alliance the fear that Germany would do most of the fighting against Russia while Great Britain reaped the benefits; similarly there were always Frenchmen who thought that a similar motive had inspired the Entente Cordiale. Then something might be said about the practice of lecturing Continental states on the sanctity of treaties and the iniquity of conquest, while Great Britain herself has often evaded treaties and has conquered vast territories in Africa and Asia. No one will contend that such criticisms are always deserved, but *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* should not have shirked a large discussion of such matters.

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"The greatest of British interests is peace" has long been a slogan of British publicists. This doctrine was not always held. The younger Pitt, after 1783, was determined to restore the influence of Great Britain in the councils of Europe. So in the navy, "he maintained a larger personnel than had ever been maintained in times of peace", and "by 1787 he was prepared to risk war" (I, 147). He did risk it three years later in the affair of Nootka Sound, where British interests were directly involved, and in 1791, although Great Britain was not a party to the quarrel, he wished to use force against the Russians when they seized the Turkish town of Oczakoff. For the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens in 1803, France was probably more to blame than Great Britain, but the fact that Napoleon was ready to let Britain keep Malta, which was the crux of the negotiations, for a term of years (I, 323) and the admission that "from the beginning of the crisis, George III, whose influence over the Cabinet was great, had been eager for war" (I, 322) suggest something more than "slackness and incompetence" (I, 326) in the negotiations.

After 1815, however, British policy became more pacific, at least to the extent that it aimed to preserve the peace of Europe and only once, up to 1914, became involved in war with a European state. But if the policy was pacific, its conduct was hardly pacifist. It is really astonishing how many times in the course of the last century Great Britain has resorted to threats, open or veiled, to carry her points. The first was the warning from Canning to Polignac in 1823 that "any French attempt to restore Spanish dominion or to establish French authority in the American provinces would be followed by war with Great Britain" (II, 67). Again and again France was made to toe the line. In 1832 the departure of the French army from Belgium was, so Palmerston wrote to Paris, "a question of peace or war" (II, 144). French submission in "the unfortunate Tahiti episode" was enforced by the strong and unambiguous language of Peel (II, 184–185), just as fifty years later Lord Rosebery ordered a British gunboat to prevent the enforcement of a French blockade of Siam (III, 198). The last episode occurred in 1898, over Fashoda, when France was presented with the alternative of yielding or fighting (III, 254). Russia was also subjected to this kind of pressure. In 1849 when Russia and Austria were demanding the surrender of Hungarian refugees by Turkey, Palmerston "plainly told the Russian and Austrian ambassadors that insistence on their demand would mean war" (II, 321). In 1877 Beaconsfield privately conveyed to the Tsar a warning that a second campaign against Turkey would be resisted by Great Britain, and his military and naval measures following the Treaty of San Stefano are

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well known. Even the United States has not escaped, for in 1841 Palmerston declared that if Alexander McLeod, arrested in New York for complicity in the *Caroline* case, were executed, "there must be war" (II, 241). With the coming of the twentieth century, British policy became genuinely pacific, and lost much of its pugnacity. Yet Turkey had to be overawed by a naval demonstration when, in 1906, she tried to seize Tabah, on the Egyptian frontier (III, 380). More striking still was Lord Lansdowne's pronouncement in 1903 that "we should resist by all the means at our disposal" "the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the [Persian] Gulf by any other Power" (III, 321); the warning may have been proper, but the language used resembled rather too much that affected on occasion by the Imperial German Government.

It will be observed that these defiances were hurled chiefly in quarrels outside of Europe. As far back as 1802 the British Government had asserted "His Majesty's determination never to forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the Continent on every occasion in which the interests of his own dominions or those of Europe in general appear to him to require it" (I, 312); and there was plenty of interference in the nineteenth century. But generally speaking, diplomacy sufficed to gain the end desired, or the interest involved was not worth war. It was otherwise with the expansion of Empire. That expansion was pursued when possible by peaceful penetration, but if necessary by military action, and the "little wars" fought in almost every continent reach a very respectable number. The results were certainly impressive, but it was even more remarkable that Great Britain could acquire her enormous empire without having to fight a single war with a European Power. The explanation, however, is simple enough, being found in the superior strength of the British navy, which had no serious rival for a hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar. Concessions were sometimes made, notably in Africa, but if Great Britain elected to maintain her position, other states were almost helpless, and it is very curious that a survey of British foreign policy should fail, as this *History* does fail, to emphasize the inexorable working of sea power in times of peace, or to provide some account of the development of the British navy in the nineteenth century.

The happy situation just described was profoundly altered by the rise of the German navy. That a German fleet might blockade England and starve her into submission was obvious, and this was both the official and the popular justification for keeping the British navy well ahead of the German. But a German fleet was also bound to affect British imperial ambitions. Not only was no territory added to

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the British Empire between 1902 and 1914, but British interests in Morocco were sacrificed, and in 1914 concessions were made to Germany in Mesopotamia (III, 477–481) which would not have been thought of ten years before when the German navy was not yet built.

From this point of view it is hard to understand an episode, only recently revealed from German sources, that runs so contrary to the traditions of British policy. For although in 1898 and 1900 the laws were passed which presaged the building of a mighty German fleet, in 1899 and 1901 overtures were made by Great Britain to Germany for an alliance, and on the second occasion the principal obstacle seems to have been the British reluctance, because of the uncertain future of Austria-Hungary, to join the Triple Alliance. An Anglo-German alliance would have changed the course of history, but Sir Valentine Chirol is probably right in calling the negotiations "unreal" (III, 285). If the evidence does not warrant the German charge that the British offer was insincere, just another attempt to enlist a continental army in the service of Britain, yet in the long run the mistress of the seas must have found an alliance with her greatest rival extremely irksome. Either Great Britain did not understand the passionate desire of Germany to possess a navy, or she hoped to moderate that desire by supporting German ambitions in Turkey, Morocco, and elsewhere. Many German writers now bitterly regret that the proffered hand was not seized, and the naval rivalry avoided; but for a definitive judgment we must await the next installment of *Die Grosse Politik* and the publication of documents from the British archives.

It was the failure of this project which caused Great Britain to turn to France. British statesmen perceived that the aggressive policy pursued overseas for thirty years had aroused great animosities in Europe, and the intrigues carried on during the Boer War, with a view to intervention, convinced them that isolation was no longer profitable and might be dangerous. If an accomodation with Germany was not to be had, then her rivals in the Dual Alliance must be approached. Such a move was indeed called for to restore the balance of power in Europe, which was being upset by the astonishing development of Germany; to give Great Britain every chance for maintaining her maritime supremacy; and to protect the Empire against attacks from France and Russia, the two Powers that had been its inveterate opponents. On the surface this change of front shows once more that "Great Britain was consistent only in self-interest" (II, 449); actually it was in perfect harmony with the principles sanctioned by four centuries of successful application.

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Thus immediate interest and historic tradition alike recommended the Entente with France and Russia. The object of this policy was, in the first instance of course, to protect the interests of Great Britain, but there was also an ardent desire to preserve the peace of Europe; for its chief artificer, Sir Edward Grey, was at heart a pacifist. Yet the policy not only failed to keep the peace, but probably made war more likely. For this reason no section of the *History* will be read with greater attention than the chapters devoted to the years 1902–1914.

Dr. Gooch's method is to let the facts speak for themselves, and the objectivity and impartiality of his narrative deserves high praise. He is not in the least afraid of disagreeable facts or hesitant about criticising the conduct of the British Government. Thus Mr. Lloyd George's famous Mansion House speech in the Morocco crisis of 1911 "was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier in 1905, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England" (III, 446). Or, *à propos* of the Italian raid on Tripoli: "British opinion was hostile; but no word of rebuke was heard from the Minister who had so sharply condemned the annexation of Bosnia" (III, 455). Dr. Gooch also protests against the secrecy with which the fact of Anglo-French military conversations was shrouded for eight years (III, 347, note), and calls it a "problem in casuistry" (III, 486) to reconcile Sir Edward Grey's consent to the Anglo-Russian naval conversations with his public denial of them. Nor does he accept the thesis of Mr. Asquith's recent book that Great Britain had retained its freedom of action. The British Government had "underestimated the intimacy of the relationship which had grown up in eight years of diplomatic cooperation" with France (III, 468), and it was "conditionally involved in the quarrels and ambitions of a distant Power over whose policy [it] exercised no control" (III, 469). In short, there was an "obligation of honor" to assist France (III, 469, 508), and "British policy in the Near East was to follow Russia, wherever possible" (III, 475). But the apologists of the Central Powers will not derive much comfort from these admissions; for although Dr. Gooch is critical of "the whole policy of Continental commitments", he observes that "it ensured that in the event of a German attack we should not be left to face the ordeal single-handed" (III, 508). If he does not say much about French chauvinism, he declines to regard the German danger as imaginary; if he shows up a certain recklessness on the part of Russia, he does not forget that Austrian policy was provocative and dangerous.

If any criticism is to be made of this scrupulously honest attempt

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to establish the truth, it is that on several points the analysis is not carried quite far enough. The most important incident of these years was the mission of Lord Haldane to Berlin in 1912, to discuss a neutrality agreement and a limitation of armaments. Naturally enough perhaps, Dr. Gooch follows Lord Haldane's account, adding "one or two details" from the versions of Bethmann-Hollweg and Admiral von Tirpitz, and he says frankly that "the negotiations failed because each side suspected the other of entertaining unavowed designs" (III, 465). But he does not seem to appreciate that Great Britain insisted on retaining both her supremacy at sea and her diplomatic combinations. If the German demand for unconditional neutrality was unacceptable to Great Britain,[1] the British offer was inadequate from a German point of view. Sir Edward Grey understood that without a limitation of armaments a catastrophe was inevitable, and he was anxious to substitute a Concert of Europe for the existing schism between Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, but he could not bring himself to surrender anything essential. The Germans being equally adamant, a deadlock was reached.

This was the more dangerous because of the Continental situation, about which Dr. Gooch says less than might have been expected. In the first place, a tightening-up of the two alliances was going on apace. Between France and Russia on the one hand, and between Germany, Austria and Italy, on the other, arrangements for military and naval cooperation were studied and worked out to the last detail, so that in 1914 the rival groups stood not only face to face, but as it were, with swords drawn. Secondly, the two groups were engaged in desperate maneuvers at the Balkan capitals and Constantinople, each hoping to turn the balance of power in its own favor. On the spot, Serbia held the key position, and hence in 1914 neither side could yield to the other without, as it seemed, hopelessly compromising the future. Consequently the attitude of Great Britain was of great importance, not merely during the crisis of July, 1914, as Dr. Gooch makes clear (III, 507), but perhaps even more in the antecedents of the crisis.

The public statements of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey that their hands were free, as technically they were, and the course of the Anglo-German negotiations about African and Turkish problems, gave the German government ground for hoping that Great Britain would remain neutral in a Continental war, and it was this expectation which caused Germany to promise her unconditional support to Austria for dealing with Serbia. On the other hand, the private and informal

[1] According to the Russian secret decuments, French pressure was exerted to secure the rejection of the German formula.

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assurances given by Great Britain to France,[1] and the communication of these promises to Russia determined the statesmen of Paris and St. Petersburg to oppose any move by the Central Powers. Granted that a clash between Austria and Russia for ascendancy in the Balkans was probably not to be avoided, the equivocal conduct of Great Britain was in part responsible for the precipitation of the conflict in 1914.

Assuredly nothing was further from the intentions or desires of British statesmen, for there was less inclination to war in Great Britain, a more sincere desire for peace, than in any other Great Power, and it is difficult to say just what the mistake was in a policy which was designed to preserve peace but ended in war. In the presence of the German fleet, the old policy of isolation had to be abandoned. An open alliance with France, held up by many post-war critics as preferable to the indefinite arrangements actually entered into, would probably have been rejected by the House of Commons, would have encouraged the chauvinists in France, and would have angered the Germans perhaps to desperation. The policy of diplomatic agreements with France and Russia was a middle course, characteristically British, which in its first stages was unobjectionable, for it did not exclude a similar agreement with Germany, and, as is well known, an agreement had been reached on the eve of the war. The trouble was that when Germany refused to discuss a limitation of naval armaments, the diplomatic friendship developed into a kind of military alliance, the Germans refusing because Great Britain would not abandon her diplomatic friendships! Thus events moved in a vicious circle.

Sir Edward Grey saw the dilemma, and tried to escape from it through the Concert of Europe; from the Bosnian crisis of 1908 to the final crash, he preferred common action by all the Powers to lining up the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance. No man ever worked harder to retrieve the consequences of a situation which was in part—Sir Edward Grey can hardly be held responsible for the German fleet—of his own making. Dr. Gooch very properly emphasizes the success of this policy, the policy of the Concert, in keeping the peace during the Balkan wars of 1912–1913, as was recognized by the Germans (III, 471–472), and if it was not given a chance in 1914, the fault was assuredly not Sir Edward Grey's. The irony of the German refusal to accept mediation by the Concert was that in his

[1] Volume II of the Russian *Livre Noir*, published too late for Dr. Gooch to use, prints documents, according to which there existed between the French and British Governments "a verbal agreement, by virtue of which England had declared herself ready to come to the aid of France in the event of an attack by Germany."

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desperation Sir Edward went so far as to say that he would abandon France and Russia if they declined to support a peace proposal coming from Germany and Austria (III, 498); he was offering what Bethmann-Hollweg had vainly demanded in the negotiations of 1912! It is quite true that Germany made belated efforts to restrain Austria (III, 497), but by that time mobilizations, which had been made inevitable by Germany's previous conduct, were under way, and diplomacy had ceased to count. Whatever his previous mistakes may have been, Sir Edward Grey made the *amende honorable* in 1914; because Germany did not meet him half-way, Great Britain had to make the choice, which she had hoped to avoid, which both honor and interest demanded.

On two points Dr. Gooch's account of the crisis of 1914 needs correction. He states that the Russian minister of war and the chief of the general staff "allowed general mobilization to continue" on July 29, after it had been countermanded by the Tsar (III, 498). Apparently he has not seen, although it was published in 1922, a pamphlet by General Serge Dobrorolsky,[1] who was chief of the mobilization section of the Russian general staff. According to Dobrorolsky, the Tsar was not disobeyed by his generals; Dobrorolsky himself sent out the orders countermanding the general and substituting a partial mobilization, and it was not until the evening of the next day that the order for general mobilization was finally given. Dr. Gooch then goes on to say that the war was "precipitated by the action of Russia, at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed" (III, 499). This is hardly correct, for it was not until the following day, July 31, Austria informed Russia of her willingness to discuss the ultimatum to Serbia. In conclusion, it is interesting to note the opinion expressed with reference to British policy towards Belgian neutrality in 1870 (II, 14–15), that Great Britain had the liberty, but not the obligation, to regard a violation of that neutrality as a *casus belli*, whereas in 1914, Sir Edward Grey "treated it as a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain was bound to engage in a single-handed defence of Belgium."

Attention may be called to the parallel between British policy at the close of the Napoleonic wars and American policy since 1918. Castlereagh, like Mr. Wilson, "was prepared to play the part of mediator between the statesmen and sovereigns of the Allies" (I, 434), and he had a "great scheme for preserving Europe from the evils of the last twenty years," nothing less than "an alliance, not merely against

[1] *Die Mobilmachung der Russischen Armee, 1914.* Berlin, 1922.

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France, but against whatever Power broke the peace" (I, 444). He had to compromise, for the Quadruple Alliance was directed solely against France. The last article of that alliance, providing for "diplomacy by conference," was unpopular in England, and in 1816 Castlereagh had to inform the Tsar that his government, "so far from desiring to undertake further international obligations, was rather disposed to withdraw from those already incurred" (II, 26). In the end Castlereagh was reduced to sending an "unofficial observer" to the Conference of Troppau (II, 37). But just as the United States, after withdrawing from the Supreme Council, did not cease to defend American interests, so the British Government refused to recognize the pretensions of the Holy Alliance. Canning's famous cry, "Every nation for itself, and God for us all," and the American objection to "entangling alliances," represent much the same point of view.

There are many other topics worthy of discussion, did space permit, such as the law of contraband and blockade, the relation of the Crown to foreign policy, the rôle of the House of Commons, and the British attitude toward small nations. We must, however, take leave of this great *History*, which, in spite of the defects that have been indicated, is a notable monument to British historical scholarship and an important contribution to the study of international politics.

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REVIEWS

Primitive Society. By ROBERT H. LOWIE. New York, Boni and Liveright, 1920.—vi, 463 pp.

Early Civilization, An Introduction to Anthropology. By ALEXANDER A. GOLDENWEISER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1922. —xiv, 428 pp.

Man and Culture. By CLARK WISSLER. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923.—xi, 371 pp.

Anthropology. By A. L. KROEBER. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923.—x, 523 pp.

These are four important books for the student of anthropology. They may be said to present in general treatise form the new anthropology.

For about a score of years the status of anthropology has been relatively unknown to all save the specially initiated. The students of the social sciences, of the state, of economic history, of education, of ancient history, and even of sociology knew very little of the development of ethnology since the days of the so-called classical anthropologists. Why this secluded nature of the science during the past two decades?

During the latter part of the nineteenth century a good many books on anthropology were published. Such works as those of Tyler, Morgan, Spencer, McLennan, Maine, Lubbock, Lang, Fraser and Wundt were not only pretty well known to the student of the social sciences, but many of them were quite popular with the general reading public. Here were standard books on the general field that could be easily located in the libraries and read.

These books were however more or less speculative. The search for origins and evolutionary processes led to rather bold explanations, supported of course by some data and many illustrations. But these were the early days of the science and the data were often the observations of untrained missionaries, travelers and government agents. It was soon apparent that the theorizing had gone about as far as it could profitably go without more sound observation and record. These re-

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marks are not intended as a wholesale condemnation of these early works. They were a necessary stage in the growth of the science. There was much excellent formulation of plans and some good method. But the need of more field work was evident.

So anthropology entered into its second phase. There was much emphasis on field work. The investigators who went into the field were highly skilled technicians and trained in linguistics. The writings were in special monographs, or technical papers appearing in widely-scattered scientific journals and reports, of various languages. But few books. The general student of the social sciences could not easily follow. After a time, researches accumulated as records were coming in from primitive peoples of the different regions. These researches first produced destructive criticisms. Now they are yielding constructive syntheses in books and general treatises, of which these books of Lowie, Goldenweiser, Wissler and Kroeber are excellent examples. There are of course such books as Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man*, Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*, Wissler's *American Indian*, Osborn's *Men of the Old Stone Age*. There are others too, such as the writings of Rivers and Marett in England and of Graebner in Germany, but in this later development the American school under the leadership of Boas has played a most important role.

Lowie's *Primitive Society* is an excellent example of the productions of the historical school. He is very cautious about going further in his constructions than the data warrant. The book is quite rich in facts, chosen largely from North America, partly because the author is more familiar with this field and partly because in America the best intensive work over a large and varied field has been done. It should also be added that only thoroughly tested observations are used by the author, than whom there is none more critical in the use of ethnological data. True to the traditions of this school, he is severe in his criticisms of facile psychological and evolutionary interpretations and doctrines.

His subject matter is such aspects of primitive society as marriage, the family, kinship, sib, position of woman, property, associations, rank, government and justice. The picture drawn reveals primitive society as not so bizarre an affair as the stories of the cave man would lead one to expect, nor so much a wish-fulfillment as persons oppressed by society's conventions imagine. Primitive society is very much like our own in fundamental pattern. There are, to be sure, variations. Perhaps this lack of strangeness is due to greater understanding on the part of the author. The material presented is not humanized in any

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very obvious manner, but the attentive reader will find a great deal to stimulate reflection and interpretation. It is not rapid reading, though the style is clear and vigorous. The author does, in the latter pages, let himself go a bit on the subject of progress. His discussions of this subject will impress many readers with respect for his viewpoint which includes such a sweep of societal phenomena. The restraint and precision of the author are other evidences of the high mark of achievement in this book of science in the social field. The book replaces the *Ancient Society* of Lewis H. Morgan, so long the authority in this field. It will probably remain the standard book for some years to come.

Goldenweiser's *Early Civilization* will perhaps have a wider appeal than Lowie's treatise, for several reasons. The author has added personal touches here and there, particularly in the footnotes. The frequent contrasts between the life of primitive peoples and our own, together with a readiness to interpret, vitalize the treatment for the modern reader very successfully. It is well illustrated.

The layout of the material is somewhat unconventional and perhaps a little disturbing. Part I is preceded by three essays on the unity of man, the nature of civilization and a review of the evolutionary theory. These three essays are scholarly and while they represent the accepted thought on these topics, they are too condensed to be convincing to the reader who is not already an anthropologist. Part I on the other hand is well suited to the reader lacking in ethnological experience. It contains five descriptive chapters on five widely differing primitive cultures. The accounts are given simply and clearly with carefully selected materials. This is an almost necessary background too often unsupplied. Part II concerns the economic, religious, æsthetic and social life of primitive peoples. The chapters on economics are welcome, for there has been little readily available since Bücher's *Industrial Evolution*. Goldenweiser has for many years been a sympathetic student of primitive religion, and these strange phenomena are presented with understanding. Art among primitive peoples is always surprising in its beauty and richness.

Part III on the ideas of early man is an exposition and criticism of the theories on this subject of Spencer, Frazer, Wundt, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and Freud. They represent many years of study and reflection and, as a result, show a highly articulate integration and analysis. These critiques, like the first three essays, are perhaps a little erudite for an introduction, nor are they as simple and systematic an exposition of primitive ideas as the reader may want.

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At the end of each of the Parts, the author concludes with chapters entitled, for instance, "Reflections on Part I". The average reader will probably think of these as "My Reflections on . . ." despite any such intention on the part of the author. It is always a doubtful question in the light of scientific determinism what is originality and what is due to others, but in these "reflections" there is much that is the common property of the modern ethnologist. This statement is not meant to imply that there is no originality in these reflections.

In Wissler's *Man and Culture* we have a comprehensive exposition of culture as seen by the ethnologist today. There are here and there in the book some historical materials and some causal factors probably not accepted by all ethnologists, that is to say, theories peculiar to the author or to a smaller group. But in general the presentation is fair and representative. It is an impressive account.

The concept of culture is as yet little understood by the reader of the social sciences today. But it is a concept of great significance. It has real vitality. Like the concept democracy, the more it is studied the more is seen in it. Culture is more than a mere idea. It is a mass of phenomena, more or less comparable in magnitude to organic phenomena or inorganic phenomena. As such it has history. The varieties are subject to description and definition. There are multitudes of causal relationships. There are classifications and processes. The author sets forth these various aspects of culture in a picture quite readily comprehended. The style is clear, sometimes vivid, colloquial at times, and often suggestive of wider implications. There is a good deal of contrast of the processes of early culture with those of the culture of the present day or of the historical period. The student of modern social phenomena will profit a good deal by the understanding of the culture complex, the adhesion of culture traits, and the culture area with its peculiar but common center of dispersal. The great and varied role of diffusion, which we acknowledge but too frequently keep tucked away in a small isolated compartment of our knowledge, is fairly displayed in contrast to invention and convergence.

There is something so profound about the grand sweep of culture, that to a person of imagination there is a strong tendency to generalize on matters of great consequence, to the neglect of facts on which generalization should be based. The friendly critic will feel that the author's generalization regarding the origin of very early cultures among the tundra and among the mesa-peoples should be seen rather as a projected theory concerning which we need more corroboration. One is also inclined to question how it comes about, if the cultural

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processes are so important as set forth in Parts I and II, that in Part III the rôle of race is specifically made to appear so great. Also the chapter on the universal pattern of culture will raise some interesting questions and doubts as to the relative importance of the cultural and original-nature factors in the causation of this universality.

Kroeber in writing his *Anthropology* has had the advantage of having taught large numbers of students for many years in the subject. A reading of his book discloses the value of this experience. He seems to know what the reader needs presented in order to understand. The volume is also quite rich in concrete materials, not presented only as illustrations, but as basic to the hypothesis or as historical facts valuable on their own account. These may also be the reason why the transitions from one topic to another seem abrupt.

The contents begin with an introductory chapter on the relation of anthropology to the other sciences—not a very full discussion. Then follow certain chapters on early beginnings of culture, language and race, the idea being to present the facts as nearly as we have them. The language and race material are for the whole of the earth's surface, for the information appears now to be thus extensive, though of course the details of our knowledge vary greatly from region to region. The achievement of anthropologists in recovering this information on race, language and early culture is most impressive. The effect of these researches on the imagination is somewhat akin to the effect of the early researches of geology or astronomy. There is a certain sense of wonder. Few subjects do so much damage to the provincialism of Main Street, or for that matter of the United States, as anthropology. Indeed from the pages of this book, our modern civilization itself seems provincial. Then follow brief theoretical or analytical chapters on race, culture, climate, diffusion and invention. It is interesting to note that these chapters are brief. Apparently analysis is not for analysis' sake, but is subordinated to historical record valuable as history. This is probably the reason why the analysis seems so casual. These chapters, particularly the two on race, appear rather sane with very little evidence of bias.

The latter half of the book is a history of culture before the period of written history and a history of cultures among peoples who have had no written history. This story of culture is told with conciseness and a fine sense of perspective. Particularly well done is the history of America before the coming of the white man. There must be a certain speculative element in such a reconstruction, due to the nature of the problem. This is rather noticeable in the chapter on the

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history of religion, for instance, which is an excellent example of method but seems to rest on a good many assumptions. The latter half of the book yields a sort of panorama written with insight and imagination as well as based on record. This broad perspective of the early history of our culture gives a striking picture, hardly to be had otherwise, of what diffusion has meant for the growth of culture over the world, and one is much impressed with the phenomenon of the center of dispersal in a broad culture area. The author sacrifices a good deal of detail to outline the history, and perhaps critics may find fault occasionally on these grounds. History is an art as well as a science.

It is surprising that four such books could have been written with so little overlapping of contents.

WILLIAM F. OGBURN

Economics of the Hour. By J. ST. LOE STRACHEY. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1923.—xvi, 234 pp.

This is a vigorous work by the editor of *The Spectator*. In some respects it is a polemic. It is, however, tempered by remarkably good sense. The author is terribly in earnest. He might well be. No Englishman who thinks clearly could help it in these times. The blind are leading the blind toward the pit. What can a clear-sighted Englishman do but cry aloud with the fervor of a Hebrew prophet?

The book is dedicated "To the Working Mothers of England." It is a remarkable tribute. Beside the courage and fortitude of the working mother, even that of the soldier grows pale. Moreover she is wise. She learns in her busy solitude to think things out.

> Her love for her husband and her children has been her strength and her illumination in sickness and in sorrow, in anxiety and disappointment, in the wounds of the heart, and in the hunger of the soul. . . . Hers is wisdom, independence and strength.. . . .
>
> It is because of this power to see that the English working mother proves herself so shrewd a social and political philosopher, and above all so sound an economist. Her mind has been strengthened by thought, not made sodden by the perpetual drip of rhetorical shibboleths or conventional invectives such as those with which politicians great and small bemuse themselves.

The remainder of this remarkable dedication is even more pointed and appealing. It alone is worth the price of the book. The book

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itself is clear, logical and sensible. It is written for minds that think simply and in straight lines. It will make little appeal to those who learn their economics in an atmosphere of beer and tobacco and whose ears hear nothing but the language of sophistry and invective. Its style and method are the nearest approach to those of Bastiat that the reviewer has seen. Yet the author is familiar with Jevons and the marginal analysis.

If any passage could be selected as the keynote of the book, the following will serve as well as any:

> Humanity has prayed for plenty since the beginning of recorded time. Yet everywhere schemes are found for the limitation of supply, and therefore for the negation of plenty. We work for abundance with one hand, and strive for scarcity with the other. Why is this? How has a situation so mad arisen? Because mankind has adopted a theory of value imperfect, or at any rate imperfectly presented, and therefore misleading. . . .
>
> Pestilence and hunger may have slain their thousands, but in very truth this misunderstanding has slain its tens of thousands [p. 7].

He then proceeds to state the modern theory of value. He uses somewhat striking terms, but his statement is sufficiently accurate for ordinary discussions. His emphasis upon utility and demand is at least well placed.

Chapter II is entitled "Economic Aphorisms". It is one of the most readable and least satisfactory of all the chapters. The aphorisms are grouped under seven heads, The Nature of Wealth, The Home Market, The Foundations of Free Exchange, Taxation, Socialism and Free Exchange, The Wages of Capital, and Rising Prices. Some of these aphorisms are distinctly not true, others require some explanation, others are excellent. An example of those that are not true is: "We ought therefore to tax men because they are rich, not because they own a particular form of property." This overlooks the difference in the repressive power of a tax on different forms of property. Another example is: "As a rule, however, a man's income varies directly with his total capital riches, and so with his taxable capacity." This is distinctly not true of a salaried man. Worse still is: "Experience shows, however, that under normal conditions capital increases more rapidly than does the demand for it, and that therefore the wages of capital, i. e. the interest at which it is lent, tend to decrease, while the wages of labour tend to increase." Something depends upon what is meant by normal. It is not abnormal for

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inventors to be active. If they are, they show us new ways of using capital and this increases the demand for it. If business talent is also abundant and active this still further increases the demand for capital and may even raise the rate of interest on increasing quantities of capital. Under free immigration, either from Heaven or from some foreign country, labor may increase even more rapidly than capital.

Among those aphorisms which require explanation are the following: "By increasing exchanges we increase wealth," or, "There are only two ways by which a nation can obtain a particular product of human skill and energy: 1. By making it itself. 2. By making some other thing to exchange for it." This is true of a peaceful nation only. Or again, "Economic waste may be justified on moral grounds, but never on the ground that it is increasing the wealth of the community." Nothing that is economically wasteful can possibly be rationally moral. Conventional morals are no justification for anything.

Some excellent aphorisms, and worthy of all acceptation are: "A rise in price is also the most effective way of advertising to the world that there is a shortage of supply, and that it is very much worth somebody's while to seek out or to produce more of the thing demanded." "In any case the rise in prices is a trumpet call to the world to produce more, and produce it quickly." "Neither seizure by the strong nor distribution by the Government can make people keen to produce. Neither offers, like a rise in price, a premium on production." There are many others.

One of the most useful chapters is Chapter I of Part II on "The Dread of a Profit," which he shows to have been the great hindrance to recovery from the Great War. "Instead of putting all their energies into producing the things needful for civilization, and repairing a ruined world, they used up the best part of those energies in trying to prevent each other from making a profit."

Chapter IV of Part II on "The Third Partner in Industry" is a complete answer to some half-baked Americans who have suggested sabotage by technical experts. This chapter contrasts the policy of professional organizations, who set higher and higher standards of performance for themselves, with those of some trade unions that do the opposite. A statement of the Society of Technical Engineers is cited.

> Now, while Parliament is anxiously projecting remedies for saving the country from industrial ruin, it is worth while to reiterate that if we can make our Industry a better Industry the benefits will not only be for us but for the nation as a whole; but a condition of such an effort must be that

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the technicians in the Engineering and Allied Industries are able to maintain equality with, or superiority to, those of other nations [p. 80].

This he regards as a challenge

to those besotted sophists who do not realise that you can build nothing upon a foundation of paradox, but who rather seem to think that the more you pile paradox on paradox, fallacy on fallacy, the more swiftly you will arrive at the industrial paradise where everybody may live in a splendid repose upon the idleness of everybody else.

The chapter on "Commerce, Labour and the Creed of Christ" contains much good sense and little sentimental slush, but does not go very far into the philosophy of his topic. The reviewer does not remember having seen so clear or so complete an analysis of the results of a capital levy as the author has given. The immediate effect of such a levy would be to make capital goods unsalable. Therefore the owners could not raise money on them. The government would have to take them, and not being able to sell them, would merely have a lot of old junk on its hands.

It is a good book; we need more like it.

T. N. CARVER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Great Game of Politics. By FRANK R. KENT. Garden City, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923.—xiv, 332 pp.

Mr. Kent says that he has tried in this book "to paint a picture of the machine as it really is, to give the practical and human side of it, to show the good as well as the bad in it." Viewed in a not too high light at the end of a not too small salon, the picture of American politics that he paints is fairly good portraiture; viewed at close range, where the paint can be smelled as well as seen, the work is highly impressionistic. His colors are "piled"; his drawing is so straight-lined to his points as to be often untrue to life; and instead of the rich illustrative detail that might have been supplied, there are broad and florid strokes that cannot fail to distress the student who is fond of accuracy, and to give the amateur (to whom Mr. Kent chiefly addresses himself) a distorted impression of realities.

Let it be said once more that the picture is fair portraiture—so fair indeed that one can but regret that a painter of such good parts has so many and such inexcusable faults. Let it be said also that the painter has attempted an extraordinarily difficult subject—a picture of

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so restless, diversified, and changeful a thing as American politics. The author disclaims any attempt to be profound or analytical or psychological or philosophical or comprehensive. It is "practical" politics with which he deals. The distinction is popular but more or less absurd. One cannot describe practical politics without being all the things which he disavows. Moreover, Mr. Kent is all of these things to a degree, and he is by no means always "practical."

The chief criticisms that may be lodged against this book are its inaccuracies and its omission of concrete illustrations. The author is discussing a subject that involves an almost limitless number of facts, known and unknown. Quite apparently he has observed and absorbed a large number of political facts; he is no tyro at the "great game." But equally apparently there are many ascertainable facts that he ought to know and does not know. These could be exampled at any number of points in his discourse. Take page 144. He lists as "reasons why the state central committee is vital to the bosses," the following:

"The state committee or its chairman fixes the date for the party primaries.

"It fixes the date and makes the arrangements for the state and city conventions."

Mr. Kent should know that in many states (probably in most of the important ones) the date of the party primaries is fixed by law, and that it is in any case not a matter of great importance. He should also know that state conventions have lost their former significance in a considerable number of states and that city conventions are almost a thing of the past.

On the same page he says, "In every county and in every city the governor of a state has many little local appointments of justices of the peace, notaries, members of the school board, game wardens, inspectors of one thing or another, and the like." There is no state in the union in which the governor appoints justices of the peace, and certainly no state in which he appoints members of local school boards. In practically every state any respectably supported person may become a notary, which is at best a trivial office with no political significance whatever.

Innumerable inaccuracies with respect to discoverable facts of this kind put under a cloud of some suspicion Mr. Kent's many emphatic, unqualified, and wholly undocumented statements about the less known and less easily unearthed facts of our political life. What shall one say, for example, of a writer on "practical" politics, who

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does not know that congressmen are not elected in the odd-numbered years? (p. 253).

It is safe to say that there is not a single concrete illustration in this book that is not a matter of somewhat common knowledge. At best there are few illustrations where there might have been many. This, again, can be demonstrated at many points. He tells us, for instance, that presidential aspirants, after preliminary financial skirmishes, begin by getting laudatory articles about themselves "planted" in one of the big magazines or periodicals (p. 235). This may or may not be a usual procedure. If it is, however, surely the aspirants and the magazines are plentiful enough for specific citation.

Mr. Kent's thesis, if any, is that the voters should participate more generally in the party primaries, and thus weaken or break the power of the machines and bosses. No doubt such general participation, being a potential threat to machine power, would increase the caution of the bosses and thus produce results by indirection. But organization is the essence of success at the polls, as Mr. Kent recognizes and reiterates. Is it not evident that the organization which successfully disputed the existing machine at the polls would itself become the machine—better or worse or merely different in personnel—but none the less the machine? Mr. La Follette created the direct primary in Wisconsin for the purpose of overthrowing the existing Republican machine, and he succeeded. Will any observer of Wisconsin politics pretend that there is no La Follette machine in that state?

HOWARD LEE MCBAIN

Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman. By ROBERT MCELROY. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1923.—Two volumes, 359, 427 pp.

It was high time that the American people had a standard biography of Grover Cleveland when Professor McElroy's work appeared last autumn. More than fifteen years had passed since the death of the ex-president at Princeton, years during which he had grown more in public esteem than any other president since the Civil War. Professor McElroy has done ample justice to his great subject. His volumes are well proportioned, fully documented, historically accurate, and written in a sustained style of excellence which holds the reader's attention from the first chapter to the last. If he has here and there shown an inclination to a rather too favorable interpretation of his hero (for example, in the matter of Cleveland's foreign policy), after

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all it is the venial fault which must be pardoned to the enthusiasm of every devoted biographer. The thoroughness with which Professor McElroy has collected his materials is shown by the appendix of "Sources," which fills thirty pages at the end of the second volume. They include four hundred and ninety-six letters to members of his cabinets alone, with about a thousand more to other personal friends and acquaintances; a great mass of printed state documents, besides unpublished memoranda and diaries; President Cleveland's own writings, books, pamphlets, and magazine articles, to the number of thirty-eight titles; biographies, addresses, and memorials; and about seventy-five titles of periodical literature and general historical works dealing with the president's character and policy. The examination of printed sources is comparatively easy, and their tabulation is easier still. But the labor of the collection of unpublished material is well illustrated by Professor McElroy's note (Vol. II, p. 390) on the letters:

> For the most part Grover Cleveland's letters were gathered from garrets and dusty private files all over the land. Their locations were discovered by studying Mr. Cleveland's own personal papers, noting the names of all persons with whom he appeared to have been upon terms making likely a personal correspondence, and writing to the persons in question, or to descendants or relatives. In this way about 1500 manuscript letters were recovered.

It is no disparagement to Professor McElroy's work to say that in spite of its exhaustive exploitation of material, it adds remarkably little to our knowledge of Grover Cleveland. It rather confirms him than reveals him. And this is explained by the undeviating consistency of Mr. Cleveland's character in public life. There were no surprises or subtleties in him. There were no accommodations, concessions, modifications, or prevarications, to placate factions or play politics. He said just what he meant on every subject and to every person and on every occasion, without the least regard to the effect on his own political fortunes. He lost the election in 1888 because he had insisted, in spite of the pleading of his advisers, upon sending to Congress his honest views on the tariff in his message of the previous December. He risked the loss of the nomination in 1892 by saying exactly what he thought of the silver heresy in his famous Anderson letter. He cared less than any other man in the history of the presidency for the "rewards of office," and it was chiefly for this reason that the people turned to him with a more insistent demand to assume the responsibilities of office than they did to any other man, with the

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possible exception of Theodore Roosevelt. It was for this reason, too, that Mr. Cleveland's utterances, whether in public messages or in private correspondence, have that unity and continuity of content which makes multiplicity of citation merely corroboration of known principles. *Ab uno disce omnes.*

Naturally, a man of Mr. Cleveland's inflexible convictions and downright courage was "obstinate" and "headstrong" in the opinion of those who regarded politics as a game of give and take. His difficulties with Congress were incessant, even in the brief period (1893–1895) when he had a majority of his own party in both houses. "You will have to look out for those men at the other end of the avenue," was his counsel to McKinley on the latter's inauguration day. It was the responsibility for guarding democratic government against dangers rather than the opportunity for initiating new policies that appealed to him as the main duty of a public official. Therefore, he appears as a bulwark in the presidency, and not a dynamo like Roosevelt. He was always *resisting* something—the encroachment of the Senate on the constitutional powers of the executive, the impairment of the nation's credit through financial heresies, the increase of taxation for the benefit of the protected industries, forcible extension of our power over weaker peoples. As a Jeffersonian Democrat, he was a staunch supporter of the doctrine of states' rights, and rejected with indignation the suggestion that he should interfere on one occasion with the political situation in New York. Yet, like most of the strong executives of his party, including Jefferson himself, he did not hesitate to vindicate the national authority even against the protests of the state when the proper occasion arose, as his correspondence with Governor Altgelt of Illinois shows. Only Buchanan made this "grand refusal." Cleveland was a good party man, too. He believed thoroughly in the mission of his party to make the American government a truly popular government. Much as he loathed Bryanism, he thought it better to wait until that delusion had passed than to bolt to the Republicans, with whom he had far more sympathy on the issues pending at the close of the century. He could not support Bryan, however, and he welcomed the chance to vote for Palmer and Buckner. He was confessedly relieved to turn over the government to McKinley rather than to Bryan in 1897. He was opposed to forming a third party in 1900 and 1908 to contest Bryan's election. He probably did not vote at all in 1900, and he died a few months before the election of 1908. The imperialistic and trust-ridden administration of the Republicans alienated him more and

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more, and he looked with a pathetic confidence to Judge Parker to bring about the Democratic "regeneration" which the party had "waited for all these years," and "to rid the country of Rooseveltism and its entire brood of dangers and humiliations" (II, 344). Parker's overwhelming defeat only confirmed the rather sad political quietism which was Mr. Cleveland's portion from the time he left office to the close of his life. He was not permitted to see the triumph of Woodrow Wilson, nor, although he was associated with the gifted professor and president at Princeton for many years, does any anticipation of Mr. Wilson's destiny ever seem to have crossed his vision.

Elihu Root, in an introduction to Professor McElroy's work, pays a remarkable tribute to the man with whose party and policies he was in life-long opposition. He thinks that it was Cleveland's greatest service that as a Northerner he could secure enough votes in his section of the Union to insure the restoration of brotherhood between North and South before the generation who fought the Civil War had passed away and left those inherited hatreds which are "almost ineradicable." Mr. Root also gives in a single phrase the key to President Cleveland's character, which explains most simply and convincingly his actions in both foreign and domestic policy: "He had a natural hatred for fraud and false pretense, and a strong instinct for detecting the essential quality of conduct by the application of old and simple tests of morality." Nothing finer or truer has ever been said of Grover Cleveland.

There are a few errors of fact in Professor McElroy's volumes and what seem to the reviewer a few errors of judgment. For instance, the charge of "bargain and corruption" was not being fixed upon Clay during the election of 1834 (I, 90), but was brought up when Adams gave Clay the first place in his cabinet in 1835. Washington did not use the phrase "entangling alliances" in his Farewell Address (I, 262). Gresham, though born in Indiana, had been for many years a resident of Illinois before his entrance into Cleveland's second cabinet (II, 3). Hanna probably felt more certain that McKinley would "stand upon an out-and-out gold platform" in 1896 than he did that McKinley would be nominated if he made the confession in the convention (II, 220). It was the sugar growers and not the sugar refiners (the trust) to whom the tariff bill of 1890 "gave a subsidy" (II, 109). One can hardly speak of Maryland as "following Roosevelt into the Republican fold" in 1904, when Roosevelt received but one of the eight electoral votes of the state (II, 346).

Professor McElroy accepts at full value Otto Gresham's theory that

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it was a communication from Cleveland to Fairbanks that "switched" William McKinley from soft money to hard money in 1896" (II, 229). In view of the exhaustive study of Mr. Croly in his life of Hanna, it seems difficult to approve this judgment. Finally, it is hardly justifiable to speak categorically of "snatching victory" from the Democrats in 1877 by "counting out Samuel J. Tilden" (I, 97). That is a point on which historians differ and will probably continue to differ. Mr. Burgess believes that Hayes was clearly elected. Mr. Rhodes thinks that he was not. It is a case of balancing frauds, and no one can say whether the fraudulent voting in the South outweighed the fraudulent counting or not.

But these are minor blemishes in a work of great acceptability. The admirers of Grover Cleveland, who grow more numerous every year, will acknowledge their debt to Professor McElroy for this satisfying biography of the statesman whom the Roman poet Horace described many centuries ago as "the just man, tenacious of his purpose, whom the ardor of the demagogue is powerless to sway."

DAVID S. MUZZEY

The Life of Lord Rosebery. By E. T. RAYMOND. New York, George H. Doran Company, 1923.—254 pp.

There is a story that in his schoolboy days at Eton the future Lord Rosebery announced that it was his ambition to win the Derby, marry an heiress and become prime minister. The story may be apocryphal, but the ambition is pretty clearly authentic, and it was fully realized. Yet the owner of Ladas, husband of Hannah Rothschild and First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury was not at bottom a happy or, in the highest sense, a successful man. "All careers", Lord Rosebery wrote in his *Chatham*, "have their blots. The best and happiest are those in which the blemishes are obscured by high achievement." His own career was full of golden promise. From his school days until his retirement from participation in public affairs the greatest things were expected of him. His tutor at Eton saw in him the budding of genius; fellow-Etonians took it for granted that he could excel them all in anything that he cared to strive for; and before he was forty, Gladstone proclaimed him the man of the future. Even his ill-starred premiership did not shatter men's belief in Roseberian potentiality; they did not say of him, *capax imperii nisi imperasset.* Yet he fell short of that "high achievement" of which there was such plentiful prospect.

It is not true, of course, that his positive accomplishment was *nil.*

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To him more than to any other man is due the credit of establishing a tradition of continuity in the conduct of British foreign affairs. Like Lord Salisbury he held it a great evil that foreign policy was liable to reversal with every change of administration. As foreign secretary in the last two Gladstone ministries his policy was nearer to Salisbury's than to that of his own leader, and he did much to take the Foreign Office out of party politics. In the opinion of his biographer this will probably be deemed his greatest service to his country.

In the transformation of the Liberal party, too, Rosebery emphatically counted. The old Liberalism of Gladstone and Bright was individualist, anti-imperialist and isolationist, and Rosebery, despite his personal devotion to Gladstone, was none of these. He was first and foremost an Imperialist, who believed with all his soul in the beneficence and the high destiny of the British Empire; he favored a vigorous foreign policy; and he was inclined toward social reforms not far removed from the Tory Democracy of Randolph Churchill. "It was little to the purpose", says Mr. Raymond, "that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman shut out his brilliant antagonist. He could not exclude either of the policies for which Lord Rosebery stood. Roseberian Imperialism entered in the persons of Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Haldane. Roseberian pseudo-Socialism, in somewhat cruder form, entered in the person of Mr. Lloyd George." Though he happened not to like the Entente and to detest the Budget of 1909, Rosebery had no small part in bringing it to pass that the Liberal Party maintained the former and enacted the latter. He marks the transition from nineteenth to twentieth-century Liberalism.

His relation to the New Imperialism assures him a high place in the history of the British Empire; and of the agitation for the reform of the House of Lords, whereof the end is not yet, he was a great part. In the sphere of local government, also, he performed meritorious and public-spirited service as the first chairman of the London County Council. Though he missed the first rank in letters, some of his writings bear the unmistakable impress of genuine literature. Mr. Raymond comments on his gift of vivid summary and thinks that it was in his power to rival Macaulay as an historical essayist.

No doubt Rosebery's personality was a large factor in accounting for his failure to reach the highest level of achievement. There was something incalculable, baffling, in the man, which prevented his contemporaries from really knowing him; Gladstone spoke of "a vein of foreign matter which runs straight across a clear and vigorous intellect and a high-toned character." Uniform consistency is to be found in

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no man, but it is no mere inconsistency that we behold in Rosebery; it is, rather, a bewildering multifariousness of personality. What makes him so puzzling and therefore interesting must have been a source of weakness in practical politics.

Yet external circumstance played its customary rôle, and circumstance, in the crises of his career, was not friendly to him. A strong impression, I think, that one will form from a reading of Mr. Raymond's book, is that the "breaks" in the game of life went against Rosebery. Judged by the standards of "the average sensual man" this opulent aristocrat was much to be envied, but from the point of view of his own capabilities his succession to an earldom in his twenty-first year was a personal misfortune. He may not have quite meant what he said when he told Gladstone that he would cheerfully have sacrificed his peerage for a seat in the House of Commons, for he was not indifferent to the pomp and circumstance of rank. But he was chilled by the atmosphere of the House of Lords, and he learned to his cost that in his day a peer in the rôle of a Liberal prime minister was something of an anomaly. A few years in the House of Commons, such as were vouchsafed to Salisbury, might have altered the lines of his later career.

Few men born with silver spoons in their mouths exhibit a zeal for unremitting toil, and it is not strange that the admiring Eton tutor discovered in his pupil a desire for the palm without the dust. Yet Rosebery was not incapable of prolonged application to work that really engaged his interest; Mr. Raymond thinks that some years of continuous office-holding would have habituated him to sustained effort. But his brief term as foreign secretary in 1886 was followed by long years of Opposition, and when he returned to the Foreign Office in 1892 it was as a member of a weak and distracted Government. He conducted the business of his department with energy and skill, but his succession to the premiership in 1894 was rather a personal calamity than a triumph. With a majority in the House of Commons that had a distressing habit of vanishing, and dissensions in the cabinet, a strong and successful administration was out of the question, and it was with evident relief that he resigned in 1895. In the following year a difference of opinion with the retired and venerable leader of his party, Mr. Gladstone, over the course to be taken by Great Britain in consequence of the Armenian massacres led him to withdraw from the Liberal leadership.

It was by no means certain, however, that his retirement was to be permanent, and even after he passed out of communion with the

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Liberal party it was not clear that a reunion might not be effected in the future. Such a reunion, indeed, seemed to be on the point of consummation after Mr. Chamberlain's agitation for tariff reform made free trade the leading Liberal issue. But Rosebery, who had never been whole-heartedly in favor of Home Rule, had now definitely repudiated it, and when the Liberal leader, Campbell-Bannerman, outlined a policy toward Ireland which Rosebery interpreted as pledging the party anew to Home Rule, all prospects of his return to the Liberal fold vanished. Until 1911 he spoke occasionally in the House of Lords, usually in the rôle of admonishing critic of the Liberal Government, but 1905 marks his disappearance as a serious factor in British political life. Lord Rosebery still lives, but it is appropriate to speak of him, as Mr. Raymond does, in the past tense, for he belongs to a past that already seems remote.

There is no such thing as definitive biography, but there are biographies that will remain authoritative. The time for such a Life of Lord Rosebery has not yet come, nor has Mr. Raymond attempted to write it. He has, however, given us a brilliant and impressive interpretation of the most enigmatic personality in modern British politics.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories. By SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN. Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1923. —Two volumes, 253, 280 pp.

"Of the making of many books," says Sir George, "there is at present no end". He himself has added two thick volumes to the enormous number. In spite of the conceit of the author, his book is unquestionably of historical importance in view of the position he held during the war. He was at the other end of Sir Edward Grey's wire and in constant and intimate touch with the Russian government, conducting extremely delicate diplomatic transactions. The story of these conversations is interesting, and above all, sincere—an adjective which cannot be applied to the memoirs of some of his colleagues, such as Paléologue.

Buchanan's narrative is composed of three parts: the first concerning Bulgarian events, while he was the English agent in Sofia, the second relating to the antecedents of the Great War, and the third describing his position before and during the outbreak of the Russian revolution. Volume I opens with the rather uninteresting story of the author's younger years—some early impressions of Amer-

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ica, a short visit to Japan, his life in South Germany, race-horses, balls, and other personal incidents, all of no historical value. In the following chapters, devoted to the Balkans, Buchanan describes the intricate policies of the Great Powers in the Bulgarian question, throwing, incidentally, sufficient light on the actions of Great Britain and giving the reader a true and entertaining characterization of the wily Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria. There are well-drawn and vivid personal portraits of the rulers and statesmen with whom Buchanan had to deal; among the Russians, Stolypin, Kokovtseff, Goremykin, and the Tsar and his family, are especially well delineated.

Buchanan's version of the diplomatic transactions introductory to the Great War lends additional importance to the first volume. The interest centers in the fact that the ambassador was the mouthpiece of Sir Edward Grey. We see very clearly how much energy was spent by Grey in trying to prevent the final clash. The tremendous distrust that still existed between England and Russia is made evident throughout the volume. Grey, as well as Buchanan, had to make a great effort in building up the artificial Anglo-Russian Entente; both diplomats had to fight against strong and inveterate prejudice and combat innumerable obstacles before they finally attained their goal. Buchanan, however, cleverly conceals the important fact that the initiative of this Entente came steadily from England. Russia was too distrustful of her new friend to originate it herself. The author is open-minded in giving us the main reasons for this attitude: the Russian Government could not understand why, in pressing the question of an Entente, Great Britain positively declined to bind herself by any definite obligations; at the same time the Russians constantly feared that an alliance meant only a desire to have Russia pull the chestnuts out of the fire for England; the Russians knew of the irreconcilable character of British and Russian interests in Central Asia and in the Near East, especially concerning the Ottoman Empire.

The second volume is devoted entirely to the events of the Russian revolution and in some ways is even more entertaining than the first. In four introductory chapters Buchanan describes the rising tide of discontent that led to the great upheaval. Russian leaders and statesmen, the ministers, Sazonoff, Stürmer, Trepoff, Golitzin and above all the Tsar himself and his narrow-minded but willful wife, all pass before us in life-like review. The revolutionary leaders are depicted with the same faithfulness: Miliukov, Kerensky, Lenin and others are pictured with all their merits and shortcomings. The course of the revolutionary events is given in a similarly impartial and dispas-

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sionate manner. Sir George does not hesitate to explain his own extremely difficult position; he was between the devil and the deep sea. Even at the present moment the controversy concerning his activities has not yet subsided. As it often happens, he is censured by both antagonists. During the year 1917 he had to withstand numerous attacks from the Russian Socialists in general and from the Bolshevik group in particular, all aimed at the British Government. The Russians were asking Great Britain to state her war aims, and, since they never received any definite answer, they blamed Buchanan for the situation. Then came a whole torrent of accusations, incidentally aided by pro-German propaganda, implying that England was preventing peace. The British ambassador had great difficulty in fighting these insidious charges; over and over again he had to call upon the Russian Government, requesting official denials of these ugly rumors. Unfortunately he did not get much satisfaction, as the Government was no longer able to check the activities of the extremists. It must have been a source of constant anxiety for Sir George: it was his task to keep up the alliances the breakdown of which would have meant unavoidably a German victory. At moments such a breakdown must have appeared very imminent. It seems very remarkable to-day that the British ambassador could have so successfully weathered this terrific storm.

At the very same time the Russian reactionaries shamelessly accused him of misdeeds in the opposite direction—of having consciously played into the hands of the revolutionaries! Even at present they insist that he willfully called forth the revolution, that he sympathized with the extreme radicals and constantly plotted and schemed with them—charges which sound quite incredible now. As a matter of fact, Buchanan was more afraid of the Russian revolution than any other statesman, because he clearly realized what such a social upheaval would mean for the distracted country. It must have been a source of the greatest anxiety for him when he became convinced that the calamitous policy of the Tsar, of his wife and of his shortsighted and subservient ministers, led directly to revolution, and that this was bound to mean the disruption of the Russian army and the victory of the Germans. His only object was to endeavor to keep Russia in the war, and he believed that this could be done by only one policy: by satisfying the Russian people through the timely grant of liberal reforms, by making some concessions to public opinion and the claims of parliament. The Duma was openly protesting with increased vigor against the stupidity of the Government.

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Considering the political system of old Russia, it required great moral courage on the part of Buchanan to speak to the Tsar as he did, and it was not his fault if he never succeeded in instilling sufficient firmness into the vacillating monarch. Autocracy was slowly going to pieces and no foreign ambassador could stop this process. But this could not mean that Buchanan was plotting a revolution; in fact, it was just the other way—he was most eager to prevent it at all cost.

In the middle of this fateful controversy, in the summer of 1917, came the last shock, when the British Government, not fully realizing the difficulties with which Buchanan had to cope, sent out a special envoy, Mr. Henderson, to supersede Sir George. It must have been an extremely mortifying situation for Buchanan, hardly compensated by the fact that Henderson himself utterly failed to gain the sympathies of the Russians, and finally reported to London that Buchanan ought to remain in Russia. The Bolshevik *coup d'état* was bound, however, to lead to a diplomatic rupture with Great Britain. In January, 1918, Buchanan was forced to leave the country. In the last chapters of Volume II, he gives an interesting account of his departure, as well as of his reception in England.

SERGE A. KORFF

Labour Supply and Regulation. By HUMBERT WOLFE. Published on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923.—xiv, 422 pp.

Of all the problems which the Carnegie Endowment has set itself in its vast enterprise of writing the economic and social history of the Great War, few can be more baffling than the British handling of labor supply. Here was a great nation, highly specialized in the industries of peace, with all its relations between labor and management subtly balanced through the play of competition and the adjustments between organized labor, and less consciously, but not less effectively organized capital. The war came on like an earthquake shock, shattering the routine of trade and production and creating grave stresses everywhere. It was a war which from the outset demanded the organization of the whole nation as a fighting machine. Other wars had demanded industrial adaptation. This war demanded industrial reorganization. But at the outset nobody realized this.

Consequently there was at first a great confusion. The most obvious requirement was men for the fighting line, and the recruiting agent took them wherever he could find them. The withdrawal of men for

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military service was heaviest precisely in the industries most essential to the supplying of the munitions of war. Gradually it came to be understood that the recruiting agent had to be compelled to keep his hands off the workers who were more useful in the factories than at the front. The rule "business as usual," so gallantly proclaimed in the early months of the war, gave way to a slow suppression of businesses that were mere money-makers and the diversion of productive power to the supplying of the immediate national need. New workers had to be found to take the place of the skilled men who had gone to the front. It was necessary to eliminate the waste of labor power involved in industrial disputes and in the chaotic shifting from one plant to another in response to competitive bidding for hands. Wherever possible, skilled labor had to be diluted with semi-skilled and unskilled. There were also grave problems of finding living accommodations for workers near the rapidly expanding munitions plants; of coping with the mounting cost of living; of safeguarding the workers' health under the strain of excessive overtime; of assuring the worker that the sacrifices imposed on him were for the nation, not for the profit of his old antagonist, the employer.

In short, what the case required was the nationalization of the labor supply, as well as the nationalization of industry. Neither requirement could be met at once, as there was not the competence in government to meet it. Neither was fully met, even by the end of the war. But the approximation was nearer in the case of labor supply.

Mr. Wolfe gives us in this book a remarkably clear account of the steps by which the nation proceeded to the regulation of its labor supply. To appreciate the author's freedom from bias, one must recall the intense feeling which accompanied the adjustment to national control—the employer's charge that labor put its trade-union rules above the life of the state, the laborer's charge that the employers were availing themselves of the national emergency to reduce labor to slavery, the charges of socialistic purpose against the government, the charge of selfishness against the industrial leaders. Mr. Wolfe does not ignore the shortcomings of any of the parties concerned. But he draws them in their true proportions.

War is to society what insanity is to the individual. Its most striking manifestations are illuminating only as to itself. Most of the lessons of economic control in the late war are directly applicable only to the problem of control in the next war—if there is to be a next war within the period in which industrial conditions are fairly comparable to those of 1914–18. Yet just as insanity often opens a

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breach through which many normal psychological facts may be examined in a new light, so war lays bare many social and economic facts that are otherwise concealed from view. Without doubt the shrewd observer might have learned much from British war experience as to the effect on industrial efficiency of the compulsion to labor that every workman knew lay in the background. He might have learned much about the actual effect of trade-union rules in curbing production, of which we hear so much loose talk in time of peace. He might also have made important discoveries as to the extent to which employers, even in a great national emergency, are inclined to use the machinery of a middle class state in advancing their own interest.

There is in Mr. Wolfe's book scarcely any of this by-product information which alone makes war history useful to the student of civil problems. Mr. Wolfe is far too intelligent and open-minded to have ignored the existence or underestimated the importance of such problems. But he had set himself the limitation of avoidance of the controversial. He sought to write a book nobody could quarrel with. In this he has been eminently successful. Nobody could have set forth more clearly and succinctly exactly what the government tried to do and succeeded in doing. Yet I do not see any reason why any one not a military statesman or a professional historian should read this book.

The Carnegie Endowment, in organizing this series on the history of the war, must have taken as its object the advancement of the cause of peace. How does this book bear on that object? When a country fights, it has to organize its economic resources. Mr. Wolfe's book shows how England did this. It offers information that will prove invaluable to those who set out to make war, but will prove of little value to those who seek to keep the peace.

ALVIN JOHNSON

NEW YORK CITY

Samuel Adams, Promoter of the American Revolution. A Study in Psychology and Politics. By RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1923.—x, 363 pp.

It is nearly sixty years since W. V. Wells published his three-volume biography of Samuel Adams. This book by a great-grandson of the old revolutionary leader was written, to use Lecky's phrase, "with great elaboration and unqualified eulogy." Extensive use was made of manuscript material, including the Adams papers in the possession of George Bancroft, and the book is still useful because of the original

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material reproduced in it; but New England writers were not quite ready for detached and critical estimates of the fathers of the republic. Twenty years later, Hosmer contributed his volume on Adams in the *American Statesmen* series, basing it upon a fresh examination of the sources from a different angle and in a more judicial spirit. There was some frank recognition of Adams's limitations and a fairer treatment of his loyalist opponents. The latest biography by Professor Harlow carries us much farther from the "hereditary-patriotic" standpoint.

Mr. Harlow has not only given the older sources an independent and more critical treatment but he has exploited much unused, or superficially used, material. He has thus been able to make a valuable addition to our knowledge of the revolutionary propaganda in which Adams was unquestionably the central figure. Indeed, this latest biographer hardly yields to either of his predecessors in appraising the range and effectiveness of Adams's influence in the period before 1776. Conceding the influence of British policy and of economic discontent, Mr. Harlow still attaches prime importance to what may be called the deliberate manufacture of public opinion by a few leaders, notably Adams himself: "The processes by which the leaders got results contain within themselves the major part of the revolutionary story" (p. 25).

Nevertheless, the author believes that Adams, though highly influential, was not essentially a great man—quite the contrary. He is rather to be regarded as suffering from an "inferiority complex", due to the mishaps or failures of his earlier career. This "inferiority complex" is held to be the prime explanation of his keen interest in political agitation and management, for which he had peculiar gifts and in which he took refuge from his sense of failure in other directions. To this "complex" also is traced his intense feeling against the constituted authorities in England and in America. Similarly his declared indifference to his own material interests is characterized as a "cover spread out to conceal his real feelings". In short, Mr. Harlow is obviously much under the influence of the *Zeitgeist*, as it finds expression in current psychological terms.

In the presence of "modern psychology", the mere historian should doubtless display a becoming modesty; but he can hardly help expressing his misgivings about such a passage as this (p. 37): "For this change [the increasing intensity of Adams's political activities after 1764] historical evidence of the documentary sort offers no explanation but modern psychology does." Unquestionably psychology

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may be highly suggestive in such cases, but the results need to be stated with more reserve than the author seems to think necessary. A few bits of direct evidence are indeed offered to support a psychopathic interpretation, as, for instance, a "constitutional tremulousness of voice and hand"; but they seem hardly sufficient for a confident diagnosis. Is not Mr. Harlow's formula too simple for the complexities of history and human personality? Does it quite adequately explain the place which Adams occupied in the estimation of his neighbors and contemporaries?

In his rather cavalier treatment of the American Whig argument, particularly on the constitutional side, the author is in excellent company; but there is somewhat more to be said for the American case than the reader of this book would suspect. Students who wish to know this "other side", as presented by a thoroughly competent scholar should consult McIlwain's *The American Revolution; a Constitutional Interpretation.*

It would be unfair to close this review without a more positive appreciation of what the author has done. Indeed one of the chief reasons why one regrets the over-positive reiteration of what can at best only be regarded as possible, or probable, interpretations is that it tends to obscure the merits of a really able book, based upon extensive and thorough research, and throwing new light in several directions on the processes through which political controversy developed into revolution. The style is clear, vigorous and distinctly readable.

EVARTS B. GREENE

Political Action. By SEBA ELDRIDGE. With an Introduction by Edward A. Hayes. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1924.—xviii, 382 pp.

Professor Eldridge strikes out into new fields in his attempt to apply the "naturalistic method of inquiry" to the economic and political struggles between labor and capital. By "naturalistic method" the author means a method of inquiry which appraises the net effect of hereditary traits, physical environment, traditions and intellectual processes on a social situation. The main part of his book was begun prior to the recent controversy between the "behaviorists" and the followers of McDougall. Professor Eldridge thus makes much of the instincts or instinctive tendencies catalogued by the McDougall school —the instincts of hunger, fear, repulsion, pugnacity, the sex and parental instincts, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, submissiveness, curi-

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osity, constructiveness and the play tendencies—and attempts to show the result of the interplay of these tendencies on the economic struggle in contemporary life.

His analysis leads him to the conclusion that "all attempts to bring about an harmonious cooperation between the capitalist and the labor classes are doomed to failure", and that indications point to the gradual ascendancy of labor over the capitalistic group. "Judging from historical experience, however, that would not mean the total disappearance of private capitalism", Professor Eldridge continues, "but only its relegation to a subordinate place in the economic system."

Applying the same method of analysis to radical political action, Professor Eldridge sees little hope of social transformation through a labor party. The dominant press, according to the author, will be able to prevent a large proportion of the laboring class, tied down by habit and tradition, from seeing where their interests lie. Farmers and small tradesmen will be more easily deterred, while court decisions will render many legislative victories worthless. Labor will probably resort to other weapons, as, for instance, the general strike, in order to obtain a shift of power, though political action may *register* that shift.

Professor Eldridge claims that "liberals" (as opposed to conservatives on the one hand and radicals on the other) have failed to adopt a scientific attitude toward progress. They have fondly imagined that social behavior is largely determined by the processes of reason, whereas it is a result of "habit, tradition, suggestion, class interest and other facts having little or nothing in common with reason". Liberals should thus think and talk much more in terms of interest and power and much less in terms of ideas and ideals. He further maintains that most liberals who speak of "freedom of discussion" as a means of progress are disregarding the fact that if one is to secure *positive* freedom of discussion, "equally large and constant audiences must be available to rival ideas and programs," and that such is far from the case at present.

In his introduction, Professor Hayes, the editor of the Lippincott series, agrees with the author in his contention that our so-called political democracy has not provided for the *formation* of a public will in accordance with justice and experience, but only for the means of *expressing* that public will through the ballot. As a practical step toward a *positive* freedom of discussion he tentatively suggests a constitutional requirement that:

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every newspaper attaining a given circulation should pay for the most valuable of all franchises and give a guarantee for its share in the greatest of all powers, by placing certain space in every issue at the disposal of each of the four political parties that cast the largest votes in the preceding state election. . . . The deadliest of all monopolies—the monopoly of access to the mind—would be overthrown, and a habit of the public would be developed which in itself might solve the unsolved problem of the technique of democracy, prevent revolution, and assure orderly progress.

Exception will undoubtedly be taken to many of Professor Eldridge's conclusions. The "behaviorists" will insist that too much weight has been given to inherited tendencies, not enough to environmental factors. The political radical will point out that, despite the obstacles in the way, the success of a labor party is in the realm of *Realpolitik*. The farmers have shown that they are capable of uniting with labor. The victories of labor in Great Britain and in a number of American states against the combined opposition of the press have indicated that the press is not all-powerful in molding opinion. More enlightened judges can be appointed. A third party need not obtain an absolute majority in order to effect political changes. The conservatives and liberals will object that a number of conclusions reached are based on inadequate data.

But despite detailed criticisms, all students of politics must unite in congratulating the author on his pioneer work of attempting to obtain an objective and scientific view of all of the forces making for fundamental social change, and of endeavoring to consider this problem in the light of the latest discoveries in economics, sociology and psychology. It is hoped that the author may be able to deal in a similar fashion with economic action and the class conflict, and that other students may be stimulated to investigate this fascinating field.

HARRY W. LAIDLER

NEW YORK CITY.

My Rhineland Journal. By HENRY T. ALLEN, Major-General, U. S. A. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.—xvi, 593 pp.

Many of the actors, both civil and military, in the great world tragedy of 1914–1918 have presented to the world their apologies for the parts which they played in it. Most of these productions have been characterized by special pleading, and many have not risen above the level of partisan propaganda. It is a relief, therefore, to find a man who played a distinguished part, both as soldier and diplo-

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mat, whose mind was not warped by the horrors of the tragedy, and whose sense of reality and chivalry was preserved in the welter of after-war bitterness and disillusionment.

General Allen was first and foremost a soldier. Not for a moment did he tolerate in those under his command a departure from what he considered the ideals of a soldier, and he succeeded in developing what was by common consent the finest body of troops in the armies of occupation along the Rhine.

One marvels at the remarkable vitality of the man. Though over sixty years of age, he was always ready to join in the many hunting parties or to rough it with his younger officers in a strenuous game of polo. The continuous round of visitors, involving innumerable receptions and dinners, never seemed to ruffle his even temper. And withal he found time from his multitudinous official duties to keep in touch with the stirring events in all parts of the world. His terse comments, whether they be on the Polish settlement, the Turkish situation, Italian politics, or American conditions, are nearly always well informed and show a keen appreciation of realities. An occasional misjudgment was perhaps inevitable, as in the following comment on the struggle over the ratification of the treaty in the Senate: "I cannot believe that Lodge and company will sacrifice patriotism and world welfare, beyond a certain point, to partisanship."

His judgments on the men who shaped the destinies of the world during those momentous years are characterized by restraint and an evident desire to be fair to those with whom he disagreed. But it was difficult at times for him to restrain his righteous indignation. Thus he records, "I am going over my diary and cutting out much which appears too circumstantial as well as too critical of individuals." Very illuminating, although somewhat disconcerting to trusting souls in this country, is the following entry: "Mr. Charles H. Grasty, correspondent of the *New York Times*, experiences difficulty in reconciling what he finds on the Rhine with what he must write for one of the most pro-French of our large daily journals."

By far the most significant feature of the *Journal* is the light which it throws upon the most serious international problem to-day, *viz.*, the relations between France and Germany. From the very first General Allen sensed the real purposes of the French military leaders and politicians—the creation of a separate Rhineland state under French control and the political disintegration of Germany. To accomplish these ends the French leaders attempted to sweep aside the slight restraints which the treaty of Versailles placed upon them. To this

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policy of France General Allen was consistently opposed. This opposition was not due to any lack of sympathy for France. It was because his rugged honesty would not permit him to violate the guarantees of the treaty and further because of his conviction that the policy of France would perpetuate European chaos and in the end drag France itself down in the collapse of European civilization. In his dual capacity as commander of the American forces at Coblenz and as American observer on the Rhineland High Commission he resisted with unflinching determination and with unfailing good-humor the persistent encroachments and the unjust exactions of his French colleagues. Characteristic of his attitude was his reply to the French request that the castle of Ehrenbreitstein be turned over to them:

> Your country has much sentiment, for which I admire it. We Americans also have some sentiment. That flag was hoisted on our arrival and we attach sentimental importance to seeing it remain there as long as we are on the Rhine. Moreover I am convinced that it is of more importance for you that it fly there than it is for us.

General Allen's comments upon the post-war policy of America are restrained, but there is little doubt that he was keenly disappointed at the inglorious part which this country played in the greatest crisis of world history.

As a literary production the *Journal* has distinct limitations. It is in large measure a daily chronicle of incidents in a crowded four years. The abrupt passing from one incident to another is at times disconcerting. The dramatic touch is entirely lacking and there is little attempt at character analysis. But withal it is a very human document by a distinguished soldier, an accomplished diplomat and a chivalrous gentleman.

NELSON P. MEAD

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Actividades de la Liga de las Naciones. By COSME DE LA TORRIENTE. Habana, Rambla, Bouza y C[a], 1923.—xxviii, 485 pp.

The rather lengthy preface by Antonio S. de Bustamente, himself a judge of the Permanent Court, is in many respects the most interesting part of a well-constructed book. For him, the importance of the League lies not so much in anything which it is organized to accomplish in the immediate future as in its possibilities. The Permanent Court is at least established, whatever its shortcomings as a judicial branch—lack of compulsory jurisdiction being the most obvious. Sr.

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de Bustamente does not permit himself any illusions about the executive power of the League, however. Required unity of interest and thought sharply narrow the organization's field of political action even in Europe, and "the semi-juridical barrier erected by Monroe across the Atlantic in 1823" reduces this still further for cases involving any American nation. This and the effects of our non-participation lend peculiar interest to the Latin-American viewpoint—to that of Cuba in particular, because of her special relationship to the United States since our decisive intervention in her struggle for independence.

The main purpose of the book, as avowed in preface and introduction, is to meet the need for a thorough treatise in the Spanish language. It fills this gap admirably. Two chapters are devoted to an analysis of the organization of the League, and its problems and accomplishments down to the Third Assembly. There is no detailed discussion of the Second Assembly, which has been treated by Sr. Torriente in a previous work (Habana, 1922), but ample reference to previous acts and discussions is given whenever necessary. Thus the main body is a somewhat detailed discussion of the activities of the Third Assembly. In the second and longer part (chs. vi–xii, pp. 139–307), much of the text of the various accords and agreements of the Assembly is given, accompanied by sufficient explanation to make them intelligible even to the novice.

In addition to the usual appendices—League Covenant, agreements of first and second Assemblies, etc.—there is an interesting note on a project for a society of nations, published by a Cuban, José Calixto Bernal y Soto, in 1857. The proposed covenant was very short, consisting of thirteen articles, most of them only a sentence long. In an 1877 revision, presented in a parallel column, these were shortened to nine, and one significant change made: Instead of requiring assent of all members, as in the 1857 version, decisions of the proposed league were to be made obligatory by a *majority* vote of the member states, which were to be equal, as explained elsewhere in the book. Article 6 states that "all the confederated nations must submit all their differences, one with another, to this supreme body."

By 1877, the date of the revision, many discords had disturbed the concert of Europe. The Hapsburgs had fought Italy twice, Denmark and Prussia once each, and gone through an internal crisis which had momentarily threatened dissolution. The American Civil War had been fought. France and Germany had followed up mutual taunts by blows in 1870, whereupon Russia had blandly torn up an important clause of the European agreement of 1856. Massacres and insurrec-

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tions were in progress in the Balkans. Turkey had not seriously tried to carry out her promised reforms. No great power had any visible intentions of making her do so except Russia, whose reasons were open to suspicion. Finally, the Turks had flouted the great powers, purchased some hundreds of thousands of American rifles and plunged into a pretty well matched war with Russia—a war which they were to lose, but this was by no means obvious in 1877. The moral must have seemed obvious—make the international organization a real parliamentary one, with majority rule.

In a way, the incorporation of this project into a book on the present League of Nations is a bit of unconscious humor, since it eulogizes the views of a man whom events had wholly disillusioned about the efficacy of an international organization in which any member nation might block the will of the whole or claim liberty of action for itself. What he wanted was a confederation with a super-government, which would curb nationalism and limit sovereignty, an aim apparently as far from realization now as it was then, in spite of the League.

M. M. KNIGHT

BARNARD COLLEGE

Money. By W. T. FOSTER and WADDILL CATCHINGS. Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1923.—viii, 409 pp.

This is one of the best books on the subject of money that has appeared for some years. It is not a systematic treatise and makes no pretence of supplying a complete exposition of the subject. It is rather a discussion of what some would call the "insistent problems" of money as a phenomenon of modern economic organization.

The first task to which the authors set themselves is to destroy the old notion that money as a medium of exchange and as a standard of value is of itself insignificant. Of course, this subject has been receiving considerable attention for some time past but nowhere else is the discussion so complete and so emphatic. Particularly valuable is the authors' demonstration of the modifying effect of the introduction of money upon purely barter relations of supply and demand. Under barter, demand and supply are obverse sides of the same thing: money by splitting the fundamental barter exchange into two separate transactions, and by giving the holder time, place and goods options as to expenditure, makes possible complications of far-reaching significance. The authors clearly demonstrate the futility, under a money economy,

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of discussing economic theory and economic problems on the basis of barter preconceptions.

Two matters of great practical interest which the authors discuss are inflation and deflation and the relation of money to the business cycle. Inflation and deflation are defined in terms of expansion and contraction accompanied respectively by rising and falling price levels. In this connection the Ford and the Edison currency schemes are subjected to impartial, but, nevertheless, overwhelming criticism. The business cycle is discussed as a purely monetary phenomenon and the authors present not only a new theory of crises but suggest also a new scheme of control. Starting with the "circuit flow of money" as a basis, the authors seek to establish that the chief cause of trouble is the failure to maintain the "annual production-consumption equation," namely, "an exact and continuous correspondence between the dollar-sales of consumers' commodities and the output of these commodities measured in dollars at prevailing prices" [page 321]. A real contribution to the understanding of the business cycle is found in their discussion of this question. Their remedy the authors present only tentatively and with less assurance. It involves the issue and withdrawal of currency as the price level falls and rises. Nothing like a complete means of control can yet be determined because our knowledge is inadequate. The control of the discount rate, while insufficient standing alone, could also be employed in mitigating extreme fluctuations.

The book is exceedingly well written. It is characterized not only by clearness and forcefulness but also by a degree of liveliness unusual in books of this sort.

E. E. AGGER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The History of Utopian Thought. By JOYCE O. HERTZLER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923.—321 pp.

In the period of disillusion that followed the war the accounts of industrial civilization were cast up and it was seen that a civilization that could furnish not only the material basis for progress but also the materials for social self-destruction was not beyond criticism. In such an atmosphere it was inevitable that there should be a renewal of interest in Utopia; for Utopia offers, ready-made, an escape from the perils of a troubled world. There had been a long period when there was but little interest in Utopia. It had been as long ago as 1885 that Henry Morley had published his *Ideal Commonwealths*, a reprinting of Plutarch's *Lycurgus*, More's *Utopia*, Bacon's *New Atlantis*, Campa-

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nella's *City of the Sun* and Hall's *Mundus Alter et Idem*. From then until 1923 the classic Utopias were neglected—with the exception of the school-texts of Plato and Bacon.

Within a few weeks of each other in 1923 Mumford's *Story of Utopias* and Hertzler's *History of Utopian Thought* were published. The wide appeal of Mumford's book evidenced the renewed interest in the suggestions of the philosophers for the radical reconstruction of the world's institutions. But Hertzler's book is of a different sort, though he covers much the same ground as Mumford. It is more heavily documented and in general the apparatus of the scholar is more apparent. On account of the contrast also of Mumford's easy style with the awkward one of Hertzler, it is certain that this book will reach a much more restricted public. It must be said that one trusts Hertzler more than Mumford but enjoys him far less.

The book is divided into two approximately equal parts, the first being historical review, the second critical analysis. What is unique about the first part is the inclusion of nearly a hundred pages on the ethico-religious thinkers from the Hebrew prophets to Savonarola. There follows a chapter on Plato, then one on the "early moderns", Sir Thomas More to Harrington, another on the Utopian Socialists, Morelly, Babeuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet, Blanc and Owen, and a final one on Bellamy, Hertzka and Wells.

In the second half of the book he gauges the Utopian contribution to thought and in general the rôle of ideals in civilization, closing with a critique of the illusive character of the Utopianistic attitude.

It seems to the present reviewer that the discussion of the Hebrew prophets which occupies forty-six extremely dull pages at the beginning of the book might as well have been omitted for all the light it throws upon strictly Utopian thought. Utopianism is here confused with social prophecy or leadership. This confusion flows from the definition of Utopia (p. 2) as a "conception of social improvement either by ideas and ideals themselves or embodied in definite agencies for social change". Such a definition cannot be allowed. It would destroy the group of historical connotations that have gathered about the term and which are of so great use that they ought to be preserved. Any kind of a program of change, or any kind of an ideal for the future, however timid and tenuous, might come within such a classification. But Utopia has a narrower, more precise meaning and needs a closer definition. It means really the construction of an ideal society, fairly whole, and with a many-sidedness that roughly, at least, comprehends the whole group of functions that must be carried on

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within the social organism. The functions in Utopia have new institutional embodiments; and the whole picture becomes that of a society in good running order but which is very different from the one we now have. Of course this excluded a good deal of prophetic thought that Hertzler wanted to include; but he cannot be permitted the whittling away of a useful term for his own conceptual purposes. When we speak of Utopia we mean what Sir Thomas More meant, the projected, unattainable, wholly imaginative and highly romantic order of affairs that was created out of whole cloth by Plato, by Bacon, by Fourier, by Hudson and by Wells. Isaiah and Ezekiel were not Utopists in the same sense as we understand those others to be. To count them as included we should have to read into the term the hope, prophecy or ideal of a changed and perfect personal life. But this would comprehend the hopes and ideals of all of us and a history of Utopian thought would be a history of the thought of all mankind.

We must rather define Utopianism as the forecast or ideal institutional embodiments of a changed culture. In Utopia changed institutions precede personal goodness; they are not created from it. In a later chapter (p. 263) Hertzler seems to note these distinctions; but their bearing upon his own book he has not realized.

That part of the book that summarizes and reviews the long list of Utopias since Plato should prove useful to the reader who wishes to be spared the difficulties of going to original sources and who is yet desirous of knowing at second hand something of the bulky and important body of Utopian literature. Such readers will also find a valuable critique of the Utopian contribution to civilization in chapter ix.

REXFORD G. TUGWELL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Public Relief of Sickness. By GERALD MORGAN. New York, Macmillan Company, 1922.—195 pp.

Shortly after the War sickness insurance was up for consideration in the legislatures of several states, following reports of investigating commissions. Just now interest in this question as a political issue seems to be in abeyence, awaiting, perhaps, our recovery from "normalcy." At any rate, a reading of Mr. Morgan's admirable analysis of the relation of the state to the economic distress caused by sickness leaves no doubt but that the public disinterest in this problem is temporary. It is a question which challenges the best statesmanship.

The discussion opens with the conclusions of the Illinois Health Insurance Commission. This body discovered that the wage earners

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covered by their investigation "were almost always either uninsured or inadequately insured; and those who most needed insurance, because most often sick, poorest, and nearest dependency, were insured both least often and least adequately." Later in the discussion there are presented illuminating digests of family case histories, showing the demoralizing effects of sickness where family incomes are too small to meet its burden. Three-eighths of all observed dependency was attributed to sickness.

The author then takes up the question of the availability of medical treatment. The conclusion here reached is that notwithstanding the increase of dispensaries and of out-patient departments in recent years, their further extension is hampered by the lack of competent physicians, by the meagre financial support, and by the failure to pay the doctors. Hospital service is notoriously inadequate outside some of the urban centers. Even in cities hospital beds are often vacant, not because there are no sick people to occupy them, but because they are too expensive for many who need them. These conclusions of Morgan are amply borne out by the sickness surveys of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which showed that among their policy holders from one-fourth to two-fifths of those seriously ill were without medical attendance.

The hope that working people may more generally provide against their sickness risks through voluntary insurance—trade-union, fraternal, or otherwise—is not very promising, as the benefits from such voluntary organizations are small. To increase them would make such insurance more costly, and thus reduce the numbers of those who could afford it.

The writer next proceeds to analyze health insurance projects in Denmark, Germany and England. The Danish system is one of state subsidies to voluntary societies, mostly fraternal orders and trade unions. "The outstanding feature of the Danish system," says Morgan, "is the remarkable inadequacy of the cash benefits, even in view of the physical restrictions in force." These restrictions have to do with the reduction of the age limit, of the period during which benefits are paid, and of the amount of medicines dispensed. They also refer to the increase in membership dues. Such tendencies, in addition to the difficulty of building up a system of voluntary carriers, forbid serious consideration of the Danish plan for the United States.

Inadequacy of cash benefits and of medical treatment are also the chief indictments of the German system of sickness insurance, in the mind of the author. The medical service has been even less sufficient

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than the cash benefits. To the British system the writer pays this dismal tribute: "All that can be said for it is that it gave treatment no worse than the patients received before, and opened the eyes of the public to the lack of hospital and other medical facilities; and that, perhaps, if it had not been for the war and its after effects, the government might have found some financial way of improving the situation."

The constructive part of the book suggests that the reason for the failure of these European schemes lies in their attempt to combine in the same system the two features of cash benefits and of medical service. Insurance to provide cash benefits for the family of the sick wage earner is financially sound because morbidity statistics give us data showing the extent of the risk, both as to the number of individuals liable to be ill, and the duration of their illness. On the other hand, the cost of medical service is not a predictable risk, for the reason that medical science is advancing, and requires an ever more expensive equipment, if the highest scientific work is to be done. A high order of trained, specialized and personal service is apparently not obtainable from the doctors' panels of Germany and England. To provide it would bankrupt the prevailing systems.

The way out of these difficulties, according to the author, is to separate the cash benefits from the medical service, and to provide for them by separate systems. Cash benefits should be furnished by an insurance plan, to be paid for by contributions from employers and employees, the state bearing the overhead. Industries having the higher sickness rates should pay higher rates. Employee contributions should be based upon wages in such a way that the lowest wage groups would contribute nothing. The author has apparently followed in his recommendations the main provisions of the proposed New York health insurance law of 1919, with the important exception of the medical benefits. These, it is argued, should be provided by a system of state-wide, state-subsidized health centers, fully equipped for reaching not merely the wage-earning class, but the entire population. All types of surgical, medical and nursing service, including provisions for hospitalization, should be rendered at the health center on a fee basis in accordance with the ability of people to pay. However, no one should be denied service because of inability to pay. A measure authorizing the establishment of such health centers was also introduced into the New York state legislature as an alternative to the health-insurance bill referred to above. State subsidies to county health districts have already been established in Ohio. It is probable that the next devel-

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opments in state health activities will be in the direction of the Ohio legislation, rather than the adoption of European health-insurance measures.

Throughout the book the discussion is clear and convincing. It should prove an invaluable aid in the coming fight for making the state in some practicable way responsible for the greater availability of medical service, and for the economic distress that accompanies sickness. It would be a good book to hand to one's medical friends, provided that the friendship can stand the strain!

ARTHUR EVANS WOOD

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Capital's Duty to the Wage Earner. By JOHN CALDER. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1923.—xii, 326 pp.

American labor literature has been enriched in recent years by several valuable analyses of the labor question from the employers' point of view. One of the most valuable of these is *Capital's Duty to the Wage Earner.* The author, John Calder, draws upon a rich background of experience. Born in Scotland and trained as a mechanical engineer, he had sixteen years' experience as a factory inspector in his native land before coming to America, where he has managed large industrial plants and acted as consulting industrial engineer.

Forty years' continuous experience in industry have brought him to the conclusion that the essential difficulties in relations between capital and labor are the lack of knowledge and understanding on both sides, wrong feelings engendered by mistakes both of management and of labor leaders and sympathizers, and a failure to develop constructive cooperation between employers and their workmen. "The way out for capital and labor," he says, "can only be through mutual education and the participation and cooperation of their best minds in the search for truth." Throughout his "manual of principles and practice for employers and executives and for teachers and students of management" on the handling of the human factors in industry, he continually insists that by a cooperative search for truth and justice the employers and employees of the nation can control and reduce to harmlessness the causes of industrial friction.

He believes that 6370 of the employers of the nation hold the key to the situation in their hands. The 1920 census reveals that these employers, 2.2 per cent of the employers engaged in manufacturing, employ 53½ per cent of the manufacturing wage-earners. In 1914,

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more than 26 per cent of the employees in manufacturing worked for concerns that employed over a thousand workmen. Miners constitute but 2.6 per cent of the nation's wage-earners, construction workers but 9 per cent and transportation employees but 7½ per cent. The storm centers of labor conflict are in the larger manufacturing plants, mining, transportation and construction industries. The larger concerns in these fields have at their disposal the best facilities and the best managerial ability and, if they set themselves to the task, can bring about industrial peace for more than half of the wage-earners of the nation directly and furnish leadership for the smaller employers who employ the balance. The stabilizing of labor relations among the nearly 5,000,000 wage-earners in these 6,370 larger plants would set the pace in industrial goodwill and in labor practice, not only for the 97.8 per cent of the establishments which constitute the smaller plants . . . but for all *gainful occupations* where labor is congregated and masses its likes and dislikes, its hopes and fears. Constructive experiments cordially supported by labor and capital, if successful in big industry, will undoubtedly influence for good the system of capitalism as a whole (p. 19).

Mr. Calder calls upon business managers of the nation to develop a new constructive and cooperative attitude towards labor. He likewise calls upon the labor unions to develop a new type of leadership which will work with management instead of along lines of industrial conflict. The thesis of the book is that honest-minded employers and labor leaders can quickly find solutions for our most baffling labor problems in cooperative study and utilization of the best of labor relationships already known or in process of development.

The work is a survey of the whole field of labor relations, including labor's criticisms of capitalism and capitalism's criticism of labor, the open and closed shop, employers' associations, the organization of personnel services, employees' representation systems, wages, profit-sharing, unemployment and the principles of labor relations. The appendix gives a complete description of the system of industrial government used by Swift and Company (packers). The reviewer, while not agreeing at all points with the writer, commends the book to the thoughtful consideration of those who are interested in labor problems.

D. D. LESCOHIER

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BOOK NOTES

Those acquainted with the scholarly works of the late George Louis Beer on the British colonial system will welcome his extremely valuable book, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, With Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Colonial Settlement* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923; xliv, 628 pp.). So also will every person interested in present-day economic imperialism and international affairs. In content it consists of the studies prepared for the American Commission of Inquiry by Mr. Beer, who served as colonial expert for the inquiry and, subsequently, as chief of the colonial section of the American commission to negotiate peace; a thirty-page introductory note by Mr. Gray, the editor, summarizing in some detail the part played by Mr. Beer in the settlement of colonial problems at the Paris Conference; and, lastly, eighteen annexes which include the texts of the African and Asiatic mandates, copies of documents relating to Anglo-Egyptian relations, trade in arms and liquor traffic in Africa, and a statement of the present situation on that continent as determined by existing treaties and agreements. It is Mr. Beer's six monographic studies, however, which make the volume so distinctly worth while. The first four deal exclusively with African problems, the fifth with Mesopotamia, while the sixth embodies recommendations made by Mr. Beer for the immediate disposition of the African territories and the former German islands in the Pacific. All are based on a minute, impartial and scientific investigation and are veritable storehouses of information. The volume reveals unmistakably that Mr. Beer from the first maintained that the former German colonies should be placed under some system of international control and should be administered primarily for the benefit of the native populations. Indeed he appears to have early had in mind the concept of international control later embodied in the Mandate Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations. One is not to gather from this statement that he conceived the League as a "super-state". Far from it. Rather the volume reveals him as an ardent nationalist endeavoring to combine the ideal with the real. The value of the book is enhanced by the inclusion of some half-dozen maps illustrating the economic and political status of Africa, and a chart indicating the trade of the German colonies in 1913.

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Written upon the author's return from a sojourn of several months in Europe, *The Malady of Europe* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923; 250 pp.) represents an attempt by an able writer, M. E. Ravage, to diagnose the affliction of Europe. The diagnosis is made after the manner of the old-fashioned physician; although no hitherto unsuspected disease has been revealed, the physician's insight is penetrating. The malady of Europe is simply hysteria, based upon fear, suspicion, and hatred—the "evil spectre" which is her heritage from the past. That which is responsible for her plight is the autocracy of her foreign offices. The cure, therefore, lies in the achievement of democracy in international affairs. But that is impossible until Europe has achieved unity—preferably through federation modeled after America. President Wilson sought to achieve these ends, but America lost its hold upon the Wilson program; and the Allies, after perpetrating a peace of vengeance, hypocritically used the League as a means of sanctifying it—a fact which condemned the League to futility. Thus the opportunity to achieve a democratic federation was lost and Europe continues to rot. Some of the conclusions of the author are hard to reconcile with others; e. g., he says that "a pathetic faith in cures and panaceas pervades all classes and countries" (p. 46), and that "there is faith in nothing, neither in God nor man" (p. 19); but the volume as a whole offers an interesting interpretation of international relations during the past ten years.

An unusual contribution to the contemporary history of the Russian Revolution is made by Emma Goldman in *My Disillusionment in Russia* (New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923; xxii, 242 pp.). The disillusionment of the author might well have been anticipated, in view of her theoretical premises, that is, her sincere anarchism, the most extreme form of individualism amounting to a veritable worship of human personality. She found in Russia a régime built on the antithesis of this theory, submerging if not quite annihilating the human personality. What Miss Goldman witnessed in Russia was much worse than she expected; "it was grotesque, totally unlike the great ideal that had borne the author upon the crest of high hopes to this land of promise." Her narrative is the story of the gradual emergence, from the revolutionary outburst in 1917, of a new form of government that had all the attributes of autocracy, the total denial of personal freedom, the persecutions, tortures, exiles and executions. When she tries to substantiate her charges, however, the book is disappointing. The instances cited all seem trivial, and the scope of her vision is very limited.

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Slightly more encouraging is the view of Russia given in *Russia and Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1924; 162 pp.) by Dr. Fritjof Nansen. This distinguished observer was for some time the representative of the League of Nations in Russia and had many opportunities to examine the working of the Moscow government, though largely, as he admits, through the eyes and with the help of the Bolshevik commissars. Consequently the book is an exposition of their hopes and plans, which leave the reader with a sad impression of discouragement and disorganization, especially in regard to the economic development of Russia. The tragedy of the situation is the lack of capital, without which Russia cannot get on her feet again; and yet, up to the present, capital refuses to go in and start the exploitation of the wonderful natural resources of Russia. The reconstruction of her agricultural system, as Dr. Nansen points out, is another important factor in Russia's rehabilitation.

V. Th. Totomiantz, author of a small but interesting volume entitled *Histoire des doctrines économiques et sociales* (With a preface by Charles Rist. Paris, Marcel Giard, 1922; x, 238 pp.) is an exiled Russian; former professor at the University of Moscow, now professor at the University of Prague. To the American reader perhaps the chief interest in reading the book will lie in discovering what a Russian thinks about western-European economics—for, as Professor Rist points out in his preface, the author mentions not one Russian economist! The general scope is strikingly similar to that of the well-known history by Gide and Rist, perhaps the chief difference consisting of a concluding chapter on the modern cooperative movement, in which M. Gide's contribution to this subject is discussed at length. The distribution of emphasis is strikingly shown by a count of pages. On the Middle Ages, thirteen pages are given to economic conditions and institutions, eight lines to Thomas Aquinas and all of the remaining sixteen pages to Utopias and communist movements—More's *Utopia*, Thomas Münzer, John of Leyden and Campanella's *City of the Sun*. The total space given to the Classical School, the followers of the classical tradition and the Austrians amounts altogether to forty pages, while thirty-five are given to the modern coöperative movements alone, and if one groups this movement with the early associative (or "utopian") socialists and with Henry George, Carlyle, Ruskin and William Morris, the total is seventy-six pages, or nearly twice the space given to the more orthodox movements. Nineteen pages are devoted to Marxism, revisionism and syndicalism. It is plain that the author's heart is in the cooperative movement;

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everything else in his treatment appears to lead up to this as the final culmination of the whole procession of errors and half-truths. Such a high degree of condensation is required that there is a resulting tendency to state things without their contexts and qualifications. Thus Malthus's doctrine of the arithmetical and geometric ratios of increase of population appears in an even more rigid form than in Malthus's first edition. In presenting the theory of marginal utility, the author goes to some length to explain the fundamental fact of marginal determination of the importance of things, but hardly touches on the real complexities and difficulties of the relations between this concept and price. On the whole, the book is a remarkably successful effort at condensed and simple presentation, aided by that dominant interest which made it easier for the author to limit his material. The style is lucid and attractive, despite some curious spellings of English names, and the author's attitude, as it shows itself through the pages, has something very winning about it. His mind is fixed so definitely on a social goal far removed from modern commercialism, yet he is so tolerant of past and present. The reader is left to surmise what depth of personal experience lies behind the author's repeated insistence that love and not conflict is the way of economic salvation, but he cannot help concluding that here is a kind of spirit which Russia can ill afford to spare.

The German Revolution and After (New York, Thomas Seltzer, 1923; vi, 320 pp.) by Heinrich Ströbel, is a significant though somewhat one-sided addition to the modern history of Germany. It gives in full detail the history of German socialism and describes its fate in recent years. The narrative begins with an account of the tragic debates among the German Socialists at the outbreak of the war in 1914, when they were confronted so suddenly with the question of voting war-credits for the government. Here we can see the origins of the cleavage which hopelessly divided the Socialists, creating a Majority Party who followed the lead of David and fell an easy prey to nationalism and chauvinism. According to the author, the division of the Socialists into majority and minority groups, which persisted throughout the war and revolution, was the great, if not the sole source of the weakness of the Reich. A fair and impartial account of the revolutionary months of 1918-19 is presented, together with an interesting picture of the difficulties in both domestic and foreign affairs which confronted the Majority Socialist Government. Then follows a description of the activities of the Spartacists, influenced and encouraged as they were by their

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Bolshevist friends; a good characterization of their leaders, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Haase and others; and an exposition of their final failure, after they had come so near to possible success in the early months of 1919. In his last two chapters, dealing with more recent events, Ströbel once more stresses the internal disagreements that were constantly undermining the policies and activities of the Socialists.

The Institute of Politics of Williamstown has issued another of its interesting volumes, namely the lectures of Count Harry Kessler, under the title *Germany and Europe* (New Haven, The Yale Press, 1923; 150 pp.). The book is valuable because it gives in a clear and concise way the point of view of a sincere German liberal, who fervently hopes for peace in the world and for Germany's reentrance into the comity of nations. The six chapters of the volume correspond to the six lectures that the author gave at the Institute in the summer of 1923, except that the last one is somewhat expanded by the addition of new economic material concerning modern Germany. There are left in the volume traces of the conversational element, answers to other Williams speakers, controversial matter, etc., but on the whole this does not lessen the historical importance of the work. Of course there is some bitterness toward the French in general and Poincaré in particular; possibly one cannot expect a German to remain absolutely impartial in this question. Count Kessler goes over the "fruits" of war and peace and carefully analyzes the Versailles treaty and the Ruhr occupation. His conclusion is that Germany is a sick nation, "gripped by two mortal diseases, the destruction of its economic organism and the corruption of its currency" (p. 57). One could also add the moral element, the degradation and down-heartedness of the people, which are such a handicap to Germany to-day. But the author's greatest complaint concerns democracy. He says the Germans were told that their salvation depended on the democratization of their national institutions, but as soon as they started on the path of reform, they found themselves hampered by the policies of the Allies; Count Kessler considers that it was the French above all who prevented the growth of democracy in Germany. In his last chapter he also emphasizes the importance of good relations between Germany and Russia and tries to explain the origin and meaning of the treaty of Rapallo. He thinks that Rathenau, the father of that treaty, was prompted only by the desire for Germany's economic recovery; for the latter Germany is in urgent need of the Russian market (p. 138). A

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whole chapter is devoted to French security, so closely bound with the occupation of the Ruhr; the author censures the French for their sympathies with Germany's disruption and for their support of the separatist movements.

In spite of the tremendous economic loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars of wealth in the terrible disaster by earthquake, wave and fire that has overwhelmed the populous and prosperous cities of Yokohama and Tokio, the faith of the world in the future of Japan has not been shaken. Quotations of Japanese Government securities on the New York Stock Exchange faltered, fell a few points, and shortly recovered to practically the pre-disaster level. The causes of this confidence are not far to seek. Underlying the commercial prosperity of the Japanese nation, and constituting the ultimate basis of Japanese credit, are the small-scale, widely-dispersed industrial centers and the agricultural regions of the island hinterland, with their compact populations of industrious, courageous and persevering workers. These are the firm "foundations" of Japan's future. For four and a half years J. W. Robertson-Scott, author of *The Foundations of Japan* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1922; xxv, 446 pp.) traveled throughout rural Japan, living much of the time in the homes of the Japanese and making copious notes of what he saw and heard. These he has brought together into a coherent story of the people. Through his eyes we see the daily life of the town, the *cho,* and of the rural settlements in the *son.* He interprets for us manners and customs and points of view; and draws vivid pictures of the hard struggle to wring a living from the stony slopes, gutted by torrential rains; of the dreary life of the silk factory; of the patience and patriotism, the frugality and faithfulness of this remarkable people. Though in the main the author presents social rather than economic facts, he describes the economic organization, the methods of production and distribution, the development and conservation of resources, labor problems and the way in which they are handled. The book is one for the general student of Japan and the Japanese.

Thorstein Veblen has reprinted, without change, under the title *Engineers and the Price System* (New York, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1921; 169 pp.) the series of articles which appeared originally in the *Dial.* In them, in his characteristic style, he reviews what he considers the dominant tendencies of our present economic system. The conflict in interest between the business man seeking profits and consumers desiring goods is represented as though untempered by

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the desire for continuing mutually advantageous relations; the increasing importance of financial control with the expansion of corporate enterprise is made to appear the cause of the increased inefficiency and waste which the author believes he discovers in present methods of production; and the remedies, withdrawal of the instruments of production from their absentee owners and the substitution of production for service for production for profits, are made to seem highly attractive, even if not exactly easy of accomplishment. One wonders whether, while formulating his highly individual, not to say jaundiced, views in reference to our economic situation, Mr. Veblen has felt the enthusiasm which logic would seem to demand over the results of the Russian experiment in expropriating the absentee owners of Russian capital and suppressing production for profit.

Some Aspects of Recent British Economics (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1923; 134 pp.) is a reprint of four informing articles which first appeared in the *Journal of Political Economy* and which were written by John A. Hobson, D. H. Macgregor and Reginald Lennard. Particularly suggestive are Hobson's "Britain's Economic Outlook in Europe" and Macgregor's "British Aspects of Unemployment". While both writers recognize the gravity of Britain's economic situation, they appear to believe that the much-needed reconstruction of the country's industries and enhancement of the productive power of its wage-earners may gradually be brought about through the vigorous prosecution of the constructive measures which they advocate.

That the experiences of Germany with her paper mark have led to animated discussion of the whole subject of money in that country is not to be wondered at. Naturally enough the main point of interest has been the theory of money value. For years the so-called *Staatliche Theorie* of Knapp has held the field in Germany. But some of the other theories of money value have also attracted attention. Two German studies give one a good idea of the development of German theoretical discussion since Knapp's time. One is the historical study by Doctor Herbert Döring called *Die Geldtheorien seit Knapp* (Greifswald, L. Bamberg, 1922; viii, 281 pp.). This constitutes simply an historical analysis. A somewhat livelier study from another point of view is that of Doctor Melchior Palyi called *Der Streit um die Staatliche Theorie des Geldes* (Munich and Leipzig, Dunker and Humblot, 1922; 95 pp.). This is a discussion of the criticisms that have been brought against Knapp's legalistic

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theory by other German writers. In both these books the discussion is pretty well limited to Germany and not much attention is given to writers in other countries; for example, no mention is made in either work of B. M. Anderson, Jr.'s important study, *The Value of Money*.

The difficulties and needed reforms of the German monetary situation are set forth in two interesting booklets. One is by Doctor Richard Kerschagl entitled *Die Geldprobleme von heute* (Munich and Leipzig, Duncker and Humblot, 1922; 87 pp.). The other booklet is by the well-known writer and financier Dr. Friedrich Bendixen, *Das Wesen des Geldes* (Munich and Leipzig, Duncker and Humblot, 1922; 91 pp.). Dr. Bendixen has written on the same subject before. Both authors are concerned with the distress brought about by inflation and the need for a scientific reordering of the monetary system if something like normal economic relations are again to be restored.

The vigor and success with which Czechoslovakia attacked the difficult problem of finances during the first year of its history has aroused the interest of students all over the world. A careful study of this period of Czechoslovakia's financial history has been made by Dr. Alois Rasin under the title of *Financial Policy of Czecho-Slovakia During the First Year of its History* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923; xvi, 155, 10 pp.). The currency question in connection with domestic banking and with international exchange, as well as the question of taxation, is fully discussed by Dr. Rasin. He also gives a full account of various other economic measures that the new government took in connection with the reorganization of corporations, with the stock exchange and with the housing problem. The story as a whole is a stimulating one. Dr. Rasin's study is one of the series on the Economic and Social History of the World War published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It is a worthy member of a distinguished group.

The price movement of silver during the World War was so pronounced that a study of the forces affecting it during this period is of interest and importance. Such a study has been made by M. André Pailhas in *L'Argent-métal, la Hausse des Cours de 1914 à 1920* (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1922; 196 pp.). Doctor Pailhas goes carefully into the subject of the production of silver during the period of his study as well as into the demand for it that grew up particularly in connection with the Eastern exchanges. He sets forth the conditions which led to the

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adoption of the Pittman Act by the United States Congress, and he also describes the effects of that act. He seems to have no great hope for silver so far as its future monetary use is concerned.

The business cycle has during the last few years attracted the attention of a widening circle of students as well as of business men. It will be of interest to American students, therefore, to learn that the Russian economist, Mentor Bouniatian, has revised and brought down to date his *Les Crises économiques* (Paris, Marcel Giard, 1922; xvii, 288 pp.). The new study is available in French, translation having been made by J. Bernard.

The terms inflation and deflation, heretofore largely confined to scientific discussion, have become commonplace. Discussions of the subject have also recently multiplied. A somewhat specialized study in this field is that of Professor Charles Rist called *La Déflation en pratique* (Paris, Marcel Giard, 1924; 172 pp.). Professor Rist studies deflation primarily as a process of withdrawing credit from governmental uses, for which uses the original inflation was undertaken. His study is confined to four countries, England, United States, France, and Czechoslovakia. Despite the rather limited view that it takes of deflation, Professor Rist's study, so far as it goes, is of marked interest and value for comparative purposes.

Before the war attempts were made on the continent of Europe to develop the deposit and check system in order to reduce the dependence upon note issue that has so long characterized European banking. This effort was intensified after the war, due to the inflationary difficulties that accompanied post-armistice finance. Increased attention has, in consequence, been given to the study of the check as an instrument of payment in commerce. A very useful book which has recently appeared is the study by Professor Petre Trisca, *Le Chèque, son Internationalisation et son Risque Professionnel* (Paris, Marcel Giard, 1922; 290 pp.). This study begins with the discussion at the Hague Conference in 1912, and the position of the check in the law of the principal countries is carefully set forth. In a series of *Annexes,* the author summarizes the law for each country. The study will prove of interest to students of banking whether as legal specialists or as general economic students.

A very popular beginning text on money and banking has been that of Dr. John Thom Holdsworth. A new edition of his *Money and Banking* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1923; 564 pp.) has recently made its appearance. This edition, which is the fourth, follows in general those which preceded it, but brings down

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to date all the factual material. Furthermore, because of additional experience with it, there is some modification of the discussion of the Federal Reserve System, and attention is also given to land banking and similar developments that have arisen in this country during the last few years. The style is as readable and engaging as before, and the new edition will doubtless enjoy the same popularity that has been accorded to the earlier editions.

French scholars have traditionally interested themselves in administration from the point of view of *droit administratif* and have almost entirely neglected the managerial phase which in recent years has loomed so large in America. One of the first French contributions in the field of efficiency engineering is M. Henri Fayol's *Administration industrielle et générale* (Paris, Dunod, 1920; 174 pp.). The book has a practical purpose, to emphasize the need for and possibility of formal instruction in administration as a preparation for a managerial career in either state or industry. This guiding motive leads M. Fayol to develop the foundation of the theory of administration as the substance of what should be taught to young engineers who necessarily must concern themselves also with administration. All operations which arise from the conduct of enterprises, public or private, are included in six groups — technical operations (production), commercial operations (purchase and sale), financial operations (supply of funds), security operations (protection of property and persons), accounting operations (statistics), and administrative operations. Administration means specifically to plan (*prévoir*), to organize, to command, to coordinate and to control. M. Fayol condemns the lack of good planning in the French government and traces the troubles to ministerial instability. *"L'instabilité ministérielle est une plaie pour le pays."*

Secondary school teachers have been asking for a book which would give, in simple form, intimate glimpses of the life of the people in the Middle Ages. The task of building up and simplifying the story of social life in the thirteenth century is by no means easy, and one who essays it lays himself open to a wide range of criticism. Professor William Stearns Davis has already shown himself a man of courage, both in the wide diversity of the problems which he attacks and in his apparent willingness to face the critics, and on the whole in his last venture, *Life on a mediæval barony: a picture of a typical feudal community in the thirteenth century* (New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1923; xi, 414 pp.), he has given a good account of himself. There is depicted, in con-

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crete fashion, the life of the noble—in peace and in war, of the peasant, of the townsman, of the priest and the monk. The story is well enough written and simply enough told to hold the attention of the general reader or beginning student; the book is not for the specialist. Professor Davis makes no pretense of any but the more general familiarity with source materials, but he has chosen good guides and followed them with apparent conscientiousness. There is much in detail to which exception might be taken, but this is not the sort of a book to be criticized in detail. If it be asked whether or not the ensemble of the picture is just, the answer must be that the canvas is less good of the monk and the craftsman than of the knight and the bishop. The author has hardly caught the spirit of medieval monasticism nor has he read himself deeply enough into the life of the towns of the early thirteenth century. One is startled, too, to find cropping up again, though in mild form, the myth of the year 1000 (p. 288 *et seq.*).

It seems curious that relatively so little has been written in English upon so important an aspect of European history as the crusades. Such general surveys as we have can scarcely be pronounced satisfactory from the point of view of modern scholarship. A real service has, therefore, been rendered in making more readily available through a reprint the capital article by Ernest Barker in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* under the caption *The Crusades* (London, Oxford University Press, 1923; 112 pp.). It is a pity, however, that Mr. Barker had not the time or interest to expand and lighten the article somewhat. Much material is crowded into all too few pages; the book makes heavy going for the average reader who comes to it with only a general notion of the crusading movement.

Keenly analytical and charmingly told is the story of *The Rise of the Universities* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1923; ix, 134 pp.), the substance of the Culver Lectures delivered at Brown University by Professor C. H. Haskins. It is a brief summary comprising three lectures—on the rise of the universities, the professor and the student, respectively; but it is remarkable how much of suggestiveness has been packed within these few pages. Quite the most interesting, because there the author seems to have put most of his own research, are the few pages at the end of the chapter on the professor, in which the troubled question of academic freedom is discussed (pp. 69-78), and the final chapter on the student. As to the first question, the author finds that "in law, in medicine, in grammar, in mathemaics, men were normally free to

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lecture and dispute as they would. . . . Even within the more carefully-guarded field of theology and philosophy, it is doubtful whether many found themselves cramped." He has found no instance where a "mediæval professor was condemned for preaching free trade or free silver or socialism or non-resistance." The most interesting materials for a picture of student life are drawn from their own letters and from the conversational dictionaries prepared for their use. This little volume forms a welcome addition to our literature on the medieval university.

A term in the New York State Legislature, where he was forced to endure the ebullitions of prohibition lobbyists, led Hoffman Nickerson to cast about for a "historical precedent in the way of religio-political oppression on so vast a scale." The result is *The Inquisition: a Political and Military Study of its Establishment,* with a preface by Hilaire Belloc (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923; xvii, 258 pp.), in the writing of which the author apparently attempted to relieve his pent-up emotions. To most the linking of the two movements will seem at least novel, and to some it may even imply something of an insult to the Holy Office, but happily the author himself forgets the marriage except for a few pages at the beginning and at the end of the book. The bulk of the work is devoted to the story of the Albigensian Crusade. For this portion the author has done considerable reading and he has familiarized himself with the topography of the land where the bitter drama was played. Where the interest of the plot grips him and entices him to forget his "interpretation" and his rôle of moralizer, the book is written with intimacy, clarity and considerable charm, though it is at times diffuse and repetitious. This substantial portion of the work is preceded by a brief summary in which are traced and interpreted the main currents in the history of the early Middle Ages. Hoary old myths that have been peacefully reposing in their graves for a generation are dug up to be unhorsed by this modern Don Quixote. In the Epilogue the author gives us his philosophy of history. The Protestant revolt substituted for a well-considered Christian ethic a system of taboos. Hence the infringement upon individual liberty, the crowning exhibition of which is the eighteenth amendment. The book is entertaining, but must be classed with the growing literature wherein history is "interpreted" in terms of spite.

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